THE GEOPOLITICS OF DISTANT SUFFERING: U. S. GOVERNMENT AND FAITH-BASED RESPONSES TO "GENOCIDE" IN SUDAN

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FOR

MARIA AND ADA

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ABSTRACT

Building on the work of Giorgio Agamben and Michel Foucault, this dissertation addresses how the sovereign's command over life intersects with contemporary global governmentality. Particular attention is given to the geographically sedimented normative dimensions entailed in this intersection. Two broad questions emerge from this focus: 1) How are the perceived and actual boundaries of U.S. responsibility for distant (non-national) life formed; and 2) How do emotional sentiments of care and concern within the U.S. populace for distant life impact the sovereign's geopolitical calculations.

The case of Sudan, especially Darfur, is utilized to help illuminate these questions. With regard to sovereign power, I analyze the Darfur related discourse being produced by the U.S. executive. I argue that this discourse is part of a bio-normative geopolitics aimed at maintaining the U.S. claim on the valuation of global life, while at the same time challenging the privileged status of the concept of genocide within our contemporary global governmentality. With regard to the societal constitution of global governmentality, I investigate two partially overlapping cases, one on the globally focused Christian Right and the other on the faith based movement to "save Darfur".

In the former case, I consider how norms, values, and feelings of care contribute to the facilitation and construction of geographical knowledge, which, in turn, helps to inform particular engagements with the space of Sudan. In the latter case, the question of caring for distant others is taken up from the perspective of the recent work of Giorgio Agamben, who ultimately posits the inherent need to circumvent sovereign power within any form of normative activism. Addressing this problem, I suggest the possibility of

establishing alternative communities of care, which are not only grounded on a recognition of our global intersubjectivity, but also on our common predicament in the face of a universally prevalent sovereign power.

INTRODUCTION

The underlying focus of this dissertation concerns the positionality of human life within the spatially articulated relation between sovereign power and governmentality at the global level. Ultimately, this is a focus that juxtaposes the work of Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben who both theorize the power dynamics involved in the discursive and material management and control of life. Whereas Foucault emphasizes an emergent and diffuse form of power in his conceptualization of governmentality, Agamben stresses a sovereign power that is grounded in the human decision to call a state of exception. Furthermore, whereas governmentality is focused on the control and regulation of life, sovereign power is the power to take life, or, more specifically, to allow life to be taken. In this dissertation, I seek a middle way between the extremes of these two concepts. I take seriously Agamben's depiction of sovereign power as intimately linked to the command over life, yet I also maintain Foucault's view that sovereign power must be seen as infused with a governmentality that, in the end, transcends it.

In *Paper A*, entitled "Bio-Normative Geopolitics: The U.S. and the Darfur Crisis in Sudan" (Appendix A), I employ an Agambian-Foucauldian approach to theorize the global spatiality of power. More specifically, I probe the ways sovereign power's embeddedness within a normatively laden global governmentality influences this spatiality. In *Paper B*, entitled "Norms, Geography and the Globally Focused Christian Right" (Appendix B), I consider the role that norms and values play in shaping the global government of life. I pay particular attention to how ethical convictions and feelings mold geographical information, which, in turn, affects the transnational practices of both

state and non-state actors. In *Paper C*, entitled "Caring For Distant Victims of Political Violence: Agamben and the Faith-Based Movement to Save Darfur" (Appendix C), the question of caring for distant and foreign others is taken up from an Agambian perspective, which posits the inherent need to circumvent sovereign power within any form of normative activism. I address this issue directly by asking how, if at all, an ethics of care can be developed that works to liberate global human life from the throes of oppressive sovereign power.

Governmentality

To enlighten these concerns and to explicate their significance, I first turn to the work of Michel Foucault who developed the concept of governmentality as a direct response to theories of power that centered on the sovereign. The conceptualization of governmentality was part of a larger project aimed at understanding more than the negative, juridical power of obedience. Instead, Foucault wanted to explore the subtle and constructive forms of power involved in actually shaping subjectivities. With governmentality, in particular, the focus falls on how subjectivities are formed and lived through rationalizations of the "art of government." In this sense, governmentality can be seen as a rationality focused on how to control, regulate, and direct the self and the population. However, governmentality also entails the specific discourses and practices – the technologies – that are involved in shaping the actual interpretation and implementation of this rationality. Governmentality must thus be considered a unique and relatively recent nexus of norms, discourses, and techniques, which forms the execution of government, at both the micro and macro level.

It is important to note that the concept of governmentality is not posited as a replacement to the other forms of power that Foucault addressed, such as sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopolitical power. Governmentality is, instead, conceived as a supplementary configuration of forces that ultimately help to illuminate the dynamics of these other forms of power. Following Foucault, then, sovereign power, which is seen as a fundamentally juridical power that demands obedience and wields the threat of death, decreased in importance after the Middle Ages at which time there developed a more decentralized regime of disciplinary power. Disciplinary power, on the other hand, is characterized by localized sites such as the clinic, the prison, and the school, where individuals are categorized, controlled, and formed according to specific knowledge regimes. Even later, however, with the “discovery” of both the political economy and the population as entities to know and manipulate, there appeared what Foucault called biopower. This power is concerned solely with the government of living human beings and is associated with the emergent focus in the 19th century on issues of health, sanitation, birth rates, longevity and race.

According to Foucault, the dawn of biopower harkened a fundamental switch in power regimes in which "the ancient right to *take* life or *let* live," associated with sovereign power was largely replaced by the "power to *foster* life or *disallow* it to the point of death" (Foucault 1998: 138). In other words, the preeminence of sovereign power, along with the subsequent rationality centered on maintaining and consolidating sovereign power over a particular territory, gave way to a rationality of rule that was much more concerned with the “correct disposition of things”. To help explain this extraordinary shift from negative sovereign power to positive biopower Foucault resorted

to the concept of governmentality. Governmentality can here be seen as functioning as a type of meta-rationality, with subsequent regimes of practices, that undergirds the specific nature of and relation between sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower. Importantly, the regulating power of governmentality must therefore be recognized as superseding the state apparatus. In fact, as can be discerned from Foucault's genealogy of governmentality, which he traced through the popular critiques of Machiavelli in the 16th century, governmentality emerges from the discourses and practices at play within the populace at large. In other words, it is not from the sovereign's will, but rather from society more generally that the aim of the correct disposition of things is pondered, negotiated, and internalized.

It is this general understanding of governmentality, as an emergent, direction-giving force, that I ultimately consider the *form* of governmentality. It is also possible, however, to specify a particular *content* of governmentality. Foucault and subsequent governmentality scholars have thus generally homed in on liberalism and neo-liberalism as the basic content of our current governmentality. Emphasis has thus been placed on the discourses and regimes of practices that emanate from and, in turn, sustain the belief in the optimizing potential of a self-regulating market. In this sense, liberalism served as a response to the inefficiency of the disciplinary power identified by Foucault. As opposed to the strict panoptic control and regulation sought by the disciplinary *polizeiwissenschaften*, for example, liberal governmentality sought to put an increasing check on state-sovereign power, while at the same time striving to foster and establish firm self-disciplining regimes within the population.

It was ultimately this liberal core within governmentality that led Foucault to address the connection between power and freedom, that is, the conception of how power can be diffused to such an extent that its enactment is executed in and through each and every individual human body. In this sense, sovereign power is seen to become increasingly diluted and fragmented. Geographically, power can therefore be conceptualized as moving away from centralized spaces that seek to concretely categorize and control individuals towards one that is diffused across shifting, haphazard spaces, increasingly produced and reproduced within the individual. Gilles Deleuze (1992) who was an avid proponent of this aspect of Foucault's work, ultimately saw this shift from sovereign power to immanent micro powers as a fundamental abandonment of the dualistic distinction between the governor and the governed.

Governmentality and Geography

Over the past two decades there has been a steady engagement within geography with Foucault's work. This engagement can roughly be divided into three categories. The first category, which was also the first to emerge, focused primarily on Foucault's conceptualization of disciplinary power. This work tended to emphasize a relatively concrete power that lay behind specific spaces and places intended to organize and shape individuals and populations for particular purposes (see, for example, Driver 1985; 1993; Hannah 1997; Pallot 2005; Soja 1989). The second category has addressed the "nondisciplinary" aspects of power suggested in Foucault's later work, which finds expression in diffuse, multilayered, and "aleatory" spaces and spacings of power (for example, Agnew and Coleman 2007; O'Tuathail 1996; Philo 1992; Sharp, Routledge,

Philo & Paddison 2000; Herod, O'Tuathail & Roberts 1998). Finally, there is a set of articles, which overlaps in significant ways with the first two categories, that has directly addressed the issue of geography and governmentality (Barnett 2001; 2005a; Blake 1999; Braun 2000; Crampton 2003; Hannah 2000; Lawson 2003; Luke 1996; Mackinnon 2000; Moon and Brown 2000; O'Tuathail 1996; Raco 2003; Watts 2003).

The geographical work on governmentality, following a recent review by Rose-Redwood (2006), has in different ways attempted to work through geography's intimate connection to specific regimes of government, either as an essential contributing factor to such regimes (Blomely and Sommers 1999; Crampton 2003; Hannah 2000; Rose-Redwood 2006) or as a consequence of such regimes (MacKinnon 2000; Murdoch and Ward 1997). Rose-Redwood (2006) emphasizes the former of these approaches by stressing the importance of geo-power, that is, the power to make and shape spaces and places, for biopower, which is an integral element of any governmentality regime. Yet one aspect of governmentality that Rose-Redwood mostly ignores concerns its transnational dimensions, that is, how transnational forms of geographical knowledge, techniques, and norms come to shape rationalities and practices of global governance, and vice versa. The papers of this dissertation ultimately take up and comment on such a globally focused form of governmentality.

The global applicability of governmentality is not completely novel in the field of geography, however. For example, the concept of governmentality played a significant role in the development of the nascent field of critical geopolitics Thus when Rose-Redwood argues that geographers "have so much to offer to the analysis of governmentality" because "geographical knowledge and the ordering of space have been

at the heart of governmental rationality from its very inception," (2006: 480) it should be recognized that this is precisely what scholars in the field of critical geopolitics have been asserting all along, except with regard to the governmental rationality inherent in foreign affairs (see for example Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Dodds 2000; Dodds and Sidaway 1994; O'Tuathail 1996; 2000; O'Tuathail and Dalby 1998). To my knowledge, O'Tuathail (1996) was the first geographer to challenge Foucault's shift away from the importance of territory in his conceptualization of governmentality. In this way, O'Tuathail endeavored to maintain the epistemological approach offered in the theorization of governmentality while at the same time shifting the focus more concretely to geography. The contemporary field of critical geopolitics may thus only infrequently incorporate the term "governmentality" in its literature, yet it nevertheless shares a basic affinity with this conceptualization by considering how the production of discourses, knowledge, and technologies shape rationalities and practices of government – in this case the government of global space.

Yet exactly how the government of global space is to be theorized is not unanimously agreed upon. I identify two divergent approaches. One approach has been to remain steadfastly centered on the nation-state. In other words, despite the globalization of cultural and economic flows, the governing of global space is still seen to be occurring primarily within the framework of a Westphalian system of clearly delimited, independent, and competing nation states.[1] It should be noted that, following Foucault, it was ultimately the creation of distinct spaces of sovereign responsibility as established through the Westphalian order, that contributed to the emergence of governmentality in

[1] For example, a large percentage of articles published in the journal *Geopolitics* focus on the geopolitical calculations of a particular state vis-à-vis other states. These calculations, in turn, are generally seen to be aimed at benefiting this particular state, or elements within this state.

the first place. [2] In other words, the dispositional character of governmentality was originally conceived of as being inherently focused on a territorially delimited political community.

A second approach to the government of global space has attempted to dissociate itself from the confining starting point of an internally looking nation-state. More than a decade ago, Agnew (1994) already warned of the "territorial trap", which refers to the outdated spatial imaginary in which nation-states and their sovereignty are seen to be essentially grounded on a clearly defined territory. Following Agnew, this territory, furthermore, is then falsely seen to establish a clear distinction between an ordered domestic space, containing a naturally given society, and an external, disconnected and often antagonistic foreign space.

Since Agnew's critique, there have been a number of theorizations of the global spatiality of power that have attempted to circumvent the primacy of the nation-state (Agnew 2005; Glassman 1999; Herod, Ó Tuathail & Roberts 1998; Hudson 1998; Larner and Walter 2003; Luke 1996; Newman 1999; O'Tuathail 1996; 1999; 2000; O'Tuathail & Luke 1994,). In his work *Hegemony: The New Shape of Global Power*, for example, Agnew (2005) argues that there are overlapping ascending and descending spatialities of global power. Thus, the Westphalian territoriality, which is centered on the nation state, is seen to have reached its peak in the mid 19th century and is now strongly in decline. Agnew then posits the emergence of a territoriality based on a "hierarchical-network" model, characterized by cores and peripheries that are linked in a transnational network

[2] Mitchell Dean (1999), for example, extrapolating from Foucault's (1991) comments on the importance of diplomatic-military developments for the emergence of governmentality, closely links this emergence with the rise of distinctly defined and bounded independent sovereign states, which were first established through the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.

of resource flows and production centers. Currently, Agnew suggests that "the hierarchical-network model is ascendant," yet he then goes on to declare that there are "signs of the beginning of a trend toward an integrated 'world society' model" (2005: 47). This latter and still undeveloped model Agnew describes as "relatively unhierarchical", based on "sproutlike" connections between multiple actors that manage to integrate not only the economic but also the cultural and political world. Agnew thus leaves us with the idea of a gradual trajectory of overlapping organizations of power that ultimately culminate in what appears to be the superseding of sovereign power altogether through decentralized rhizomatic powers that emerge from within "world society" itself.[3]

I will return to the idea of such "headless" spatialities of power shortly. At this point I want to emphasize, however, that any global spatiality of power should, in the end, be seen as intimately connected to a specific form of global governmentality. This is a position that is expounded and then posited in the three papers of this dissertation. One constructive way to think about this connection between global governmentality and the global spatiality of power is offered by Barry Hindess (1998; 2000a; 2000b). Hindess, referring to the Westphalian delimitation of governmental responsibility within the distinct bounds of sovereign spatial entities, makes the point that such a (bio)political organization of global space, which can be traced back to the rethinking of European political space following the Thirty Years War, must in itself be seen as an act of governmentality. Based on this approach, I develop a definition of global governmentality as the rationality and practices entailed in the spatial organization of the

[3] This final stage recalls both a globalized form of liberal governmentality, associated with Deleuze's (1992) conception of control societies [also Hardt and Negri 2000], as well as a Marxist trajectory of global capitalism, in which a super-imperialism that has become global yet tweaked to benefit the United States gives way to an ultra-imperialism in which nation-states are ultimately overcome to allow the free flow of capital.

governmental responsibility for populations across the globe.[4] In this sense, the nation-state order and its biopolitical-geographic imaginary must be seen to reflect one among many possible global governmentalities. Following Agnew's depictions of the global spatiality of power, a "hierarchical-network" model or a "world society" model must, in turn, also be seen to be undergirded by respective regimes of global governmentality. I suggest that it is precisely such a global understanding of governmentality that is called for in order to bring Foucault's work on governmentality to bear on an analysis of the current global order.

Agamben

Before turning to how the papers of this dissertation endeavor to make this connection between global governmentality and the global spatiality of power, however, I want to first turn to Giorgio Agamben's outright critique of the non-disciplinary conceptualizations of power that characterize many post-Westphalian theories of the reigning world order alluded to earlier. In his privileging of the sovereign, Agamben presents a compelling theory of power that poses a direct challenge to the more decentered and emergent forms of power that were so popular in the 1990s and early 2000s. Due to recent events that seem to give special credibility to Agamben's work, and I will come to these events shortly, I believe it is worthwhile to take Agamben's insights seriously. In this sense, I want to consider what consequences Agamben's thinking has

[4] My definition is here in line with the broad understanding of global governmentality offered in the recent collection of works with the same title: Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces, edited by Larner and Walters (2004). In this work global governmentality is offered as "a heading for studies which problematize the constitution, and governance of spaces above, beyond, between and across states" (2). My particular contribution focuses precisely on the biopolitical constitution and governance of transnational spaces.

for an understanding of global governmentality, and vice versa, how the theorization of global governmentality may be used to modify some of Agamben's own work. This is an issue, which is directly addressed in *Paper A* and *C*, and which I consider to be of particular theoretical relevance at a time when there is a growing sensitivity to the realities of contemporary sovereign power.

In his most widely read work, *Homo Sacer*, Giorgio Agamben addresses Foucault head on by asking, "what is the point at which the voluntary servitude of individuals comes into contact with objective power?" (1998: 6). In other words, at what point is the rule through freedom inherent in conceptions of liberal governmentality confronted by an external sovereign power that nonetheless can intervene in this apparently self regulatory web of power? Agamben suggests that despite a pervasive rule through freedom that is suggested in Foucault's later work, the sovereign still maintains a capture of life itself, and along with it, a tenacious grasp on the ability to ban this life to the status of *homo sacer*, a human who has lost all forms of sovereign protection and who can thus be killed with impunity. Agamben thus focuses on the "objective power" that he believes to be inherent in Foucault's conceptualization of biopower, that is, the power which, "assumes and integrates the care and natural life of individuals into its very center" (1998: 5).

Agamben is here ultimately positing a sovereign power that has made the "care and natural life" of individuals indistinct from its own power, a development that coincides with an emerging distinction in western society between the human as a biological creature and the human as a meaningful, acting citizen. Agamben traces the roots of this distinction back to the ancient Greeks, who utilized the term *zoe* for pure biological life, and *bios* for the good life within a political community. Yet, for the Greeks, *zoe* was

more of a philosophical, general concept; it had no political significance. According to Agamben this apolitical understanding of life began to change with the Enlightenment when natural life was increasingly made the center of political attention. Thus, the development of democracy, for example, did not bring an end to the conceptualization of *zoe*, as could perhaps be expected with the expansion of citizenship rights. Instead, democracy was sedimented, via the Magna Carta and Habeas Corpus, precisely in the physical body of the human. In this sense, Agamben suggests, *zoe* was, in fact, shattered and disseminated into every individual body, as the body became the ultimate ground for rights claims.

Following Agamben, the politicization of *zoe* was a hugely significant development. In his words: "the inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original – if concealed – nucleus of sovereign power" (1998: 6). The reason why the politicization of bare life is so critical is that it places bare life into the legal realm and, following Agamben, it is the sovereign who, in the end, commands the legal sphere through its power to call a state of exception. In other words, the fact that bare life is inscribed in law, and that sovereign power commands this law, ultimately makes the sovereign the gatekeeper between the realms of bare life, or *zoe*, and the good life of the citizen, or *bios*. It is this gatekeeper role that, according to Agamben, captures the crux of the sovereign's power.

Following from this formulation, the sovereign can be expected to actively create both spaces of inclusion and exclusion, that is, spaces of the *nomos*, where law and order reign, and spaces of the exception, where life is banned to the status of *homo sacer*. What is critical for Agamben here is that these two realms are intimately intertwined and

mutually dependent. In other words, the authority of the sovereign, which enables the creation of a *nomos*, in which *bios* may thrive, must itself be grounded in a force, or a decision, that exceeds the law that it enforces. This raw power, or *auctoritas* as Agamben calls it, can only truly be actualized in the state of exception. In biopolitical terms this ultimately means that the sovereign's capture of life depends on the banning of life, of excepting life from the *nomos*.

Agamben and the Global Spatiality of Power

Agamben's theorization of sovereign power has garnered immense interest in recent years within the social sciences and has recently been fruitfully applied to geography as well (Gregory 2004a; 2004b; Long 2004; Pratt 2006; Secor 2007). This limited but valuable work has generally attempted to spatialize the "objective power" posited by Agamben, which is seen to maintain a critical grasp on determining the value and non-value of life. Emphasis has here generally fallen on spaces of the exception, where particular lives have been banned from the sovereignly-protected realm of *bios*. In this way geographers have, for example, focused on the exceptional spaces of the Palestinians in relation to Israel (Gregory 2004a), the Middle East in terms of the Unites States (Gregory 2004b), the Kurds in relation to Turkey (Secor 2007), and prostitutes in Vancouver, Canada (Pratt 2006).

Undoubtedly, a key factor for the increasing popularity of Agamben has to do with a reconsideration of the more diffuse, non-disciplinary forms of power associated with Foucault's later work. Yet, it should be noted that one of the key grounds for such a reconsideration lie in the geopolitical realm. As Matthew Sparke puts it:

> "If the new millennium began with much critical fanfare about the 'smooth', 'deterritorialized' and supposedly 'decentered' space of the Empire outlined by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), political geographers both inside and outside the discipline have increasingly been forced by events to try to come to terms with the violently recentered place of America . . . " (2004: 785).

The events that Sparke is referring to relate to the U.S. approach to the world following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Since these attacks the United States has fostered the conviction that the world is a fundamentally dangerous and risk-prone place (Coleman 2003; Dalby 2003). For the United States, the perceived absence of the security needed for a liberal global order has led to a switch in attention towards the transnational power to punish, thus resorting to what Foucault (1979) has termed the sovereign power of the sword. This trend towards an increased focus on coercive power is clearly demonstrated within U.S. state discourse and practice, commencing with the National Security Strategy published in (2002) and culminating in the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (also see Agnew 2003).

Surprisingly, however, there has been very little use of Agamben in the field of critical geopolitics to make sense of these developments. Two exceptions are Minca (2005) and Gregory (2004a; 2004b), who have pointed to the applicability of the concept of the state of exception to the U.S. War on Terror. In this work, the emphasis is fixed on the sovereign's power to call a state of exception within a delimited transnational space, where life is ultimately banned to the status of *homos sacer*. Yet beyond these isolated

incorporations of Agamben's work, there has yet to emerge a coherent theorization of the spatiality of power that truly addresses the biopolitical dimensions suggested by Agamben. I consider this to be a major gap in the field of critical geopolitics, one which I redress in the papers of this dissertation, particularly in *Paper A.* In other words, if we are to take seriously Agamben's insightful suggestion that the valuation of life is at the core of sovereign power, then it behooves us to recognize that there is more to the transnationalization of power than economic, political, and military processes; there are also critical biopolitical decisions regarding the valuation and devaluation of life that require our careful attention.

In my view, such attention, however, must also move beyond considerations of how the sovereign manages to ban life beyond state borders to include considerations of how such life is captured to begin with. When such a concern is applied to the current global predicament a question that comes to the fore is how the United States has worked to articulate its expanded transnational power to call a state of exception with efforts to maintain a global capture of life. *Paper A* directly addresses this question by examining the actual, spatially sedimented relation between the sovereign's power to condemn and the sovereign's power to protect life at the transnational level. More specifically this paper considers the role that the U.S. response to foreign events such as genocide and ethnic cleansing play with regard to maintaining its self-imposed status as a global biopolitical hegemon, that is, its status as a global gatekeeper between *bios* and *zoe*.

Whereas *Paper A* presents a significant contribution to an Agambian inspired theory of the spatiality of global power, I want to point out that it also offers a significant departure from Agamben's thought. This departure is centered on Agamben's position

that sovereign power inevitably tends towards, and ultimately establishes, a permanent state of exception. What Agamben (2005) means by a permanent state of exception is a state of affairs in which sovereign power has lost all reference to an internal space within which a *nomos* can be seen to reign.[5] At this point, and it is a point that Agamben suggests we are quickly approaching, the sovereign and law become indistinct across all space; that is to say, the sovereign's will becomes law.[6] Such a development, it should be noted, would also mean an end to any form of governmentality, since power has now become detached from any external forms of direction and legitimation.

It is precisely here that I propose a needed intervention in Agamben's work. Thus, just as the fascination with diffuse, non-disciplinary power seems to have led to an exaggeration of its explanatory capacity in the late 1990s and early 2000s, so too is there a danger of over-privileging sovereign power today. Opposed to Agamben's suggestion that sovereign power inevitably divorces itself from any external limitations, culminating in a permanent state of exception, I therefore contend that sovereign power is in fact deeply entangled in the discourses and practices that constitute the prevailing global governmentality. What this global governmentality actually consists of, I believe, requires further investigation, of which *Paper B* and *C* are partial contributions. In general, however, building on the work of Carl Schmitt (2003), I suggest that there is a critical normative aspect to global governmentality that is inherently universalist in outlook. In other words, there is an ideal of establishing a functioning, *bios*-fostering *nomos* across all space.

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[5] Agamben, in turn, derives the concept of the permanent state of exception from Walter Benjamin (1997) "Critique of Violence."

[6] A good example of this is when the famous war criminal Adolf Eichmann repeatedly claimed in his defense: the Führer's words had the force of law (Arendt 1964).

Although such an "idealism" came most clearly to the fore in the heyday of Wilsonianism following WWI, I contend that it has comprised an integral part of global governmentality ever since the U.S. rise to global preeminence (see for example Rasch 2003; O'Tuathail 2002). Thus, in contradistinction to past world orders in which disconnected zones of the *nomos* and the exception were permitted to exist side by side (see Schmitt 2003; also Rasch 2003), a global governmentality that is deeply influenced by universalist norms ultimately leads to a view that any exceptionality is inherently problematic. It is, in this sense, that William Rasch, for example, insists that a U.S. hegemony "challenges us to imagine a total exceptionless inclusion . . . with no enabling exclusion" (2003: 130). What this ultimately means is that in our current global governmentality, the state of exception can only be tolerated temporarily and only if this exception is recognized to be serving the purpose of eventually establishing a reigning *nomos* in this space.

In this sense I ultimately resort to a form of Gramsci's concept of hegemony. I suggest that sovereign power is seeking a consensus from the populace that is grounded in the bio-normative content of global governmentality – it is ultimately this consensus that ensures the sovereign's hegemonic reign. Failing to establish such a hegemony would cast doubt on the sovereign's power and the legitimacy of the exceptions called forth by the sovereign. In Gramscian terms this would force the sovereign to resort to coercion in order to maintain power. From a Foucauldian-Agambian perspective, however, such a faltering hegemony would be characterized by a collapse of governmentality regimes and the emergence of what Agamben calls *auctoritas*, a raw power that is not just characterized by its coercive force but by the fact that this power is

completely unbound by any law outside of the will of the sovereign. Agamben tends to promote a vision in which such a non-hegemonic reign, in the form of a permanent state of exception, is upon us, largely, I believe, because Agamben holds to the idea that a mass recognition of such a permanent exceptionality offers the key to a final liberation from the throes of sovereign power as such.

Yet, it is my contention that it is precisely this threat that is recognized and actively counteracted by the sovereign. For this reason it is my disputation that the sovereign has little incentive to suspend the *nomos* unnecessarily, let alone to do so indefinitely. Quite the contrary, the sovereign appears to be at great pains to come across as being in the service of this governmentality. In this sense the United States has quite consciously framed its exceptional actions as temporary and in the service of a *nomos* to come. Failing this, the United States has tended to incorporate the exception into the *nomos* by altering the legal framework itself, thus paving the way for the exception to become a new norm, thereby suspending its exceptionality.[7] It is such maneuverings that I refer to as bio-normative geopolitics. In *Paper A,* I consider such bio-normative geopolitics in greater detail, viewing them ultimately as a coming together of sovereign power and global governmentality, which jointly give rise to a biopolitically laden, transnational spatiality of power.

[7] For example, the decision by the Supreme Court in "Rumsfeld vs. Hamdan", which concluded that military trials set up at Guantanamo Bay violate both U.S. law and the Geneva Conventions has been met by the Whitehouse's introduction of the "Military Commissions Act of 2006", which seeks to legalize the current juridical handling and treatment of detainees.

Transnational Solidarity

Whereas *Paper A* focuses on the calculations of sovereign power, *Paper B* and *C* turn to particular societal influences on global governmentality, although the concept of governmentality is not always explicitly addressed. Of particular interest in these latter two papers is how life and the responsibility for life, especially life beyond national boundaries, is conceptualized within particular portions of the populace and how this conception, in turn, feeds back into rationalities on the government of global populations and, subsequently, the execution of transnational sovereign power. A critical starting point for *Papers B* and *C* is thus the acceptance of global governmentality as an important meta-rationality for the carrying out of sovereign power. Yet at the same time, global governmentality is posited as diffuse and in tension, characterized by many forces pulling in separate directions. In *Paper B* and *C* I focus only on a small aspect of this complex play of forces, namely on the discourses and practices involved in the engagements of faith-based non-governmental organization and institutions in "foreign" spaces, particularly Sudan.

By accepting global governmentality as a critical meta-rationality that ultimately has deep implications for sovereign power, we obviously challenge Agamben's suggestion that sovereign power has an absolute monopoly on the valuation of life. Katharyne Mitchell (2006), for example, points to the need for recognizing that sovereign power must always be placed within a larger societal-political context where there is a continuous biopolitical struggle over the value and non-value of life. In this way, race, gender, and nationality, all play significant roles in determining the relation of power to

life. Put somewhat differently, these various cultural forces within society (race, gender, nationality) infuse governmental rationalities, which, in turn, help to mold sovereign power. It is precisely to such cultural factors that I wish to turn in enlightening global governmentality, except instead of homing in on constructed subjectivities such as race and gender, as Mitchell does, I want to focus on the internalized norms and values regulating the interaction and sense of responsibility between subjectivities.

It should be noted that a focus on the normative aspect of governmental rationalities is still relatively unexplored. This neglect is largely due to Foucault himself (1991) who consistently privileged the role of constructed knowledge and truth systems when theorizing the various apparatuses that help form regimes of governmentality. Yet, I want to suggest that the connection between truth/knowledge and governance is, in fact, saturated with ethical assumptions and ideals. This is a point that has been well made, for example, in the academic discourse within international relations known as constructivism (see O'Thuathail 2002 for a geopolitical incorporation of constructivist theory). Constructivists emphasize that all foreign policy is inherently normative (Kratochwil 1989; Katzenstein 1996; Onuf 1989; Wendt 1992). In this sense, the (a)moral world order posited by the dominant realist approach, that is, one that is based on national interests and power differentials, is not a given but is actually created by states, in which their moral assumptions and calculations are deeply implicated. It is thus not just a question of truth/knowledge regimes but also of the normativity that structures these regimes.

In his seminal work on governmentality, Dean (1999) acknowledges the normative content inherent in forms of governmentality, which he sees as being intimately linked to

underlying thoughts of an end goal toward which governance is oriented. Following Dean, such an end goal is inevitably utopian, consisting of an ethically grounded conception of a better world. Yet Dean also strikes a note of caution, warning the researcher not to consider the regimes of practices that constitute governmentality as direct expressions of values. Here Dean focuses on normativity as a rhetorical bolster of more fundamental regimes of truth/knowledge rather than as a possible explanans in and of itself. There is thus clearly a disconnect in Deans' presentation of values as, on the one hand, inherently part of the thought processes driving the rationality of governance and, on the other, as merely rhetorical add-ons to that rationality. Dean (1999: 34) vaguely concludes his discussion on values by stating, "Values, knowledge, techniques are all part of the mix of regimes of practices but none alone acts as guarantor of ultimate meaning." What is needed, then, is a more precise determination of how values, knowledge, and techniques interact to help form particular regimes of practices.

In line with constructivist theory, it is my contention that an understanding of global governmentality, and its role in helping to shape the spatiality of power across the world, will have to place much more attention on the values dimension of the three-way dynamic suggested by Dean. Relating this view more explicitly to geography, it can thus be asked how truth/knowledge constructions of, for example, place/territoriality are linked to specific normative regimes, and how these, in turn, interact to form a specific government of global life. I am particularly interested here in the normative regimes involved in the perceived responsibility and care for what are termed "distant others"(Chaterjee 2004; Green and Silk 2000; Lester 2002; Smith 1998; Silk 1998), or more specifically in the cases that I consider "foreign others".

The focus on foreign others, i.e. non-nationals, follows directly from a concern with global governmentality, which I defined above as being centered on "the spatial organization of the governmental responsibility for populations across the globe". In other words, I believe that the various internalized ethical responsibilities that are assumed for "foreign others" play directly into the normative rationales that are at work within global governmentality. An interesting question to consider here, and one that is directly addressed in *Paper B* and *C*, is how current normative frameworks are thus challenging the Westphalian delimitation of governmental responsibility for life and in what ways such challenges nonetheless incorporate forms of sovereign power into their calculations. I want to suggest that how sovereign power is here incorporated has direct implications for the unfolding of the global spatiality of power.

Currently there exists a limited body of work that specifically addresses the issue of how geographic constructions are intertwined with the formation and maintenance of ethical subjectivities (I am referring primarily to the work of Campbell 1998; 1999; Campbell and Shapiro 1999; Shapiro 1994; 1998; 1999; but precursor and variants of this approach can be found elsewhere, for example Slater 1997; and Popke 2003). This work explores the relationship between space, subjectivity, and ethics by bringing to the fore the 'radical entanglement between moral discourses and spatial imaginaries (Campbell and Shapiro 1999: ix).' The primary focus in this work is on how the prevailing conceptual structures of modernity, such as citizenship, territoriality, and sovereignty, constitute the lived, everyday perceptions of political space and thus ethical engagement. These conceptual structures, in turn, are seen to arise out of geo-strategic practices and discourses that are acting on and simultaneously reinforcing a realist paradigmatic model

of the world, which posits the existence of geographically delimited, self-interested sovereign states within an anarchic realm of potentially aggressive competition.

A critical point being made by Campbell and Shapiro is that the geographical imaginaries created by the practice of modern statecraft have become hegemonic; in other words, the conceptualization of a bounded national community in a world of similarly bounded communities has become part of everyday, taken for granted consciousness (see also Billig 1995; Knight 1982; Mountz 2003). Shapiro, for example, states that, "although the dominant geopolitical map appears uncontentious, it constitutes . . . a moral geography, a set of silent ethical assertions that preorganize explicit ethico-politico discourse" (1998: 482). In other words, the geopolitical map manages to delimit ethical concern because it places boundaries around communities of responsibility – in this case national communities. As Campbell and Shapiro (1999) write, moral spaces are "the bounded locations whose inhabitants acquire the privileges deriving from ethical inclusion" (ix). In this sense, the very concept of "distant other", must be seen as being already infused with the geographical imagining of a national community, since it is grounded on a taken for granted organization of space that automatically makes some people "other", "far away", and to some degree outside of the spatial reach of caring offered by a national community.

There are two critiques that can be made of Campbell and Shapiro's approach to the geography of ethics. For one, there is the danger of over-emphasizing a clear cut distinction between a "here" and a "there" as it is enshrined in the Westphalian order of demarcated states. As with some of the critical geopolitics literature, there appears to be a neglect of the increasingly global and interconnected world that an increasing number of

the world's population lives in. For an approach that is intentionally trying to deconstruct the preeminence of national boundaries within ethical rationalities, one would expect more attention to how transnational spaces are in fact perceived to be (and actually are) interconnected (see for example Appadurai 1997; Brah 1996; Carney and Voeks 2003; Cohen 1997; Crang, Dwyer, Jackson 2003; Gupta and Ferguson 1992; Jackson, Crang, Dwyer 2003; Ong 1999). I want to argue that a greater focus on transnationalism, as presented by the authors cited above, could help illustrate how, counter to the uncontested map suggested by Campbell and Shapiro, alternative maps of belonging and ethical concern are also frequently constructed and internalized. In *Papers B* and *C* I present two concrete cases in which such alternative maps, both mental and material, are fashioned and ultimately employed to direct transnational practices.

Another critique of Campbell's and Shapiro's work is that norms and values are treated purely as an explanans, something to be explained. It is my contention, however, as suggested earlier, that ethical regimes must also be considered as an explanandum, something that has explanatory power in and of itself. Thus, when looking at the literature on transnational solidarity (Cravey 2004; Desai 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005), for example, I suggest that we must not forget to focus on the actual people involved in this activism and their internal, mental, normative worlds. In this sense, I posit ethical regimes as complex emergent phenomena, which, once internalized by a group of people, can have a considerable influence on the construction of truth/knowledge systems. Thus, from a geographical perspective, norms and values must be seen as deeply implicated in how borders, places, and spaces of responsibility are understood and (re)constructed. This active role of ethical regimes is a prime focus in

Paper B. More specifically, the normative outlook of the globally focused Christian Right is analyzed with regard to the influence it has in creating specific geographical imaginaries and mappings of the world. It is my contention that this research ultimately aids our understanding of how particular ethical regimes help form global governmentality, which, in turn, provides the contextual background for the biopolitically laden, global spatiality of power.

Escaping Sovereign Power

If we accept ethical regimes as emergent phenomena that play an important role in shaping governmentality, then the conceptualization of universal human rights must be recognized as a critical normative construction within our current global governmentality. Human rights are undoubtedly one of the most important ethical concepts of the last two centuries and one that has served as an increasingly popular ground for transnational activism. The history of human rights is often traced back to an outgrowth of the natural law tradition during the Enlightenment, in other words, rights are posited as arising directly from the nature of being human. Karl Marx, among others, however, traced the emergence of rights back to the dawn of Christianity (See Marx 1978; Hamacher 2004).

By declaring itself independent of the concerns of the Roman Empire, Christianity sought to establish a spiritual community that offered an alternative to the strict boundaries of the reigning political community. According to Marx, the establishment of such an alternative community ultimately led to a fracturing of the political and social domains. Then, as the power of the sovereign state increased and as the Christian community became fractured the gap between the social and the political was politicized

in the form of a demand for negative civil rights, that is, juridically grounded rights that offer protection from sovereign state power.

From a Christian perspective the impetus for demanding such rights was to ensure the possibility of providing an alternative meaning system to that offered by the sovereign (Hamacher 2004).[8] Yet for Marx, as societies became increasingly secular, the Christian community was gradually replaced by an economically focused civil society, which was inherently individualistic, governed by a sense of man against man. In this sense, negative civil rights simply solidified the gap between political and social emancipation. In other words, people managed to gain political rights without gaining the right to a functioning community.

This Marxian trajectory of rights regimes actually coincides quite well with Agamben's understanding of how life has come to be monopolized by sovereign power. In other words, it is precisely the separation of the social and the political realms that led to the politicization of life itself. This politicization is then what called forth the *zoe-bios* distinction proposed by Agamben, placing the sovereign in the position of gatekeeper between these two realms. Yet, I want to suggest that the *zoe-bios* distinction also created a demand upon the sovereign to take up the role of provider of *bios*, as can be recognized in the many social movements that have demanded rights from their sovereign. In fact, I posit this insistence on the sovereign to become invested in the life of the populace to be the key normative content of our current global governmentality.

One trend within the normative content of global governmentality worth mentioning here, and one that is in line with the liberalist tendencies in governmentality more

[8] To be more specific it could be said an alternative is provided to an earthly sovereign. An argument could be made, in other words, that the earthly sovereign was instead replaced by a divine sovereign.

generally, is an increasing turn away from a focus on the actual fostering of life, often associated with the intensive biopolitical campaigns described by Foucault, and instead a privileging of the less ambitious aim of simply protecting life. In many ways, this reflects the normative outlook of a post-Auschwitzian ethics, which is fundamentally suspicious of the sovereign's biopolitical investment in life since such an investment ultimately serves as the grounds for the sovereign's excesses to begin with (see Dean 2002; Meister 2005). Instead, a post-Auschwitzian ethics demands, first and foremost, the protection of life from sovereign power. When internalized into the normative core of global governmentality, such an ethics leads to the utopian aim of a world in which all spaces are included in a protected *nomos*. It is ultimately such an ethics raised to the highest imperative that makes genocide, understood as the state sponsored extermination of particular groups, the definitive evil of our time.

Western based transnational social movements have acted within the global governmentality described above in various ways. In some instances, one can discern a resistance to the limited aim of protecting life where reference is often made to positive rights (also termed social, economic and cultural rights), such as the right to water or the right to work, which governmental powers are called upon to guarantee (see for example, Nelson and Dorsey 2003). More common, however, and in line with the current global governmentality, is the push for a meta-sovereign power to actually guarantee global life's protection against arbitrary, sovereign persecution. It should be noted that such an approach is also a critique of the liberal tendencies within global governmentality that have suggested the possibility of all nation-states becoming self-disciplined actors in line with global standards of good governance (see Lipschultz 2000; 2002). This ideal of self

regulation has been increasingly criticized in light of recurring, crass failures in the global government of life, as demonstrated most drastically by the ethnic cleansing campaigns in Bosnia in 1993-1995 and the genocide in Rwanda in 1994.

Agamben (1998), however, rejects both forms of social engagement presented above. For him, all "humanitarian" organizations that turn to the state to foster and protect life are in fact in collusion with the grander foundational logic of sovereign power (Agamben 1998). As Caldwell explains, "humanitarianism, speaking for the very life sovereignty grounds itself in, provides the justification for the 'exceptional' measures of sovereign powers" (2004: 31). In other words, the ethical regimes which push and enable sovereign power to take responsibility for life, often on a transnational level, are, in fact, being subsumed by the sovereign to give it even more power. Following Agamben, this is completely counterproductive since it is precisely the disempowerment, or even annihilation, of the sovereign that we must strive to achieve in order to find a true liberation from oppressive and dangerous power. Agamben's rigid stand here is directly related to his position that sovereign power will inescapably spiral towards global fascism, in which the exception becomes spatially all-pervasive and in which everyone is a potential target of the sovereign's violent will.

The solution that Agamben posits to such an analysis of sovereign power is a radical and typically poststructuralist focus on subjectivity and the need to free this subjectivity from any imposing external political determinations. In his work *The Coming Community*, Agamben (1993) describes life that breaks free from sovereign power as "whatever being", which is characterized by the fact that it has no particular characterization. For Agamben, the attainment of "whatever being" is the only way

towards a liberation from the politicization of life, which forms the basis of the power to ban life from law. Agamben's politics of liberation, however, turn out to be extremely atomistic, centered solely on the individual's enlightenment regarding the nature of sovereign power. In this sense, I suggest that Agamben's solution is, in the end, unrealistic since it seems to suggest that sovereign power can simply be willed away through individual effort.

In *Paper C*, as an alternative to Agamben's approach, I propose an answer to the problem of sovereign power that is based on the establishment of communities that consciously resists the gatekeeper role assumed by the sovereign. In other words, in line with Agamben, I suggest that a liberation from oppressive power must be based on a rejection of bare life as a valid concept altogether. However, I see this rejection as being effective only through a *solidarity* against the power that is ultimately responsible for maintaining the conceptualization of bare life to begin with. In many ways, this is a return to the impetus of early Christianity, that is, to establish a community that is independent of the concerns of empire. It is worth noting Slavoj Žižek (2000) here, who has adamantly stressed the liberatory and even revolutionary potential of Christian teachings. For Žižek (2000), true Christianity ultimately works to "unplug" subjectivities from the oppressive political order in which they are ensnared. Žižek writes that such unplugging is eventually grounded on "the active *work* of love which necessarily leads to the creation of an *alternative* community," (quoted in Cloke 200: 594. Italics in Žižek's original). From a more Agambian perspective we can think of these communities as

providing an alternative framework for the valuation of life, thereby circumventing, and partially incapacitating, sovereign power.[9]

Paper C is ultimately dedicated to developing an ethical framework that poses a direct resistance to the sovereign's innate power to ban life to the status of *homo sacer*. In this sense, it should be noted, that I also accept in broad terms the problematic character of rights ethics that Agamben points out. In other words, by grounding rights regimes in law, rights ethics ultimately accept the sovereign's gatekeeper role. Furthermore, by accepting this gatekeeper role, rights ethics, ironically, often succumb to an understanding of life as bare life, as a non-value until assigned one by the sovereign. The aim of establishing communities of resistance to sovereign power is therefore also a struggle against the current global governmentality, which is still steeped in a rights-based normativity. As an alternative to such rights-based ethics I ultimately turn to a feminist ethics of care (Clement 1996; Friedman 1993; Gilligan 1982; Held 1993; Tronto 1993), which I see as providing a basis for ethical concern and commitment that fundamentally evades the sovereign's power over life.

In feminist care ethics emotions and actions of empathy are seen to be more effective and realistic bases for grasping "ethical behavior" than the ontological grounds sought in the traditional philosophy of ethics (for geographical engagements with care ethics see Brown 2003; Haylett 2003; Lawson 2007; Massey 2004; McCormack 2003; McDowell 2004; 2003; Silk 1998; Smith 1998; Smith S. 2005; Staeheli 2003). As Friedman explains, "Care ethics raises caring, nurturing, and the maintenance of interpersonal

[9] It could here be argued that within the Christian community the political sovereign is simply replaced by a heavenly sovereign (God). Whereas this may be, the fact remains that within this vision of early Christianity an earthly sovereign is circumvented and that the valuation of life, at least here on earth, is executed through a mutually supportive alternative community.

relationships to the status of foundational moral importance (quoted in Smith 1998: 25)." However, as this quote indicates, the geographic scope of caring is left in a precarious position as interpersonal relationships are usually associated with more intimate local spaces and places. David Smith (1998) was one of the first geographers to take up this issue by asking how the more locally sedimented "care ethics" can be expanded to include moral responsibility for distant others. Smith (1998) ultimately finds guidance in the work of a number of virtue-ethics writers (Friedman 1991; Barry 1995; O'Neil 1996) who manage to reconcile the very local basis of caring, which is considered to be grounded in private space, and the need to take into account inequalities and suffering that are a part of public space. In many of these approaches caring at the local level provides the foundation for moral behavior, but this caring is then seen to be expandable through a process of outward projection, ultimately becoming global in scope (Robinson 1999).

Since David Smith's original analysis of this issue, there has been a good amount of geographical work to address the question of ethics and geographical reach. Whereas some geographers have limited themselves to the purely theoretical realm of moral theory (Barnett 2005b; Bridge 1999; Cloke 2002; Popke 2003; Sack 1997; Smith 1998; 2000) others have attempted to apply aspects of this theory to particular cases such as development aid (Corbridge 1993; 1994, Korf 2007; Silk 2004) and issues of ethical consumption (Barnett et al. 2005; Castree 2004; Friedberg 2004; Goodman 2004; Hudson and Hudson 2003; Miller 2001). There has, however, been only scant attention paid by geographers to the problems involved in caring for foreign strangers who are being persecuted by their own state, for example through genocide or ethnic cleansing (see

O'Tuathail 1999 for a partial exception). *Paper B* and *C* fills this lacuna by offering a unique focus on how transnational forms of solidarity can be formed in the face of such crises, with a particular emphasis on how forms of meta-sovereign power are perceived and engaged in this solidarity. Both of these papers offer a case based, geographical contribution to the ethics of care literature by analyzing how care among Christian advocates has developed for distant others in Sudan and in what ways this care has experienced particular limitations.

Conclusion

To sum up, this dissertation addresses a number of interrelated, geographically focused questions regarding sovereign power and global governmentality. The first question, addressed most directly in *Paper A*, concerns how sovereign power's relation to life is articulated in spatial terms at the global level. A critical aspect to the argument I develop in this paper is that sovereign power must be seen in relation to a broader, normative, global governmentality, which gives rise to what I call bio-normative geopolitics. Due to its specific focus on an Agambian biopolitics this paper offers an innovative approach to the relatively unexplored consideration of the role that the government of life plays within the global spatiality of power.

Paper B does not engage the term "governmentality", yet this paper can nevertheless be seen to address the role of normativity within the global government of life. The focus in this paper is specifically on how norms and values give rise to particular forms of geographic information, which, in turn, help to mold specific transnational regimes of

practices. Related to this, the relation between societal norms and the execution of transnational sovereign power is also explored.

Finally, given the challenge that Agamben's conceptualization of sovereign power offers, *Paper C* addresses how resistance and possible liberation from such power could be pursued. This is a valuable contribution in that it seeks an alternative to Agamben's extremely atomistic and essentially utopic solution to the problem of sovereign power by positing the possibility of establishing alternative communities of solidarity that avoid the sovereign's role as gatekeeper between *zoe* and *bios*. I argue that the basis for such alternative communities is best understood via an ethics of care, an approach that I also explore in *Paper B.* A specific addition I make to the ethics of care literature within geography is that I focus on the particular problems involved in caring for distant humans who have become the victims of genocide or ethnic cleansing, an issue that has thus far gone largely unaddressed.

PRESENT STUDY

The full arguments, outcomes, and conclusions of this study are presented in the three papers appended to this dissertation. The following is a summary of the methodology employed and the basic findings that emerged.

The Methodological Framework

Following the methodological underpinnings of a governmentality framework, this research embraces the importance of discourse in shaping the meanings that enable humans to make sense of and act in the world. Discourse is here understood as a regulated way of communicating that "defines and produces objects of knowledge, thereby governing the way topics are talked about and practices conducted (Barker and Galasinski 2001)". Based on the emphasis of this dissertation on the role of normativity within governmentality regimes, I would enhance the above definition to include the production of *objects of ethical concern* to the work done by discourse.

By focusing on the reality-forming power of discourse, the papers of this dissertation build on a methodological approach that is increasingly prevalent within the field of human geography. For example, the role of language in the formation and justification of economic spaces Barnes 1996; Gilbert 2005; Gibson-Graham 1996; Thrift 2000; 2001), social and political spaces (Andolina, Radcliffe and Laurie 2005; Gregory 1994; Martin 2003; Lawson 1999; Pratt 1999; Wright 2004) and geopolitical rationalities (Adams 2004; Dalby 1994; Dodds 2000; Hepple 1992; O'Tuathail 1992: 2002; O'Tuathail & Agnew 1992) have all received considerable attention. Discourse is here broken down into particular strands or

topics, which become intertwined and combined to form broader fields of knowledge and praxis (Jaeger 2001). These discursive agglomerations, in turn, can also be seen to form a reciprocally influencing relationship with the expansive practical reasoning inherent in governmentality (Lemke 2001; Walters and Haahr 2005). In this dissertation, the central focus, as spelled out in *Papers A, B,* and *C,* is to enlighten precisely how specific discursive agglomerations interact with the broader governmentality of global life. A particular focus within all three of these papers, furthermore, is on the role of sovereign power within this governmentality.

The first step in analyzing discourse is to identify the discursive plane or planes from which the discourse relevant to one's investigation is emanating. These planes are discursive spaces where communication on a particular issue is taking place. In this research, I have chosen to consider three distinctive discursive planes. The first plane is that of the U.S. executive branch, in which I emphasize the discourse emanating from the White House and the State Department concerning the Darfur crisis in Sudan. The second plane is that of the globally focused Christian Right (GCR), which entails a broad web of conservative Protestant institutions involved in the production of discourse pertaining to "foreign" spaces, generally from the perspective of a divinely proffered Christian ethics. The third plane, which partly overlaps with the second, consists of an eclectic group of religious denominations and organizations that have allied themselves under the banner of the Save Darfur Coalition, a largely faith-based coalition aimed at bringing an end to, or at lease alleviating, the Darfur crisis in Sudan.

Due to my interest in the rationality and practices entailed in the spatial organization of the governmental responsibility for populations across the globe, i.e. global governmentality, the discursive elements that I am most interested in extracting and analyzing from the three planes

depicted above relate to how distant places and ethical commitments to these places are represented (adapted from Fairclough 2003). The representation of place has to do with how a particular place and the events unfolding within this place are portrayed. Representations of ethical commitment, in turn, have to do with conceptions of who is ethically bound to a particular place and why. The specific "places" that I consider in this study include Sudan's western region of Darfur, Southern Sudan, and the 10/40 Window (the swath of land ranging from north Africa to East Asia which is seen by the globally focused Christian Right to contain the least evangelized populations in the world).

The discursive investigations in each of the three cases presented in this study proceed via a content analysis and a discourse analysis. In the content analysis the assembled texts are searched for key discourse fragments pertaining to how particular places are conceptualized and how rationalities and feeling of ethical commitment to these places are framed (Kippendorf 1980; Weber 1990). In this analysis I place particular emphasis on the biopolitical dimensions of these representations, that is, how life and the responsibility for this life, whether sovereign or community based, is depicted. However, I suggest that the representation of place and ethical commitment should not be seen as two completely independent discursive strands, where one reflects a certain geographical imaginary and the other an unconnected internalized normative regime. Instead, these two discursive expressions must be recognized as being intimately intertwined, together giving rise to a set of practices that constitute both our contemporary global governmentality and the resistance to this governmentality. A deeper discourse analysis (see Van Dijk 1993) is therefore required not only to further probe the link between geographical imaginaries and ethical positioning, but to discern how a particular discursive ethical-geographic nexus supports, opposes, or modifies our contemporary global

governmentality, especially in terms of the Agambian capture of life maintained by sovereign power within this governmentality.

I will now turn to the specific cases addressed in each of the three papers of this dissertation, highlighting how I traced and studied the geographical-ethical discourse produced and summarizing the basic results of these investigations.

The First Case

The first case, which provides the empirical basis for *Paper A*, entitled "Bio-Normative Geopolitics: The U.S. and the Darfur Crisis in Sudan", centers on the discourse that has emerged from the executive branch of the U.S. government over the past four years regarding the ongoing political and humanitarian crisis in Darfur. This investigation aims at enlightening bio-normative geopolitics, that is, the calculations of the state with regard to persecuted life beyond its boundaries. The texts employed to inform this investigation were all obtained through the online archives of the White House and the State Department. All Darfur related discourse produced by the President, the Secretary of State, the White House Press Secretary, and the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs were included in this analysis.

Once collected, the textual materials were catalogued within the textual processing program *N-Vivo* according to genre and source. Also using *N-Vivo,* the discourse was then coded – meaning specific discourse "nodes" were identified and classified according to relevant statements made regarding the United States' presentation of itself vis a vis the particular space of Darfur. Particular emphasis was placed on the biopolitical role the U.S. executive presents for itself in the face of the Darfur crisis, that is, on how life as

such is spoken about in the context of Darfur and how global governmental responsibility for this life is conceptualized. Once the coding was complete *N-Vivo* was used to associate and organize the various discourse nodes (Richards 1999). The systematic combination of the same nodes is what constitutes a discourse strand, that is, a coherent and repeated manner in communicating a particular topic.

A deeper discourse analysis was then performed in order to further tease out the meaning of the various discourse strands identified. This closer reading was limited to a small selection of materials considered to be "representative" with regard to the genre of the text and the discourse strands present. In this case, the aim of the critical discourse analysis was to discern the "topoi" that undergird the U.S. executive's reasoning regarding its responsibility for life in the space of Darfur. Topoi can be defined as "the content related warrants or 'conclusion rules' which connect the argument or arguments with the conclusion (Wodak 2001). The topoi employed in the texts will be partly revealed as coded nodes in the content analysis but it will take a closer reading, as guided by the question provided in *Appendix D*, to uncover how they are developed, constructed, and interrelated (Kienpointer 1992; Kienpointer and Kindt 1997; Kindt 1992).

Finally, the analyzed discourse was placed into the context of the overall practices of the U.S. executive with regard to its policy on Darfur. Here reference was made to leading U.S. newspapers, academic journals, and NGO websites to establish as well as possible the "facts" on the ground regarding U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military activities pertaining to Darfur. The larger context of U.S. action could then be related to the discourse emanating from the U.S. executive. In other words, the connections and disconnections between U.S. foreign policy discourse and practice on Darfur could be gauged and theorized.

The basic findings of this investigation suggest that the role that foreign humanitarian crises, particularly genocide, play in U.S. foreign policy is important and is carefully handled by the U.S. executive. I suggest that the discourse that has been produced in response to Darfur is part of a bio-geopolitical gaze that is aimed at maintaining a U.S. global claim on the valuation of life. In the discourse on the Darfur crisis, the U.S. executive presents itself as seeing the world for what it is and having the integrity and leadership to announce what it sees. In this way the Bush administration, as opposed to past administrations, has not recoiled from the genocide word. Instead, it has embraced the term "genocide" for Darfur and forced it into the spotlight, challenging the world to respond.

At the same time, the "genocide" in Darfur has been allowed to continue. The U.S. has attempted to save face in this situation by blaming others while simultaneously forcing the world to reevaluate the normative content of the global world order by devaluing the concept of genocide as the ultimate event determining the relation between ethics and politics in our time. We are asked, instead, to accept a world in which spaces of lurking evil and spaces of imposed states of exception have become an accepted aspect of the global political landscape. In this way, the otherwise quintessential and space-specific ethical issue of genocide has become subsumed within the broader and increasingly spaceless war on terror. The normative red line of genocide, which served as an ideal limit never to be crossed, is increasingly fading. The *nomos* that captures the value of human life has therefore become evermore fragile, in some ways more virtual than real. Yet it is a virtual project-tion that still has traction, partly because it is intricately maintained within the discourse emanating from the global sovereign power of the U.S. executive.

The Second Case

In *Paper B,* entitled, "Norms, Geography and the Globally Focused Christian Right" I aim at determining the role that norms and feelings of care play in shaping geographical knowledge of distant spaces and places. The case to inform this inquiry is based on the Globally focused Christian Right's (GCR) engagement with three distinct spaces: the 10/40 Window, Southern Sudan, and Darfur, with a focus on how the ethical-geographic constructions of the GCR affect conceptualizations and practices of governing global life. This investigation utilized both collected texts and interviews in its analysis of the GCR.

The key actors selected for this investigation were those conservative Protestant organizations that were actively involved in missionary and proselytizing work, Christian solidarity activities, or humanitarian aid efforts abroad, with a special focus on Sudan. In Table 1 below, I depict the key actors of the broad discursive plane that the GCR makes up. I have not, however, separately included the mission agencies of the various denominations listed here. Furthermore, there are dozens of non-denominational evangelical missionary organizations that are only indirectly represented below via the two main umbrella organizations that contain them: the Interdenominational Foreign Mission Association (IFMA) or the Evangelical Fellowship of Mission Agencies (EFMA).

The investigation into the discourse produced by the GCR progressed by first assembling textual information, both online, in person, and through mail requests and then supplementing this material with interviews and questionnaires targeting various key informants within the GCR. In total, I conducted twelve open ended, face to face interviews with GCR informants during 4 months of field work in Washington D.C. For a number of informants working with

GCR organizations not located in Washington D.C., I administered electronic questionnaires. Fifteen questionnaires were administered in this way.

Table 1: Key Globally Focused Christian Right Organizations

Name of organization	*Type of organization*
Southern Baptist Convention	Denominational
Assemblies of God	Denominational
Seventh Day Adventists	Denominational
United Pentecostal Church International	Denominational
National Association of Evangelicals	Interdenominational umbrella group
World Evangelical Alliance	Interdenominational umbrella group
Interdenominational Foreign Mission Association	Missions umbrella group
Evangelical Fellowship of Mission Agencies	Missions umbrella group
Institute on Religion and Democracy	Think Tank
Ethics and Public Policy Center	Think tank
World Vision	Humanitarian Aid / Development
Samaritan's Purse	Humanitarian / Development
Christian Solidarity International	Christian Solidarity
Christian Solidarity Worldwide	Christian Solidarity
Servant's Heart	Christian Solidarity
Safe Harbor International	Christian Solidarity
The Voice of the Martyrs	Christian Solidarity
Christian Freedom International	Christian Solidarity
Ministerial Alliance of Midland	Christian Solidarity (Sudan)
Christianity Today	Publication
World Magazine	Publication

All of the materials collected were transcribed into electronic form and categorized according to genre and source in *N-vivo*. Discourse fragments were coded into nodes from

which node assemblages, or discourse strands, were isolated. In this research the focus was on the discourse strands pertaining to how places were understood in terms of an ethical obligation or an emotion of care, and, furthermore, how these ethical-geographical constructs were related both to particular practices on the part of the GCR and the demand for action by the sovereign power of the United States. In line with the guideline questions provided in *Appendix D*, a critical discourse analysis was then applied to representative texts and informant responses in order to discern the topoi that underlay the connection between the GCR's conception of ethics, geographical constructions, and the fostering of particular practices.

It should be noted that an integral aspect of this research was to make sense of the shifting and contradictory nature of the discourse employed for the 10/40 Window, southern Sudan, and Darfur. To explain this variability, I contend that it is necessary to address the role of the subjectivities that are involved in the actual production and maintenance of these discourses. In other words, it must be recognized that subjects are committing themselves to particular understandings and values by constructing meaning through discourse (Halliday 1978; 1994). This is not to say that there is a unidirectional causality from discourse to identity formation. It is more appropriate to think of a complex dialectical relation between acting (practices), representing (discourse), and identifying (self perception and presentation) – these different aspects of a subject's reality will inform each other in a continuous process of negotiation (Jaeger 2001).

In the case at hand, recognizing the link between discourse and subjectivities was critical in making sense of how and why the discourse within the GCR was partially changing when applied to southern Sudan. The interviews conducted were essential for probing this link, particularly with regard to the direct emotions of care that were developing within the GCR

community for the southern Sudanese people. The benefit of conducting interviews in this case was that it enabled a more direct access to the normative subjectivities involved in the formulation of governmental rationalities. This would have been difficult if relying on textual materials alone, where the subject behind the text is often hidden by a language of subjectless objectivity and a fog of rhetoric (Fairclough 2003). In the interviews I conducted, however, it was possible to enquire into the subject's personal opinions, commitments, and feelings about the case at hand.

The basic findings of this research suggest that ethical norms and sentiments of care can impact how geographical knowledge is constructed. In this case, the universalist norms within the GCR are seen to lead to the 10/40 Window, an imagined geography that represents a culturescape of failure that is ripe for spiritual and geopolitical interventions. However, with regard to the GCR's engagement in southern Sudan an ethics of care develops that questions the hardline, confrontational approach inherent in the 10/40 Window. Instead, the detailed local geography of Sudan is allowed to be probed in an attempt to find a peace deal between the Christian (and animist) black-African rebels in the south of the country and what was otherwise considered to be the demonic Sudanese regime.

The findings, however, also point to the dangers of the partiality inherent in care ethics. In this case, the care for the southern Sudanese facilitated a peace agreement that left out significant actors in Sudan who had a legitimate stake in what was being agreed to in the peace accords. The Darfur crisis is widely regarded as a direct consequence of this neglect. The lack of a true care for the Darfurians, in turn, prompted the GCR to resort back to the confrontational worldview entailed in the 10/40 Window. This case thus presents the challenges involved in both universalist and care ethics approaches to

any attempted moral engagement with distant or "foreign" spaces. In the end, an attempt is made to find a calibration between these two forms of ethical motivation. However, instead of emphasizing the primacy of rationalized universalist norms in such a calibration, I choose to privilege care ethics, viewing normative regimes primarily in terms of their ability to compliment and foster what I call a "careful" care.

The Third Case

Paper C, entitled "Caring For Distant Victims of Political Violence: Agamben and the Faith-Based Movement to Save Darfur" is thematically and methodologically similar to *Paper B* above. In *Paper C* I focus on the faith-based organizations involved in the Save Darfur Movement (SDM), which is aimed at bringing an end to the suffering and death that have come to grip this region of the world. Again, I home in on how Darfur and its inhabitants are represented, especially with regard to how the life of Darfurians is evaluated and how the responsibility for this life is articulated.

The SDM consists of religious denominations and faith-based organizations that are members of, or associated with, the "Save Darfur" coalition. This coalition is an interdenominational umbrella group founded by the American Jewish World Service in 2004. The key SDM actors within this coalition include the National Council of Churches, The Union for Reform Judaism, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, and the National Association of Evangelicals.

As in the case informing *Paper B*, in this case textual material was collected online and in person during my field work in Washington D.C. I also enhanced this textual data with twenty three interviews of key informants from various SDM organizations (some of these overlapped

with my investigation of the Globally focused Christian Right). As well as assembling and analyzing this discursive material, however, I additionally engaged in participant observation as a part-time intern in the government affairs office of the Episcopal Church, which was particularly active on the issue of Darfur and Sudan in general. I will return to this aspect of the research shortly.

The content analysis of the materials collected in this case focused on the discourse strands pertaining to the ethical concern and responsibility for the life of Darfurians, with an emphasis on whether this life is presented as bare life or as being inscribed in a meaning-giving community. Related to this, I was also interested in the ways is which the United States was incorporated into conceptions of responsibility and care for Darfur. In the discourse analysis this interests was further probed by selecting a number of representative texts and interviews which were then scrutinized using the guideline questions in *Appendix D* to discern how the sovereign's self ascribed role as the ultimate valuator of life was either accepted, tacitly or explicitly, or circumvented and even challenged.

The aim of uncovering the relation of faith based organizations to sovereign power in their conceptualization of "care" for distant life was ultimately also pursued in the participant observation. As with interviews, participant observation facilitates an understanding of how certain subjectivities are entwined with the discourse being analyzed. In this sense, I was able to query the intimate contact I established through my work within the SDM to discern the ways in which the relation between discourse and identity actively produced and reproduced a particular commitment to the distant life in Darfur and, related to this, the general perception of the state's responsibility for this life. The benefit to such intimate contact over simple interviews is that with time I was able to

establish a trust with my co-workers and fellow activists that allowed me to truly get a sense of their emotions and sentiments regarding their advocacy work for Darfur (Jorgensen 1993).

The basic findings of this study point to varying ways that the care for distant others, and the role of sovereign power in this care, are internalized and conceptualized within the SDM. In general, it appears that an ontology of power is accepted that considers the sovereign as significantly bound to the demands of the populace. Such a conception of sovereign power, furthermore, leads to a belief that the sovereign, in this case the United States, can be directed in some way to take on a greater ethical role in foreign affairs, particularly with regard to protecting life. I point out, however, that in many instances this optimistic view of the sovereign went hand in hand with what I refer to as a sovereign framework for the valuation of life, which basically views life as either being incorporated by a sovereign, making it the good life of political inclusion, or being banned by the sovereign, making it an abject naked life. In line with the work of Giorgio Agamben, I argue that accepting a sovereign framework for the valuation of life fails to challenge the inherent power of the sovereign to condemn life to death in the first place. I also show, however, how some actors within the SDM do, in fact, engage in alternative valuations of life when addressing Darfur and I make the case that these initiatives can be seen as forms of solidarity that resist sovereign power as such. I suggest that such alternative communities of care form the most dependable basis for achieving a future in which extreme forms of sovereign violence such as genocide become unthinkable.

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APPENDIX A

BIO-NORMATIVE GEOPOLITICS: THE U.S AND THE DARFUR CRISIS IN SUDAN

To be submitted to Geopolitics

By Hannes Gerhardt

Abstract

Building on the work of Agamben and Foucault this paper explores the critical intersection between biopolitics and geopolitics. More specifically, I analyze the discourse that has been produced by the U.S. executive with regard to the ongoing Darfur crisis. I interpret this discourse as part of a bio-normative geopolitical calculation aimed at maintaining the U.S. claim on the valuation of global life. This investigation points to the important challenge that foreign humanitarian crises pose to the legitimacy of the United States unipolar power. I argue that the United States has responded to this challenge by presenting itself as a global moral hegemon whose role is primarily to judge rather than act with regard to the protection of foreign human life. As the named "genocide" in Darfur continues, however, the United States is also forcing a devaluation of the concept of genocide itself, thus recalibrating the relation between global ethics and politics in our time.

Introduction

On September 9th 2004 then Secretary of State Colin Powell declared before the Senate Foreign Relations committee that he, and therefore the executive, considered the events unfolding in Darfur, Sudan to be genocide. This claim was in stark contrast to past maneuvers of U.S. administrations that have consistently attempted to distance themselves from any form of rhetoric that could implicate them in the responsibility for the suffering and death of far away others. In the past, such distancing could be seen as a

way of avoiding what were deemed to be no-win situations within U.S. foreign policy thinking: extreme forms of political violence in foreign, non-strategic countries posed no immediately clear "national interest" while at the same time they stirred up challenging demands around the world for moral action. In this article, I reexamine the role that ethnic cleansing and genocide play in the United States' contemporary geopolitical calculations with a particular focus on how the reasoning involved in such cases is potentially shifting as the U.S. seeks to establish an unchallenged and absolute global dominance. I center this investigation on an analysis of the U.S. executive's response to the Darfur crisis in Sudan, paying particular attention to the discourses being employed to frame this crisis. The empirical data used to inform this case consists of the Darfur related speeches, statements, and press briefing produced by the White House between 2003-2007.

The aim of this study is ultimately to expand existing geographical theories that posit the trans-territorial nature of sovereign power, but which have largely overlooked the role that biopolitics play in such a spatiality.[1] I want to suggest that this oversight entails a significant omission from the perspective of the work of Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben who both advance an understanding of power that is intimately connected to the responsibility for, signification of, and investment in life itself. In this article I will therefore engage the dynamic between conceptualizations of governmentality and sovereign power as developed by these two thinkers in order to explicitly address both the extent to which a transnational valuation of life is executed and how the command over this valuation is intimately connected to the global spatiality of power.

Governmentality, Sovereignty, and Genocide

Foucault's thought on governmentality developed in his later work as an attempt to clarify how subjectivities are internalized and lived through rationalizations of government, particularly with respect to concerns regarding the control, regulation and direction of the self and the population.[2] Foucault argues that the sovereign, later in the form of the state, became deeply implicated in such rationalizations as the medieval Christian worldview disintegrated.[3] In this way, governmentality became a rationalization that centered on "the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its wealth, longevity, health, and so on".[4] Thus, for the first time in history an inherently biopolitical form of power is produced. The resultant transformation insinuated for statecraft is remarkable, developing from the predominately negative force of the sovereign power to set down the law and take life to a primarily proactive and much more broadly diffused power that seeks to promote and foster life.

Agamben presents us with a somewhat different but not necessarily contradictory analysis of sovereign power[5]. Referring to the opposition of centralized and decentralized forms of power that infuses Foucault's work, Agamben asks, "But what is the point at which the voluntary servitude of individuals comes into contact with objective power?", by which he means the more totalizing power that, "assumes and integrates the care and natural life of individuals into its very center."[6] To answer this question Agamben first posits a political distinction between *zoe*, the human as bare life, and *bios*, the human as citizen – a distinction that became increasingly established over time as a direct result of the sovereign's efforts to take responsibility for life. Once bare life is distinguished from the good life in this way, however, the status of life becomes fundamentally dependent on

the will of the sovereign, who now has the power to promote or ban life. It is precisely this power of essentially being a gatekeeper between the realms of *zoe* and *bios* that marks the point of contact between the individual and the objective power of the sovereign.

For Agamben then, sovereign power is inherently concerned with establishing a *nomos,* or ordering, in which life is placed within a particular legal framework. But it is also here that Agamben contributes something that is missing in Foucault's work; he exposes the intimately linked reverse side to the biopolitical investment in life, namely the sovereign's power to call a state of exception in which life is banned from the protection of the law-full *nomos*.[7] Thus, on the one hand, the value of life is enshrined in law, which allows the sovereign, in the terminology of Deleuze and Guatarri, to capture this life, meaning that a fixed value and understanding of life is established and monopolized by the sovereign.[8] On the other hand, however, this monopolization is also what allows the sovereign to call a state of exception, in which life may again be banned to nothing more than bare life – a life that has no value and thus one that can be taken or tortured with impunity. Agamben calls the human banned to such a condition *homo sacer*.

The normative implications that are involved when applying an Agambian understanding of sovereign power to governmentality are critical. As the sovereign takes over the role of governing populations from the church the normative emphasis of governance switches from a focus on souls to a focus on biological life. This development forms the basis of an understanding of the human as bare life, that is, devoid of value until assigned one by a sovereign. [9] Yet it is precisely this acceptance of the fact

of bare life that also gives rise to a demand on the sovereign to establish a value for life, usually through some form of legally grounded rights. The focus on sovereignly ordained rights has thus become the core of the normative content of modern governmentality. In this sense, the capture of life must be seen as both empowering and restricting sovereign power; whereas it enables an ultimate power over life, in which this life may be banned to the status of *homo sacer* within spaces of the exception, it simultaneously demands the enforcement of a broader normative space, or *nomos*, where life is in fact inscribed with value.[10] In other words, without the enforcement of a *nomos*, an exception would make no sense and, therefore, could not be commanded.

This interrelated dynamic between establishing a *nomos* and calling states of exception invariably has a spatiality. It is my intention to explore this spatiality further within the contours of our current global governmentality, by which I mean the rationality and practices entailed in the organization of the responsibility for populations across the globe. [11] Such a global focus intentionally breaks away from the strict bounding of governmentality regimes within the territory of independent and sovereign nation-states. Instead, following Barry Hindess, I consider the delimitation of responsibility for life within state boundaries as an act of governmentality in and of itself.[12] I want to also suggest, however, that this responsibility for life has, in fact, been steadily transgressing the confines of state boundaries. In other words, the transnational forms of global power that are seen to be transcending the Westphalian spatial order of nation-states is being accompanied by similar developments within global governmentality, where the capture of life is also becoming increasingly transnational.

The most significant legislation in which a transnational capture of life was first institutionally sedimented is the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. A critical aspect of the Genocide Convention is that, in contrast to any other human rights doctrines, it ultimately lays the foundation for an expanded sovereignty beyond the realm of the nation state. In other words, life is no longer inscribed only into national law but also into international law, which can be resorted to in order to trump the local sovereignty of an offending state. This transnationalization of the legal capture of life ultimately sets the stage for a meta-sovereign power, which would transcend national demarcations of citizenship in its task to maintain a transnational biopolitical order aimed at protecting life from being banned en masse to the status of *homo sacer*. The entity to act as the meta-sovereign enforcer of such an order, however, has not been clearly, or at least unanimously, established.

One key reason why a meta-sovereign power has not been institutionalized is that the international legal framework to call forth and formalize such an entity has consistently been met with extreme skepticism by the United States. Nowhere is this better demonstrated than in the U.S. relation to the Genocide Convention itself, which, despite being its own brainchild, was held up in the Senate for over 40 years before finally being passed in amended form in 1989. The debates in the Senate over the passage of the Convention reveal clearly divergent imaginaries with regard to the U.S. ideal relation to life beyond its borders.[13] On the one hand, the pro-Convention senators envisioned the dawn of a formally enforced global valuation of life enshrined in a transnational political framework that reflects the moral leadership and hegemony of the United States. The anti-Convention senators, on the other hand, saw a global valuation of life that was not

strictly within the grasp of the internal institutions of the United States. Without the complete control over the valuation of life, furthermore, these senators feared that the United States' geopolitical endeavors could be questioned and even challenged, including, as I will argue, the critical power to call a transnational state of exception.

Nevertheless, it must be realized that the United States was still quite capable of pursuing a command over global life without formally institutionalizing a meta-sovereign power. The U.S. ultimately did this by presenting itself as a representative of the interests of all mankind, a point Carl Schmitt drew attention to over half a century ago.[14] According to Schmitt, the United States pursued a secularization of the universal ambitions of Christianity. In other words, the universalism inherent in Christianity, which sees all humans as having the potential of being saved, was now to be applied politically, thus overcoming the old exclusive spatial distinctions that separated "civilized" nations from an exterior, exceptional space. For Schmitt, this claim to universal normativity ultimately enabled the Unite States to present its self-interested foreign interventions as servicing the absolute good. From an Agambian perspective this claim can be framed differently, although maintaining the same form: The U.S. self imposed role as the absolute benefactor of universal life enables the global capture of life which, in turn, gives it a worldwide monopoly on the power to call a state of exception. In this way the U.S. maintains the power to ban life across the world to the status of *home sacer*, and whereas this banning may work to meet particular imperial interests it can nonetheless be presented, often with remarkable success, as a needed "exception" servicing the life-protecting *nomos* of global law and order.[15]

Taking a step back from both Schmitt and Agamben, however, I believe it is important to recognize that the U.S. normative discourse cannot simply be viewed as a contrivance on the part of the sovereign to master the state of exception. As noted before, the sovereign ascription of value onto life has become the normative core of modern governmentality. On the global level, furthermore, genocide has come to play a particularly important role in such a normativity. Bob Meister, for example, argues that "the Holocaust" has in many ways become "the event that defines the relation between ethics and politics in late modernity." In other words, a fundamental aspect of contemporary global governmentality is an ethical imperative to hold in check the suffering caused by the abuse of sovereign power.[16] I suggest, therefore, that any hegemonic state that necessarily seeks to establish itself as the defender of the universal good, and thus as the global guardian of life, will be closely bound to the ethical framework of this global governmentality. In other words, the legitimacy of the global hegemonic state, of its role as the global gatekeeper between the realms of bare life and the good life of the political community, depends on a consensus within world society that this state is indeed servicing the normative *nomos* that global governmentality seeks to achieve.

It is then the calculations of the state with regard to the demands of this global governmentality, to which its legitimacy as a transnational actor is intimately linked, that I refer to as bio-normative geopolitics. Such a geopolitics concerns the state's global reasoning with regard to maintaining a normatively laden biopolitical capture of life beyond national boundaries. Following from this, the key question to which I want to dedicate the rest of this article is: what are the bio-normative geopolitical calculations of the U.S. state when faced with serious breaches of humanitarian law?

This question, in turn, reflects an aspect of Agamben's understanding of sovereign power and its relation to spaces of the exception that has received little attention thus far; namely how sovereign power relates to sites of lawlessness that have not come about by a sovereignly decreed state of exception. Thus, looking at the academic work in geography that has taken up Agamben's thought, there are several cases described that are premised on a tacit but not explicit suspension of law, in which the banning of life to the status of *homo sacer* is established beyond a clearly given sovereign decree.[17] These findings point to the need for a more theoretically nuanced understanding of sovereign power in which this power is recognized as embedded within the larger context of a biopolitical struggle over the ascription of the value and non-value of life.

It is my contention that focusing on such a context will allow a more explicit consideration of sovereign power's relation to sites of lawlessness where biopolitical actions transgress a law bound *nomos*. It is my intention to further tease out this relation in the context of the global realm where international law, and the amorphous meta-sovereign power that is to represent it, are transgressed by state, or even non-state, actors engaged in the pursuit of genocide and ethnic cleansing. More particularly, I want to investigate what role these transgressions play for the U.S. bio-normative geopolitics, which aims to maintain the global capture of life in order to ground and legitimize the power to call transnational states of exception.

In what follows I focus on how the United States, particularly its executive branch of government, has responded to the challenge of the Darfur crisis. My contention is that past U.S. approaches to genocide, while recognizable in the policy towards Darfur, have been significantly altered to fit the contemporary global order. The previous responses to

genocide I want to highlight here are the policies pursued during the Cold War with regard to Cambodia and during the immediate post Cold War period with regard to Bosnia and Rwanda. These two response types can be summarized as: 1) the trumping of the normative ideal of inscribing all life into a protective *nomos* by a higher norm driven by a global "friend/enemy" confrontation and 2) the conscious dissociation with the event of genocide in spaces lacking strategic value by presenting it as something other than genocide and thereby downplaying U.S. responsibility for the abandoned life there.

Genocide in World Lacking True Enmity

Turning to the first type of response, the question that I want to pose is whether it is possible within today's global governmentality to engage a bio-normative geopolitics that can ignore or even accept genocidal spaces based on a realpolitik that seeks to undermine and defeat a critical enemy. The quintessential example of such a *realpolitik* was the U.S. response to the Cambodian genocide between 1975-1979, which was initially slow and lackluster and ultimately set the U.S. on the side of the genocidal Pol Pot regime after it was invaded by Vietnam. I want to suggest that the Cold War context that pertained here was undergirded by an internalized "friend/enemy" distinction that juxtaposed two superpowers vying for the global capture of life. In this sense it is possible to speak of a global governmentality that was bifurcated into two distinct global spaces of antagonistic, pseudo meta-sovereign responsibilities for life. The political struggle involved, however, did not constitute the threat of the annihilation of one's nation, as Carl Schmitt characterizes the essence of the "friend/enemy" relation, but rather it was framed as a (bio)political struggle against the annihilation of the essence of humanity as such (its

freedom or its communality, depending on what side you were on).[18] In this context the U.S. sided with the Pol Pot regime because it was an ally of China, which, in turn, was a U.S. ally against their primary enemy, the Soviets.

For the U.S. then, the genocidal space of Cambodia, which was neither clearly Western nor Soviet, was made to exist "beyond the line", outside of western global governmentality and thus also beyond U.S. responsibility.[19] Cambodia was thus accepted as a savage space of the exception, of lawlessness, where life was temporarily acknowledged as *homo sacer* for the simple reason that doing so was deemed more helpful in the victory over the ultimate enemy than an approach based on challenging the acceptability of this anomic space, or attempting to pull this space into the *nomos* of western governmentality. It is my contention, furthermore, that such a bio-normative geopolitical move was made possible because the decision to side with the Pol Pot regime could be subsumed under a grander struggle over the global capture of life, in which the enemy was perceived, or at least presented, as a true existential threat to humanity.

The Darfur case offers an interesting comparison here since Sudan has proved to be an allegedly quite valuable ally in the U.S. war on terror. The Bush administration began to engage the Sudanese government as early as 2001 and received a significant payback for these efforts in the form of purportedly valuable intelligence information.[20] In this sense, the U.S. executive would have wanted nothing more than to normalize relations with Sudan in order to deepen this cooperation.[21] Nevertheless as the Darfur crisis began to unfold in 2003 and escalate in 2004 the Bush administration was put into a precarious situation as civil society showed a remarkable ability to mobilize around the Darfur crisis, drawing significant attention to it. The U.S. government ultimately reacted in a dual

manner. On the one hand it maintained its intelligence ties with the Sudanese regime, but on the other hand Sudan was kept on the list of state sponsors of terrorism and U.S. sanctions remained in place. What is more, the Bush administration used strong language to condemn the violence in Darfur and therewith continued an outward rhetoric of presenting Sudan as a pariah state.

It should be noted, however, that there were isolated occasions when the U.S. executive would also play down the crisis. For example, in 2005 Robert Zoellick, then Deputy Secretary of State, appeared to step back from the graver assessment of the situation in Darfur by, among other things, utilizing mortality rates that were much lower than previous estimates.[22] It is likely that such maneuverings were diplomatic appeasements in exchange for continued intelligence ties. Yet despite such sporadic attempts at mollifying the Sudanese regime the discourse emanating from the Bush administration would consistently return to firm and threatening language in dealing with Sudan, ultimately snubbing the Sudanese regime by repeatedly using the genocide term (the "G-word") to depict the events in Darfur. To back up this rhetoric President Bush eventually also signed into law the 2006 Darfur Peace and Accountability Act, which placed further sanctions and pressure on the Sudanese government.

I want to suggest that the reason the U.S. held to this confrontational course, while it had many incentives to turn its back on the Darfur crisis, is intimately related to both a geopolitical moment characterized by the unipolar power of the United States - that is its unchallenged superpower status - and a subsequent global governmentality that demands a truly universal valuation of life.[23] Both of these factors, I want to argue, are directly related to the inability to call forth a genuine Schmittian enmity, such as that which

characterized the Cold War. Such an enmity, according to Schmitt, is undergirded by the normative imperative of resisting a potential sovereign subjugator, which, in turn, is related to a struggle over the capture of life itself. In the current context, however, it is the U.S. that asserts an almost absolute claim on the universal valuation of life, in other words, it presents itself as a guardian of global life while at the same time reserving the right to unilaterally take any life it deems a threat. In this sense, the rhetoric that is sometimes expounded regarding the need to "defend western civilization" against an imposing enemy is ultimately a throwback to an earlier age and rings hollow today when there is no credible external enemy that can be presented as truly threatening the annihilation or subjugation of the American nation or humanity as such. Following Chantal Mouffe, the enemy that the United States has thus presented to the world, an enemy with no sovereign claim to a specific space or place, is in fact best grasped as a violent and desperate resistance to a world that in many ways no longer permits spaces of legitimate dissent.[24]

In this sense, any attempts of appeasement towards the government of Sudan, whether for reasons of obtaining intelligence or gaining access to oil fields, cannot easily be justified or covered up through a recourse to the normative imperative of the friend/enemy distinction. Our current global governmentality instead emerges from the fact of a largely unipolar capture of life, which makes the explicit acceptance of a genocidal regime much more difficult to justify since it lacks a compelling bio-normative rationale. Precisely since there is no such rationale to bracket off a particular space as existing beyond the line of the current global *nomos*, there is, on the contrary, a demand to respond to such genocidal spaces. For the United States, which has assumed this

unipolar power over life, to refuse such a responsibility means compromising the legitimacy of other transnational, geopolitical actions it wishes to undertake in the world. In other words, it is precisely the global capture of life that serves as a key legitimizing factor for the transnational exceptions that the United States imposes and deems necessary in order to pursue its hegemonic aims. To achieve this legitimacy, however, the United States must at least appear to be maintaining a *nomos* at the scale at which such exceptional measures are taken.

For this reason, a transnational realm of law and order is required, since it is this need to appear as an enforcer of law, a ruler of an interior, on which the sovereign's authority to decide over transnational life largely derives.[25] Here again we have the enabling and disabling character of global governmentality. The rhetoric emanating from the U.S. executive branch can be seen to reflect such a situation. Consider the following statement by President Bush:

> "An isolationist world basically says, don't worry about what happens overseas, we'll just worry about what happens here at home. Don't worry about HIV/AIDS on the continent of Africa, not our problem. Don't worry about Darfur, it's not our problem . . . The truth of the matter is, all of these issues are our problem, and if we became isolationist, we would not do our duty to protect the American people and kind of lay the foundations for a better world."[26]

The connection here between the capture of life (the bare life of AIDS victims and victims of genocide) and the ability of the United States to pursue its interests ("protect

American people", which often translates into protect the lifestyle of American people) is evident though not fully explicated. I want to suggest that what is revealed in this quote is precisely the connection of the capture of bare life and the maintenance of a true, global U.S. sovereign power.

The Global Capture of Life Without Action

In the post Cold War period, and with the subsequent demise of the friend/enemy distinction, the United States found itself particularly challenged to maintain a legitimate claim on universal life when confronted with severe politically motivated humanitarian crises outside of its borders. Humans banned to the status of *homo sacer* by their own governments and subsequently executed in large numbers flew in the face of the U.S. desire to present itself as the ultimate keeper of a global, biopolitical *nomos*. The emerging normativity of a post Cold War global governmentality demanded that these genocidal spaces be addressed, and the United States was in many ways bound to this demand to maintain its own legitimacy as a global hegemon. The way that the United States thus tended to deal with this bio-normative geopolitical challenge, for example with regard to Bosnia and Rwanda, was to simply deny that there were clear victims involved that could or should be protected.[27] Instead, the systematic violence that was playing out on the ground was presented as savage ethnic or tribal rivalries in which there were no "good guys" to side with, thus James Baker's catchy line, "we've got no dog in this fight" with regard to the U.S. position towards the unfolding Bosnian crisis in 1991.[28] A key to such an approach was the avoidance of using the genocide word, the G-word, as such a depiction of events would not only appear to present a clear moral obligation to

act, but it could also, through the Genocide Convention, be seen to call forth mandatory action via the United Nations.

With regard to the crisis in Darfur, however, the discursive maneuverings of denial, which reached tragicomic dimensions in the Clinton administration's response to Bosnia, was not resorted to by the Bush administration.[29] Instead of denying that a genocide was taking place the Bush administration was relatively quick to state that it did in fact deem that genocide was occurring. This happened first with Colin Powell's statements in 2004 and since then President Bush has repeatedly stated, in an almost sanctimonious manner, that the rightful word for the atrocities in Darfur is genocide.[30] Consider this statement by President Bush in May 2006:

> "Last weekend, thousands rallied on our National Mall to call for justice in Darfur. And among the speakers was a man who understands the meaning of evil. You know him well. And it was Elie Wiesel put it this way: 'We refuse to be silent because silence helps the killer, never his victims.' America is not silent. The United States is the only country to have called the crimes taking place in Sudan what they are: genocide."[31]

Thus, whereas the Clinton administration appeared almost paralyzed by the G-word the Bush administration has deliberately made the word its own.

Yet what is of critical importance here is that upon initially announcing the G-word Colin Powell also stated: "Mr. Chairman, some seem to have been waiting for this determination of genocide to take action. In fact, however, no new action is dictated by

this determination."[32] True to its word, the United States has never seriously considered committing any of its own troops to the ground in Darfur. Instead the United States has treated the "genocide" almost as a technocratic matter that must be dealt with as any other humanitarian disaster. In this sense, Press Secretary Scott McClellan was able to state: "There are people dying every day. There are people suffering. And we've provided an enormous amount of humanitarian aid to the people of Darfur."[33] In other words, the banning of life to the status of *homo sacer*, and what is considered to be its systematic annihilation, is not seen as requiring an extra-ordinary response, rather the legitimate response for the United States is presented as a dedication to the sustenance of the bare life that has managed to find its way to the centers of Western humanitarian aid.

The primary focus of the United States can therefore be seen to fall on the limited spaces of the refugee camps that have become permanent features of Darfur's and eastern Chad's landscapes. These camps are ultimately limbo spaces, where the human is stripped of his/her political community while at the same time is prevented from becoming *homo sacer* – life as a bare minimum is preserved. This is therefore not a space of the exception, rather it is the space that is required to demonstrate that the *nomos* of a global governmentality is still applicable to the space of Darfur, even if it is not significantly in force. In this sense, it is ultimately a space of pure bare life, where the normative core of global governmentality, which accepts the fact of bare life yet demands that this bare life not be allowed to succumb to the status of *homo sacer*, reaches its paradoxical end; namely a sovereign power that sustains minimum bare life indefinitely, where life is nothing but survival.

Thus when President Bush speaks with regard to the Darfur crisis, "We believe every life is precious, every human being is important", what such a statement actually connotes is that the bare life of every human - their survival as a biological entity - is precious.[34] The life that is achieved by being part of a political community, however, the life that, according to Hannah Arendt, makes the human truly human, clearly remains beyond the serious scope of the meta-sovereign ambitions of the United States.[35] And this, following Agamben, is not surprising, since it is precisely the indefinite maintenance of survival that the sovereign thrives on. To quote Agamben, "The decisive activity of biopower in our time consists in the production not of life or death, but rather of a mutable and virtually infinite survival."[36] In other words, the sovereign is empowered by making life "survive" since this ultimately sediments the sovereign's power over life by demonstrating what life is without the sovereign ascription of value onto life. The bare life of the camps is a constant reminder of humanity's mercy to sovereign power, a mercy that is increasingly centered on the meta-sovereign power of the United States.

Thus, related to this focus on the sustenance of bare life the U.S. financial contributions to the Darfur crisis have been primarily in the form of humanitarian aid, with funding for the much more costly peacekeeping operations on the ground making up less that a quarter of overall spending.[37] Not surprisingly, as over 2 million refugees are barely kept alive in Darfur and neighboring Chad, the violence on the ground has continued unabated. Peace negotiations have systematically failed, villages have continued to be cleansed and civilians systematically killed. The reason for this increasingly deteriorating situation has largely been attributed to the fact that the only international response to protect civilians has come in the form of an African Union force

that is small in number (7000 at maximum deployment), ill equipped, and without a clear mandate to actually protect civilians.

Nevertheless, the United States has attempted to deflect criticism for the deteriorating situation in Darfur by ultimately presenting itself as a moral leader that the world, in its moral depravity, has failed to follow. Critically, this leadership is not presented as entailing a responsibility for actually enforcing a particular *nomos*; such a responsibility is ultimately outsourced to external actors. Furthermore, this outsourcing is rarely justified in terms of lacking troops or the pitfalls of committing U.S. troops to yet another Islamic country. Instead, I want to suggest that such a logic is based on an expectation by the United States to be recognized as the sole possessor of a global panoptic moral gaze. For example, in May 2006 President Bush stated at a press briefing:

> "But you and I know that at all times, in all places, there is a just God who sides with the suffering, and calls us to do the same. America will not turn away from this tragedy. We will call genocide by its rightful name, and we will stand up for the innocent until the peace of Darfur is secured."[38]

The sense of divine providence is clearly evident in this statement. Yet in this case the providence consists in a panoptic power to see and to judge. This then is the gift of the United States to the world; to show things as they are, to rightfully name. [39] The global sovereign gaze is here not a pastoral one in the Foucauldian sense, that is, a vigilant eye over a flock for which there is a responsibility to care; rather it is a gaze more like God's,

it sees things for what they are while at the same time being unable, or simply unwilling, to constantly intervene.[40] The onus is on others to provide the bodies to respond.

The fact that no other state has effectively responded, however, is finally blamed on the United Nations. Thus, when addressing the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush stated: "If the Sudanese government does not approve this peacekeeping force quickly, the United Nations must act . . . the credibility of the United Nations is at stake."[41] On another occasion, the President framed it this way:

> "The problem is, is that the United Nations hasn't acted. And so I can understand why those who are concerned about Darfur are frustrated; I am. I'd like to see more robust United Nations action. What you'll hear is, well, the government of Sudan must invite the United Nations in for us to act. Well, there are other alternatives, like passing a resolution saying, we're coming in with a U.N. force, in order to save lives."[42]

Following this discourse it is the United Nations that is facing a credibility issue, not the United States. The United States, instead, presents itself as the truly concerned party, striving for the enforcement of the normative content of a global governmentality for which it stands.

It has been argued that U.S. pressure on the United Nations is in fact disingenuous and ultimately serves as a trap to capture the United Nations in an untenable and de-legitimizing situation.[43] The United Nations for its part has been wary of such an entrapment. As Kofi Annan stated in 2004 with regard to Darfur, "We can't go and say

'Send in the cavalry' and then not be able to go through with it."[44] In other words, the United Nations has lacked the troop commitments to be able to declare genocide, since such a finding would demand some form of military intervention. This reticence on the part of the world community to consign bodies to the Darfur crisis clearly shows that the U.S. self-imposed role as a moral hegemon has not been heeded. I contend, however, that this flouting of American moral leadership is ultimately of little concern to the U.S. state. The aim of the United States was simply to maintain a more or less legitimate claim on universal life in the face of the political humanitarian challenge that Darfur posed. The United Nations can, therefore, be seen to have played a critical role in this situation by taking the blame, and shame, for inaction while the United States was able to present itself as the truly concerned party.

Genocide and the War on Terror

In this concluding section I want to comment briefly on how the flaunting of the genocide word on the part of the Bush administration, without any effective action being taken by anyone to stop the violence, has ultimately amounted to an outright de-sanctification of the genocide concept. There are a number of things that follow from such a move. On the one hand, the Bush administration, in typically unilateral fashion, has managed to extricate itself from any external legal requirements that may have been perceived to follow from the Genocide Convention. In other words, the United States has made it clear that it is they, and they alone, who will determine what to do if a genocide is recognized to be occurring. For the other, and more importantly, the devaluation of the

genocide term in many ways pulls the rug from under the belief in, and hope for, a post-Auschwitzian normative-political era.

Genocide, a key concept for the normative outlook of global governmentality in the last half century, has thus become bureaucratized. "Never Again" is here turned into "inevitably again", which, in turn, demands a resignation to the sense that even the worst forms of evil cannot be banished completely. Such a position closely coincides with the U.S. current presentation of the world; a world of ubiquitous evil enclaves that ultimately resist the true and just valuation of life that the United States presents itself as providing.[45] Such a conception of evil, in connection with the internalized sense of a foregone "innocence" after 9-11, ultimately functions as the normative drive behind the U.S. current war on terror.

In this sense Osama bin Laden's call for violent resistance to any foreign presence in Darfur offered a perfect opportunity for the United States to link the genocidal crisis in Darfur to the broader global war on terror. President Bush was thus able to state:

> "Once again, the terrorists are attempting to exploit the misery of fellow Muslims and encourage more death. Once again, America and other responsible nations are fighting misery and helping a desperate region come back to life. And once again, the contrast could not be more clear."[46]

Here we are presented with a clear biopolitical, normative distinction between the terrorist's primal drive to instill death, and ultimately genocide, and the U.S. actions to attribute value to, and foster, life.

The connection between Islamic terrorists and genocide, however, is not completely novel; such an association was made by President Bush at the very outset of the war on terror in an address to the nation two months after the 9/11 attacks:

> "We are the target of enemies who boast they want to kill -- kill all Americans, kill all Jews, and kill all Christians. We've seen that type of hate before -- and the only possible response is to confront it, and to defeat it."[47]

I want to contend that the maintenance of this presentation of the war on terror as essentially a war on a shadowy pseudo-genocidal movement ultimately works to align the specific Darfur crisis to this larger global struggle at the same time that it relegates it to its margins. In other words, we are asked to realize that the current global reality is not one in which just poor peasants in Darfur are targeted for annihilation, Westerners are also presented as such targets. [48] In this way, the Darfur crisis is demoted to just another flashpoint in the extended global war on terror.

Clearly, this relegation of an actual genocide to a grander yet also much more vague global project works to obliterate the import of the genocide concept, a concept that was seen by many as laying the foundation for decisive and immediate action to protect life against excessive transgressions of sovereign power. I want to reiterate here, however, that this is not a trumping of the “never-again” norm by a higher norm grounded on a friend/enemy distinction. Today there no longer exists a convincing, politically legitimate enemy that threatens the very existence of the United States or the world order that it has come to establish. Rather, in the terminology of Carl Schmitt, the enemy has become

criminalized; global space has ultimately become the domestic space of one aspiring sovereign. In this sense, genocide is not devalued in favor of a more pressing imperative; genocide is rather demoted as a concept as such, as one among many tactics associated more generally with the global criminal. Rather than posing an existential threat to the sovereign, the global criminal is presented as posing a serious threat to public health and safety. In this way, the U.S. is attempting to shape a new 21st century era in which not the Holocaust, but 9/11 becomes the key event defining the relation between ethics and politics.

Thus, instead of a focus on checking sovereign power's violations against life, which characterized the post-Auschwitzian imperative, the new, much more ambitious imperative seems to focus on a continuous routing of any resistance to a U.S. monopoly on the global ascription of value onto life. Ethnic cleansing and genocide performed counter to the U.S. command can ultimately be seen as a refutation of such a monopoly, yet these specific forms of violence are not recognized as possessing an elevated status with regard to their normative-political significance. "Rogue" sovereigns are here considered as being on par with terrorist organizations, both represent forms of resistance that need to be tackled in a struggle that we are asked to acknowledge cannot be won overnight, and may never fully be won at all.

It is still uncertain whether 9/11 will indeed succeed in being made the defining event of our age, shaping a continuous war of pacification. Nevertheless, in the meantime, the relation between politics and ethics is significantly jostled as we are asked to accept an unbounded and possibly never-ending struggle against terrorists and genocidaires, the distinction between the two now increasingly unclear. At the same time we are asked to

recognize that this struggle, and thus the current state of affairs, will inevitably be riddled with exceptional spaces and spaces of survival. Accepting such a world ultimately means accepting genocide as a regular feature of our times.

Notes

[1] J. Agnew, 'The territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of international relations theory', Review of International Political Economy 1/1 (1994); J. Agnew, Hegemony. The New Shape of Global Power (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 2005); J. Agnew, 'Sovereignty regimes: territoriality and state authority in contemporary world politics', Annuals of the Association of American Geographers 95/2 (2005); J. Agnew and S. Corbridge, Mastering Space (London: Routledge 2005); D. Newman (ed.), Boundaries, Territory and Postmodernism (London: Frank Cass. 1999); G. O'Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics (London: Routledge 1996); G. O'Tuathail, 'The postmodern geopolitical condition: states, statecraft and security in the millennium', Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90/1 (2000); G. O'Tuathail and T. Luke, 'Present as (dis)integration: deterritorialization and reterritorialization in the new wor(l)d order', Annals of the Association of American Geographers 84/3 (1994).

[2] M. Foucault, 'Governmentality," in C. Gordon, G. Burchell and P. Miller (eds.), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1991)

[3] See also M. Dillon, 'Sovereignty and governmentality: From the problematics of the 'new world order' to the ethical problematic of the world order', Alternatives 20/3 (1995).

[4] Foucault (note 2)

[5] For a more detailed analysis of the compatibility between conceptualizations of sovereignty and governmentality see J. Short, 'Life and law: Agamben and Foucault on governmentality and sovereignty', Journal of the Arts, Science and Technology 3/1 (2005); also Dillon (note 3).

[6] G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1998) p. 5,6.

[7] G. Agamben, The State of Exception (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2005).

[8] G. Deleuze and F. Guatarri, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1987).

[9] This is clearly a refutation of the natural rights tradition. It should be pointed out, however, that the U.N.'s universal declaration of human rights, which is often presented as a manifesto of natural rights, also entails a recognition of the sovereign's role with regard to such rights. Although the first article states "All human beings are born free and

equal in dignity and rights," it is preceded in the preamble by the statement: "Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law." The recognition of the importance of the law, and thus the sovereign, is apparent. Without a sovereign power to back up a rights regime these rights are devoid of meaning, and a rebellion against such a "failed" sovereignty is thus seen as likely and possibly even justified. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), *available at:* http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html, accessed May 1, 2007.

[10] It is possible here to consider the applicability of Gramsci's concept of hegemony to this tension between sovereign power and governmentality. I suggest that sovereign power is seeking a consensus from the populace that is grounded in the bio-normative content of global governmentality – it is ultimately this consensus that ensures the sovereign's hegemonic reign. Failing to establish such a hegemony would cast doubt on the sovereign's power and the legitimacy of the exceptions called forth by the sovereign. In Gramscian terms this would force the sovereign to resort to coercion in order to maintain power. From a Foucauldian-Agambian perspective such a faltering hegemony would be characterized by the collapse of governmentality regimes and the emergence of what Agamben calls *auctoritas,* a raw power that is not so much characterized by its coercive force but rather by the fact that this power is completely free of any law outside of the will of the sovereign. It is, in other words, no longer a power that serves as a means to an end, (bio) power has instead become the end in itself.

[11] In this sense I am in line with the broad understanding of global governmentality offered in the recent collection of works with the same title: Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces, edited by Larner and Walters. In this work global governmentality is offered as "a heading for studies which problematize the constitution, and governance of spaces above, beyond, between and across states." My particular contribution focuses precisely on the biopolitical constitution and governance of transnational spaces. W. Larner and W. Walters (eds.) Global Governmentality: Governing International Spaces (London: Routledge 2004) p. 2.

[12] B. Hindess, 'Citizenship in the international management of populations', American Behavioral Scientist 43/9 (2000); B. Hindess, 'Divide and govern: governmental aspects of the modern states system', in R. Ericson and N. Stehr (eds.), Governing Modern Societies. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 2000); B. Hindess, 'Neo-liberal citizenship', Citizenship Studies 6/2 (2002).

[13] For a detailed review of the decades long congressional debate over the Genocide Convention see: L. J. LeBlanc, The United States and the Genocide Convention (Durham and London: Duke University Press 1991).

[14] C. Schmitt, Grossraum gegen Universalism in Positionen und Begriffe im Kampf mit Weimar- Genf- Versailles 1923-1939 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1988); C. Schmitt, Völkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung mit Interventionsverbot für Raumfremde Mächte: Ein Bitrag zum Reichsbegriff im Völkerrecht (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1991).

[15] This recalls Peter Gowan's emphasis on the United States position as Eurasia's undisputed sovereign, in that it is the U.S that has the power "to call the political community to order and to discipline it under its undivided leadership, untrammeled by restriction", quoted in A. Callinicos, 'Marxism and Global Governance', in D. Held and A. McGrew (eds.), Governing Globalization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2002) p. 260. Following Callinicos this political power is ultimately in the service of a "super imperialism" intended to keep the U.S. in a position of economic domination. Also see P. Gowan, The Global Gamble : Washington's Faustian bid for World Dominance (New York: Verso 1999).

[16] Such a sentiment can be clearly discerned within the political establishment in the United States. For example, former House of Representative member Stephen Solarz stated, "The holocaust is the key to the whole thing. It is the Rosetta stone. For me the holocaust was the central fact of the twentieth century and has had more of an influence on my view of the world and America's role in it than anything else", quoted in S. Power, A Problem from Hell, America and the Age of Genocide (New York: Perennial 2002) p. 128.

[17] See for example, G. Pratt, 'Abandoned women and spaces of the exception', Antipode 37/5 (2006); L Sanchez, 'The global e-rotic subject, the ban, and the prostitute-free zone: sex work and the theory of differential exclusion', Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 22/6 (2004); A. Secor, 'An unrecognizable condition has arrived: law,

violence and the state of exception in Turkey', in D. Gregory and A. Pred (eds.), Spaces of Political Violence (London: Routledge 2007 - in press). The lynchings of blacks in the U.S. South in the 1950's and 1960's, or the death squad militias in Iraq targeting supporters of the Sunni insurgency can be taken as further examples. Such situations touch on a common critique of Agamben, namely that the mediation of life and the ultimate determination of *homo sacer* cannot be reduced to law alone. See for example, K. Mitchell , 'Geographies of identity: The new exceptionalism', Progress in Human Geography 30/1 (2006).

[18] C. Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (Chicago:University of Chicago Press 1996).

[19] The phrase "beyond the line" is usually used in reference to the "amity line" that Carl Schmitt draws attention to in C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York: Telos Press 2003). The amity line was an unofficially agreed upon imaginary line in the Atlantic Ocean separating the New World from the Old World. European powers in the 16th and 17th century agreed that beyond this line law would cease to be valid. I want to suggest that spaces that exist beyond the line of law, and life's valuation, can be discerned long after the amity line lost its meaning after the New World no longer was considered a "free space". See also W. Rasch 'Human rights as geopolitics: Carl Schmitt and the legal form of American supremacy', Cultural Critique 54 (spring 2003).

[20] K. Silverstein, 'Official pariah Sudan valuable to America's war on terrorism', The Los Angeles Times (April 29, 2005).

[21] There were several other reasons for the United States to want to establish friendlier ties, not least of which was gaining access to the reconstruction and oil contracts that were opening up due to the peace deal that had been brokered between the North and the South in 2005. Related to this, the United States was, and still is, wary of the growing influence of China in the oil industry within Sudan.

[22] G. Dinmore, 'Zoellick reluctant to describe Darfur violence as genocide', The Financial Times (April 15, 2005); Editorial, 'Darfur's Real Death Toll', The Washington Post (April 24, 2005).

[23] The term "unipolar" comes from C. Krauthammer, 'The unipolar moment', Foreign Affairs 70 (winter 1990/91).

[24] C. Mouffe, 'Schmitt's vision of a multipolar world order', The South Atlantic Quarterly 104/2 (2005). Such a violent resistance, incidentally, is precisely what Carl Schmitt, Grossraum gegen Universalism (note 14) and (note 19), predicted when he first posited the universalizing hegemonic project pursued by the United States following WWI.

[25] This is particularly true after the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq following 9-11, where the United States appears to have abandoned its Westphalian cloak of liberalist non-interference, thereby losing its grip on the argument of an emergent universalist governmentality that would arise through a decentralized homogenization of independent sovereign spaces. See R. D. Lipschultz, After Authority: War, Peace and Global Politics in the 21st Century (Albany: SUNY Press 2000); R. D. Lipschultz 'The clash of governmentalities: The fall of the UN Republic and America's reach for imperium', Contemporary Security Policy 23/3 (2002).

[26] G. W. Bush, 'Press conference by the President', The White House (July 7, 2006), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/07/20060707-1.html>, accessed May 1, 2007.

[27] See for example, G. O'Tuathail, 'Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning: the case of the United State's response to the war in Bosnia', Political Geography 21/5 (2002).

[28] Ibid

[29] See Power (note 16) for an analysis of the Clinton administration's avoidance of the G-word.

[30] To be exact, President G. W. Bush used the genocide word 21 times in reference to Darfur in public remarks and speeches. This is based on a search of <http:www.whitehouse.gov> on May 1, 2007.

[31] G. W. Bush, 'President attends American Jewish Committee's centennial dinner', The White House (May 4, 2006), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060504-15.html>, accessed May 1, 2007.

[32] C. Powell, [testimony] 'Current situation in Sudan and prospects for peace', *Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee* (Sept. 9, 2004).

[33] S. McClellan, 'Press Briefing by Scott McClellan', The White House (May 5, 2006), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060505-5.html#e>, accessed May 1, 2007.

[34] G. W. Bush, 'President meets with Darfur advocates', The White House (April 28, 2006), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060428-5.html>, accessed May 1, 2007.

[35] H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (San Diego: Harcourt Brace 1951).

[36] G, Agamben, Remnants of Auschwitz (Zone Books: New York 1999) p. 155.

[37] The United States declared that it will have spent over a billion dollars per year for humanitarian aid to Sudan in 2006 alone. Support for the AMIS (African Union) peacekeeping force, however, which is almost completely dependent on external funding, has only received a total of $350 million dollars between the three fiscal years 2004-2006. Based on U.S. Dept. of State, 'America: Helping the people of Sudan', Bureau of Public Affairs (2007), available at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/76189.htm>, accessed May 1, 2007).

[38] G. W. Bush, 'President discusses peace agreement in Sudan', The White House (May 8, 2006), available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060508-3.html>, accessed May 1, 2007.

[39] This recalls Carl Schmitt's statement: " . . . those who detain real power are also able to determine the meaning of concepts and words", quoted in Mouffe (note 24) p. 248.

[40] M. Foucault, 'Pastoral power and political reason', in J. R Carrette (ed.), Religion and Culture by Michel Foucault (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1999).

[41] G. W. Bush, 'Fact sheet: Address to the UN General Assembly: A more hopeful world beyond terror and extremism', The White House (Sept. 19, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060919-3.html, accessed May 1, 2007.

[42] G. W. Bush, 'Press Conference of the President', The White House (Sept. 15, 2006), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060915-2.html, accessed May 1, 2007.

[43] G. Prunier, Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide (Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press 2005).

[44] Ibid, p. 143

[45] See for example, Coleman, M. 'The naming of "terrorism" and evil "outlaws": geopolitical place-making after 11 September', Geopolitics 8/3 (2003).

[46] Bush (note 38)

[47] G. W. Bush, 'President Discusses War on Terrorism', The White House (Nov. 8, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011108-13.html, accessed May 1, 2007.

[48] The common Sunni Arab identity of Al Queda and large segments of the Janjaweed leads to the dangerous potential of a clash-of-civilization dimension to such a discourse. Thus far, however, such a move has been resisted by the U.S. government.

APPENDIX B

NORMS, GEOGRAPHY, AND THE GLOBALLY FOCUSED CHRISTIAN RIGHT

To be submitted to Political Geography

By Hannes Gerhardt

Abstract

When considering the intersection between geographical knowledge and geopolitical practice emphasis generally is given to the state and the state's self-serving calculations. In this paper, instead, I focus on what I term the globally focused Christian Right, emphasizing the role that rationalized norms and emotive care ethics play in molding and facilitating certain forms of geographical knowledge and subsequent foreign interventions. In the case I present, I show how the religious normative imperative to evangelize the world has led to geographically blunt imaginaries that present spaces of alterity as being in urgent need of spiritual and also geopolitical intervention. Opposed to such imaginaries, however, I trace the development of an ethics of care within the globally focused Christian Right, here with regard to the people of southern Sudan, which maintains a more nuanced understanding of place and thus also a more compromising approach to alterity. Whereas I emphasize the benefits of the local focus entailed in such a care ethics, I also point to the dangers of the partiality involved in such a focus. This case thus presents the challenges involved in both universalist and care ethics approaches to "moral" engagements in foreign spaces. In the end, an attempt is made to find a calibration between these two forms of ethical motivation. However, instead of emphasizing the primacy of rationalized universalist norms in such a calibration, I choose to privilege care ethics, viewing normative regimes primarily in terms of their ability to compliment and foster what I call a "careful" care.

Introduction

In recent years, and in line with other social science fields, the issue of religion has come to garner increased and sustained attention in geography. This is not to say that the geography of religion or interest in religious geographies is completely new (cf. Kong, 1990; 2001; Park, 1994; Stump, 1986; 2000). Yet, as the belief in a global secular turn has failed to materialize and as religious identities are increasingly associated with the unfolding of world events, it is no wonder that geographers are displaying a new inquisitiveness towards religion and its role in shaping our world (cf. Proctor, 2006). This article is ultimately a product of this budding interest as it focuses on the geographical implications of religiously fostered norms and values. More specifically, this investigation centers on American evangelical and fundamentalist Christian organizations and how the ethical regimes and feelings they embrace are involved in shaping an understanding of, and an engagement in, foreign places.

Beyond this general focus on religion, however, the present study is also a significant contribution to the nascent field of the geography of ethics, particularly due to its emphasis on the role that normative motivations play in shaping geographical knowledge. This emphasis is in counterdistinction to the existing literature on geography and ethics in which normativity has largely been approached as an explanandum, that is, as something to be explained. In this existing literature the focus has primarily centered on the causative role of either particular places (cf. literature reviews by Smith, 1997; 1999; 2001) or specific political-geographic structures, such as borders and territorializations (Campbell, 1998; 1999; Campbell & Shapiro, 1999; Popke, 2003; Slater, 1997). Diverging from this approach, I focus on place and place imaginaries as also,

importantly, being shaped by internalized ethical regimes and sentiments. The reasoning for this shift in attention is based on my contention that a too one-sided focus on the extraneous factors affecting our ethical convictions ultimately runs the risk of blinding us to the actual people who, in the end, are responsible for making and changing the world we live in.[1]

Yet it is interesting to note that the stance of treating ethics as an explanandum is, in fact, quickly overcome in the geographical contributions that engage ethics theory itself; such work often makes the implicit assumption that the moral arguments being presented could or should have some bearing on the world (Bridge, 1999; Popke, 2003; Silk, 1998; Smith, 1998; 2000). More explicitly, David Smith (2001) has called on geographers to expand their engagement with philosophical moral theory, arguing for the need within geography to formulate more convincing ethical positions with which to influence the world.[2] I should declare right off, however, that it is not my primary intention in this article to put forward and argue for a specific ethical rationality. My interest is rather in how currently and actually existing ethical outlooks and feelings affect the geography we live in and with. This focus is thus not centered so much on the predominant philosophical concern with what, in some rational sense, *should* be the case but rather, and in line with the feminist ethics of care literature, with what in fact *is* the case, particularly with regard to existing interpersonal relationships and the feelings of commitment and responsibility that follow from these (Clement, 1996; Friedman, 1993;

[1] This does not mean that I see the research presented here as being opposed to the approaches mentioned above, rather, I see it as a complement to these approaches, bringing the causal arrows into a dynamic full circle.

[2] Andrew Sayer echoed almost this exact sentiment in a panel session entitled "radical geographies and normative political theory" at the 2007 Association of American Geographers Conference in San Francisco.

Gilligan, 1982; Held, 1993; Tronto, 1993). It is my belief and hope that such an approach can provide a more realistic starting point for successfully tackling the many different moral challenges that ceaselessly confront us.

The Case

In line with the focus spelled out above, the study I am presenting here homes in on the actually existing morals that have been internalized by the globally focused Christian Right with regard to three distinct spaces: the 10/40 Window (which I will explicate shortly), southern Sudan, and Darfur. My interest is in how these morals, in turn, impact, and are impacted by, the inter-personal relations in which its members engage. The "globally focused Christian right" (GCR) refers to those elements within evangelical and fundamentalist Protestant organizations that are engaged in influencing foreign places and spaces. A particularly important factor that underlies this transnational engagement on the part of the GCR is a commitment to what is known as the Great Commission: the instruction believed to be given in the Bible by the resurrected Jesus Christ to spread the Christian faith to all nations of the world.

Missions work is obviously a key activity for the GCR, but by no means the only one. There is also a significant engagement with humanitarian aid and the rights of Christian minorities abroad. The main denominational actor of the GCR is the Southern Baptist Convention, which claims over 16% of the U.S. population as its members. Smaller denominations include Pentecostals, Seventh Day Adventists, and the Assemblies of God. In addition to these denominational actors, however, the GCR also includes dozens

of non-denominational evangelical missionary organizations, aid agencies, and globally oriented think tanks.

My research into the GCR involved a qualitative analysis of many of the key actors within this broad network of organizations. I spent four months in Washington D.C. conducting open-ended, face to face interviews with informants working within different aspects of the GCR. I also conducted a number of more structured interviews via email with informants who were not located in Washington D.C. In addition to these interviews, I collected a large amount of primary textual data produced by various sources within the GCR: both hard materials, such as articles, reports, newsletters, and pamphlets; as well as electronic materials on the internet. The context in which I engaged the various actors of the GCR was as an activist/academic doing an internship within the office of government relations for the Episcopal Church, which has been particularly active on Sudan. Although the Episcopal denomination is generally not "evangelical", being an intern with them allowed me to be a participant observer not only in the general process of lobbying the U.S. government on behalf of a faith-based institution but it also enabled me to partake in various interdenominational meetings and demonstrations, particularly regarding the current issue of Darfur.

It should be noted that an integral aspect of this research was to make sense of the shifting and contradictory nature of the normative discourse employed by the GCR for various places and at different constructed scales. To explain this variability it was necessary to address the role of the subjectivities involved in the actual production and maintenance of these discourses (Halliday, 1978; Halliday & Hasan, 1985). The interviews conducted were essential in probing this link between discourse and subjectivities, particularly with regard to the care ethics that

had developed within the GCR. The benefit of conducting these interviews within a context where I could honestly present myself as someone who was also concerned and involved in advocacy efforts on behalf of the Sudanese people was certainly helpful in this regard. This embeddedness ultimately enabled a more direct access to the subject's personal opinions, commitments, and feelings, all of which, I will argue, play an integral role in the formulation of particular geographical imaginaries and engagements.

Universal Norms vs. Ethics of Care

To my knowledge, it is only very recently that geographers have begun to address the foreign geographical imaginaries propagated by contemporary U.S. evangelical or fundamentalist Christians (Agnew, 2006; Dijkink, 2006; Sturm, 2006; Wallace, 2006). In this existing work, which appeared together in a special issue of *Geopolitics* under the theme "Religion and Geopolitics", the emphasis centered on the subject of millennialism and premillennialism, that is, on the role that the belief in the second coming of Christ plays in shaping perceptions of and practices in the world. Although premillennialism certainly plays a significant role in the GCR, in my research I discern much more at work in the zeal to influence and mold foreign places than simply a focus on the second coming of Christ. I contend that there is also a clear ethical dimension involved in much of the GCR's activities, in which the introduction and protection of Christianity throughout the world is seen as a way of helping people in the here and now.

Take, for example, Carla, a middle aged woman who adamantly believes in the Great Commission. Carla spent several years in the field doing missions work and was now employed in a mission organization, actively recruiting new proselytizers. When I asked

her directly about the Great Commission and its role in the second coming of Christ she immediately responded:

> "We are doing God's work by spreading the word of Jesus to the far corners of the world. But this is not just ensuring that as many souls as possible will be able to rise to heaven. It is about helping people, helping whole societies find the truth of Jesus Christ in this world so that they can live happier and more fulfilling lives."

The emphasis here on assisting people with their current, corporeal lives was reflected in many of the interviews I conducted. A critical point that I want to make with regard to such ethical commitments, however, is that the motivational dynamics involved are variable, making up a broad scale of factors involved in the formulation of ethical concern. On one end of the scale, ethical commitment is driven by a sense of obligation to what is seen as a command from the Bible – to spread the Christian faith and to assist ones neighbor. Such moral reasoning is based on what the philosophy of ethics would call a divine command ethics. Yet, on the other end of the scale, and often emerging from the connection to people that the previously mentioned moral duty calls forth, is what feminist ethics theorists would call an ethics of care, where ethical motivations and actions are undergirded by an emotional, interpersonal commitment to a particular other (Clement, 1996; Gilligan, 1982; Hekman, 1995; Held, 1993; Jaggar, 1989; Robinson, 1999; Tronto, 1993).

It is my disputation that these divergent forms of ethics can ultimately lead to varying interactions with geography. Thus, in its most extreme form, a moral drive that is

informed primarily by a universalist conception of simple right and wrong ultimately gives rise to the impetus to homogenize all space according to a specific norm. I suggest that such a drive can easily lead to the creation of geography that functions primarily as a tool to justify and map out a grand strategy in the service of this homogenizing project.[3] Conversely, an ethics of care, which is based on a deeply internalized, interpersonal ethical commitment, tends to promote a focus on locally specific geographies, with the aim of having this geography pragmatically assist in the implementation of ones care.

Despite the apparent differences in their outlook and effect, however, it is my contention that both a homogenizing, universalist ethics and a care ethics can and often do coexist within the same organization and even the same individual. In the rest of this article, I demonstrate how radically divergent ethical norms and feelings play out within the GCR. First, I focus on how geographical knowledge is created and acted upon on the basis of the universalist project of the Great Commission. Then, I show how this geographical knowledge is partly rejected in one particular place, namely southern Sudan, due to the emergence of an emotionally grounded ethics of care. Finally, however, I point to the challenges involved in the partiality inherent in care ethics, demonstrated, for example, in the GCR's approach to Darfur. This finding, in turn, leads to the insight that a feminist care ethics can never be fully global; in the end, a cognitive jump is needed in order to take into consideration those that one is not interpersonally committed to on an emotional level. However, such a "rational" normative commitment need not be based on a homogenizing universalism. It can, instead, be grounded on a recognition of

[3] It should be noted that there similar projects to homogenize global space in the secular realm - political projects to democratize the world, economic projects to capitalize the world, and humanist projects to establish universal norms. For these normatively laden projects there exist similar dangers for the way geography is engaged and utilized.

our collective intersubjectivity, which, in turn, is most conducive to establishing and fostering the emotive commitment inherent in proximate care ethics.

Universal Norms and the 10/40 Window

Undoubtedly, the most popular and widely used geographical construction employed by the GCR is that of the 10/40 Window, depicted in figure 1. The 10/40 Window, which includes North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, connotes the huge rectangular swath of land located from 10 degrees to 40 degrees north of the equator, bounded by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans to the west and east. This global space is seen to contain the core of the unevangalized population of the world. The idea of the 10/40 Window was popularized by evangelical activist and strategist Luis Bush who started to regularly use the term in the early 1990s. Since then the term "10/40 Window" has become common jargon within evangelical circles and can be found in the literature of nearly all of the missionary oriented organizations of the GCR.

Figure 1: The 10/40 Window

In his original presentation of the 10/40 Window, Luis Bush points out seven reasons to focus on this geographical space:

> "The 10/40 Window confronts us with several important considerations: first, the historical and biblical significance; second, the least evangelized countries; third, the dominance of three religious blocs; fourth, the preponderance of the poor; fifth, the unreached ethnolinguistic people groups; sixth, the least evangelized megacities; and, seventh, the strongholds of Satan within The 10/40 Window" (Bush, 1993).

As can be discerned from just this brief description, the 10/40 Window is obviously more than a simple spatial construction, it is in fact a geographical imaginary that offers a clear, geographically focused interpretation of this vast space.

It is worthwhile here to explicate some of the maps used to depict this geographical imaginary, as these proved to be immensely popular within the GCR, often adorning office walls and frequently inserted into GCR literature and websites. Global Mapping International (GMI), for example, which advertises itself as "a non-profit corporation dedicated to furthering the cause of world evangelization" (GMI, 2007), has produced an entire collection of 10/40 maps for distribution. This collection includes, for instance, a choropleth map that depicts degrees of Christian persecution across the world with the 10/40 Window clearly marked to emphasize the high level of persecution in this space. Another choropleth map shows degrees of poverty across the world on which is superimposed a topographical denotation of the least evangelized people, thus providing a cartographic correlation between these two factors within the 10/40 Window. Yet

another map presents the 100 gateway cities of the world, that is, the largest, neediest, and most unevangalized cities in the 10/40 Window, which are also considered to be particular strongholds of Satan.

These maps ultimately depict an understanding of the 10/40 Window as a problematic and neglected space that is economically undeveloped and politically and socially oppressive. In this sense, the 10/40 Window can be seen to present a global culturescape of failure. More detailed human-geographical information is then readily provided by the GCR literature to fill out this spatial imaginary. Islam is often presented as inherently violent and expansionist. Buddhist nations are portrayed as exceptionally repressive, particularly towards their Christian minorities. China, in turn, is depicted as a dangerous hodgepodge of atheism, Buddhism, folklore, animism, and occult practices. India, finally, is often derided for its polytheism, which is seen to contribute to a "culture of chaos" (Non-Prophet, 2005).

To take just one example, consider Luis Bush's description of India, a critical unreached space within the 10/40 Window:

> "Overwhelmed with poverty and ravaged by disease, India is victimized even more severely by the spiritual blindness of Hinduism. To a nation in which fattened cows roam freely among emaciated humans, we must proclaim the truth that Jesus came to give us life, and give it abundantly" (Bush, 1993).

Here, of course, the insinuation is that Hinduism is counter to giving life and is thus directly responsible for the poverty and disease that is seen to ravish the country. This is a

sentiment that is repeatedly driven home; the poverty of the 10/40 space is directly linked to the religious lostness of its inhabitants. In this way, the geographical imaginary of the 10/40 Window provides a clear justification for the normative command to execute the Great Commission.

Evangelical Geopolitics

Yet the 10/40 Window is also more than a culturescape of failure, animated by pseudo human-geographical knowledge. It also functions as a tactical tool that maps out, quite literally, the global spaces of demonic and even Satanic powers. It is here that I contend the 10/40 Window imaginary becomes especially problematic since the simple mapping of good and evil ultimately provides many evangelicals with the conviction that these spaces must be dealt with in a rigid and often confrontational manner. George Otis, Jr., for example, an influential evangelical, self-identified researcher and the author of numerous "inspirational" books and videos identifies the 10/40 Window as the "primary spiritual battle ground" of our time (quoted in Cimino, 2005: 168). Otis picks out Iran and Iraq as particularly powerful strongholds for demonic spirits, which he sees as having attached themselves, since Biblical times, to the culture and regimes of this territory. This tendency to view literal incarnations of evil as holding sway over specific territories is relatively widespread in the evangelical literature.

It should be emphasized, however, that the belief in such demonic geographies does not mean that the inhabitants occupying these troubled and troubling spaces are themselves derided. Instead, the residents of such spaces are often viewed and depicted as victims. Joan, a thirty-something woman who was actively working for a missionary

organization in the United States promoting proselytizing work in Muslim countries, explained to me:

> "We do not hate Muslims, we love them, they too are made in the image of God. The problem is the religion, which holds them captured, and the brutal governments that prevent them from seeking the truth. Muslims are the victims of evil and they need our prayers."

What the idea of an oppressive, victimizing evil does, of course, is to call forth a demand for intercession. It is in this sense that the 10/40 Window can also be recognized as a geopolitical map in the classic sense; it is a tool for a particular geographical intervention, except here it is not an intervention animated by nationalism but rather by the values of a powerful religious global actor within society. These values, in turn, are undergirded by the vision of a utopian geography in which all space is homogenized into a global Christian space. The 10/40 Window thus becomes the key tactical space in the push towards this utopia. It is in the context of such a tactical struggle that the reference to the 10/40 Window as the "last frontier", the "resistant belt" and being on the "front lines" must be understood.

Within the GCR there are a number of techniques that are used to execute the geospiritual/geopolitical aim of infiltrating and ultimately transforming the 10/40 Window. Coordinated and concerted praying, missionary activity, clandestine proselytizing, and faith-based humanitarian assistance are all seen as powerful and legitimate efforts to penetrate this space. I want to focus, however, on the GCR's efforts

to access and mobilize the U.S. government to push for specific aims conducive to the Great Commission. This lobbying and advocacy work has generally entailed putting pressure on both Congress and the President to take a hardline stand against various regimes within the 10/40 Window with the aim of monitoring, controlling, and ultimately remaking these "occupied" spaces.

Such a hardline approach to foreign policy must be seen to emerge directly from the "spiritual" interpretation of global space provided by the GCR. Speaking of the Sudanese regime, for example, GCR affiliated Congressman Spencer Bachus stated, "any deal you make with them is a deal with the devil", and later, addressing a receptive audience at the National Association of Evangelicals, "You can't negotiate in good faith with someone who has none" (McMurray, 2002). This get-tough approach is seen as the only possible way to deal with the demonic forces within the 10/40 Window. Beyond harsh economic sanctions and diplomatic boycotts that such a hardline stance often entails, military action is also often considered to be a viable and sensible option. Prior to the Iraq War, for example, the Southern Baptist Convention sent a letter to the George W. Bush administration in its support for a unilateral strike against the Iraqi regime, stating that such an action would clearly fall within the norms of the Just War tradition (Land, 2002).

Sudan: The 10/40 Window and Care Ethics

Over the past five to ten years, Sudan has established itself as the perfect target for an intervention based on the 10/40 Window imaginary. Not only is Sudan's primarily Muslim population destitute, but, more importantly, its regime, which is considered to be saturated by an Islamist ideology, is considered a clear personification of evil, associated

with the persecution of domestic Christians and the tacit support of slavery practices. Not surprisingly, Sudan increasingly became one of the focal points of attention for the GCR throughout the 1990's. Most of this focus fell on the southern, Christian and animist black-African part of the country, which for decades had been at war with the Muslim, predominately Arabic north.

The attention of the Christian Right to this area of the world concurred with the post-Cold War identity shift of the Southern Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), the main rebel movement of southern Sudan, from being a Marxist inspired movement to being a movement that actively touted its Christian credentials (Kevane, 2006). It was ultimately the SPLA that (re)presented the war as a religiously inspired Jihad against the non-Muslims of southern Sudan, where roughly 20% of the population is Christian. Although this simplistic analysis ignored the many other factors involved in the conflict, particularly the issue of the struggle over oil reserves, it did achieve its primary purpose of galvanizing the GCR on the issue of Sudan.

The GCR's initial engagement with Sudan was therefore based on more than an aim to convert "lost" souls; it was also about standing up against the "persecution of the Christian Church".[4] The initial involvement in Sudan by the GCR thus centered on the basic support of Christian communities, including the construction of clinics and schools, as well as the redeeming of Christian (and animist) black-African slaves.[5] As ties with

[4] This concern for the "persecuted Christian Church" reflects a budding movement within the GCR, spearheaded mostly by conservative Protestant churches, NGOs, and think tanks, which has made the issue of religious freedom a center of advocacy in foreign affairs. Some of the key, though not necessarily associated, organizations involved in the advocacy movement for the persecuted Christian Church include Freedom House, The Voice of the Martyrs, Christian Freedom International, Institute on Religion and Democracy.

[5] Some of the most involved organizations included: Christian Solidarity International, Christian Solidarity Worldwide, Samaritan's Purse, Servant's Heart, and Safe Harbor International.

the SPLA developed the GCR also became engaged in a number of humanitarian interventions aimed at getting food and medical supplies to needy populations. This latter activity often took place despite a ban on such aid deliveries by the Sudanese government, which often pursued campaigns of attrition against population groups supporting the SPLA (Johnson, 2003).

As these interventions were taking place the GCR also made efforts to publicize its work and its witness within the Christian Community in the United States. One aim for this publicity was to maintain the funds for these activities, but another goal was to establish a grassroots basis for influencing U.S. foreign policy on Sudan. This became especially critical after the election of George W. Bush who immediately called for a review of Sudan policy. The previous policy of the Clinton administration had been relatively aggressive; it placed the Sudanese government on a list of state sponsors of terrorism, imposed sanctions on Sudan in 1996, and in 1998 employed several cruise missiles to destroy an alleged biological weapons plant. In addition to these actions, the Clinton administration was also actively aiding the SPLA, both clandestinely with military funds and training, as well as more openly through direct food assistance (Mason & Slaughter, 2000).[6] However, with the election of George W. Bush, a figure who was known to receive counsel from evangelical sources, the hope on the part of the GCR was that the screws could be tightened even further on the regime in Khartoum, particularly by emphasizing its terrible record on religious freedom.[7]

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[6] It should be noted, however, that the U.S. decision to fly in food aid to the south of Sudan came in 1999, well after the GCR had commenced with such actions.

[7] The newly established US Commission of Religious Freedom, which came about to a large extent through GCR pressure, could here be referenced. In 2000 the Commission deemed Sudan as " . . . the world's most

In 2000, the influential preacher Franklin Graham testified before the Senate Foreign Relation Committee regarding the work of his evangelical aid organization, Samaritan's Purse, in southern Sudan. In this hearing Graham spoke of the "immoral campaign" of the Sudanese regime, comparing events in southern Sudan to the Holocaust (Graham, 2000). Whereas Graham openly spoke of tough sanctions and military intervention as clearly justifiable in the face of such an evil, behind the scenes other lobbyists from the GCR were suggesting a direct U.S. bombing campaign on Khartoum itself (Cook, 2005). As this was prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks such an engagement on the part of the United States was still not unthinkable.

I want to suggest that this call to military intervention is ultimately a direct outgrowth of the 10/40 Window imaginary and it reflects a particular danger entailed in such a universalist geography. This danger, I contend, is grounded in the fact that the 10/40 Window imaginary provides an overoptimistic zeal to intervene across the globe, while at the same time its impetus to homogenize space leads to overgeneralizations and oversimplified analyses of how the specific places to be intervened in are actually constituted. This is precisely what a number of experts of the Sudan region were arguing at the time, namely that pushing for regime change in Sudan belied the realities on the ground (Shilling, 1999). A greater support of the SPLA, for example, was seen as prolonging and possibly expanding an already unpopular war within Sudan, as well as having serious destabilizing consequences for Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. A direct U.S. intervention with the commitment of ground troops, on the other

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violent abuser of the right to freedom of religion and belief" (U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 2000).

hand, was seen as running the serious risk of culminating in a deadly quagmire for U.S. personnel.

As it turned out, however, the military interventions that were fervently called for never materialized. In the end, the U.S. government opted for a less confrontational approach, commencing with the reestablishment of diplomatic ties with the Sudanese government. Yet what is especially interesting here is that the GCR not only dropped its resistance to such a move, they actually became a leading force in pushing for a negotiated settlement between the SPLA and the Sudanese regime.

A Shifting Focus

It was not long into the Bush administration's first term that the hard line approach associated with the 10/40 Window imaginary began to falter within the GCR. This partial backtracking on the otherwise consistently confrontational approach of the GCR is well illustrated in a meeting between Franklin Graham and Ben Hoffman, then director for conflict resolution at the Carter Center. Hoffman, who belonged to what the GCR disparagingly referred to as the "constructive engagement crowd" (Hertzke, 2004: 267), argued that the war between the SPLA and Khartoum was stalemated. Furthermore, he tried to convince Graham that a peace deal in Sudan was possible if the U.S. and the GCR could only be persuaded to push for it (Cook, 2005). According to Hoffman, after a grueling discussion, Graham surprisingly responded by saying: "Okay, let's give peace a chance . . . but we're not going to give them too long" (quoted in Cook, 2005: 4). In other words, the Sudanese government would have to respond quickly to such an olive branch, otherwise a more aggressive approach could again be expected.

Not long after this discussion took place, the key GCR organizations involved in Sudan did, in fact, begin to unify their efforts to push for a peace negotiation between the North and the South. This commitment was reflected in both an extensive pressure on the U.S. executive to get more involved in such a peace process, while also sending a strong signal to the SPLA that they were to abide by any interim agreements or face abandonment by the GCR, who were one of the SPLA's key allies in the U.S. (Hertzke, 2004). This significant shift on the part of the GCR, away from a hard line approach and towards an approach seeking negotiation, was remarkable and deserves further consideration. In other words, how did this otherwise confrontational global actor suddenly become committed to waging peace?

Earlier, I suggested that the normative impetus within the evangelical faith to spread and defend the gospel could very well lead to an emotionally laden ethics of care due to the interpersonal connectivity that such an ethical commitment necessarily entails. It is my disputation that such a development transpired in the case of the GCR's engagement with Sudan. Whereas the 10/40 Window set the overall context for a need to target Sudan, once this involvement became real, it acquired a dynamic of its own. This dynamic, furthermore, culminated in an emotional connection between Christian communities in the United States and those in southern Sudan. I propose that it is this connectivity, and ultimately the ethics of care that it promoted, that suddenly made "constructive engagement" appear worth the effort.

The kernel of such an ethics of care was undoubtedly centered locally within southern Sudan itself, where numerous members of the GCR struggled on behalf of Christian and potential Christian souls who had become victims of the demonic spaces they inhabited.

One particularly revealing interview I conducted was with a middle-aged evangelical, George, who had spent several months in southern Sudan with a GCR organization. When I asked him about the imperative of toppling the Sudanese regime, he told me in an emotional voice:

> "You know, after working with these people, these wonderful, giving people, and seeing the insecurity, the constant fear, the loss, you begin to ask yourself, when will this ever end, how can these people ever find peace."

I find this statement revealing, since the yearning that George was communicating to me was clearly that of finding a peace for a people he had come to feel for. George's ethical drive, at least in this case, was no longer about pursuing a divinely proffered imperative to spread and defend the Christian faith; it was, instead, centered on the southern Sudanese people who had grown emotionally close. When I followed up on George's reply by asking, "do you think that your feelings for the people you met opened you up to the possibility of negotiating with the Sudanese regime", he simply said, "I don't think that you can trust that regime, but the suffering had to stop, we had to try everything."

Whereas such a personal attachment to an assisted people is acknowledged to be relatively common among humanitarian aid and human rights workers in the field, what was especially remarkable in the case of the GCR was that this care was eventually uprooted and exported to the United States. Since its engagement in southern Sudan the GCR had been involved in an extensive and prolonged bridge building process between evangelical communities in the U.S. and Sudan, thereby enabling critical interpersonal

connections to be established (cf. Herzke, 2004). Travel between the U.S and southern Sudan played a pivotal role in this process: for one, it allowed evangelical Americans, among them numerous important political figures, to travel to Sudan and personally come into contact and witness the everyday lives of the southern Sudanese people; for the other, and perhaps even more important, Christian Sudanese were flown into the United States to speak, preach and testify. These endeavors were crucial in personalizing the plight of the southern Sudanese and ultimately establishing the basis for a transnational care. I want to suggest that of particular importance here was the meeting of American and African Christian cultures within mainstream American evangelical churches.

Jody, for example, a young evangelical and Sudan activist spoke to me about a gathering at her church on the outskirts of Washington D.C. where Christian Sudanese had been invited:

> "When you hear their stories and you see their pain you can't help but care. Everyone was moved. After we prayed together, people went up to meet them and express their sympathy. There were a lot of tears. I'll tell you, people really cared about Sudan after that."

Similar experiences were recalled by a number of my informants in the Washington D.C. area, yet according to Hertzke (2004), who conducted a nation-wide study of the GCR, these types of events were going on in churches all over America. In this sense, the southern Sudanese were quickly losing their status as "distant others" in the eyes of American evangelicals and, instead, were increasingly being seen as "one of our own".

I contend that it was this switch to a proximate care that, in the end, facilitated a relativization of the hardline tactics called for by the 10/40 Window. In concrete terms this amounted to a concerted effort by the evangelical community across the United States to vigorously pressure the U.S. government, the Sudanese regime, and the SPLA to commit to a peace in Sudan.[8] This pressure, in turn, has been widely acknowledged to have played a significant role in the events that unfolded between 2003 and 2005 in Sudan. In this time, under the watchful gaze of the GCR, the U.S. engaged in painstaking negotiations to broker a peace in Sudan's civil war. These negotiations took a tremendous amount of will and patience, but they finally culminated in what was deemed by many as unthinkable: a detailed peace agreement, hundreds of pages long, that both sides of the conflict were committed to observing. This peace deal, known as the Naivasha Accords, was finalized in January of 2005 and was celebrated as a tremendous achievement across the world, sparking a deep sense of hope that possibly the worst civil war in African history had finally come to an end.

Caring for the Southern Sudanese

A critical point that I want to make in the above depiction of events, however, is not only that the transnational ethics of care that had developed managed to challenge in significant ways the imperatives of the 10/40 Window imaginary but that it actually encouraged the creation and utilization of alternative, place specific, geographic forms of knowledge. In other words, the emphasis on making two antagonistic parties within a

[8] Even more impressive, however, is that these three key actors, in turn, showed an amazing amount of respect and receptivity for the power that lie behind this pressure (Hertzke 2004).It should also be noted that this transnational solidarity for Sudan was unfolding at a time prior to the Darfur crisis, when Sudan was generally not on the radar screen of the general press.

specific space peacefully coexist required an engagement with the intricate human geography in place.

In this way, the evangelical community was forced to accept that the conflict between the North and the South of Sudan, as well as its potential solution, was, in fact, inscribed in the complex economic, political, and cultural geography on the ground. More specifically this entailed a recognition of the three key, spatially sedimented factors involved in this crisis: 1) the issue of oil and infrastructure, 2) the issue of the distribution of political power, and 3) the issue of Sharia law (cf. Nasong'o & Murunga, 2005; Johnson, 2003). The receptivity of the evangelical community to this place specific geography was clearly evidenced by the increasing attention that the above mentioned themes were receiving in evangelical organizations and publications from 2002 onward.

I want to suggest, therefore, that an ethics of care leads to a fundamentally different engagement with geography than an ethics based on an absolutist universal normativity that seeks to homogenize space. Whereas the latter, driven by a universal cause, tends to construct a global geographical imaginary to justify and direct this cause, a care ethics, driven by an immediately felt commitment to another, turns to a place-specific geography to search for ways of fulfilling this commitment. This is precisely what happened in the GCR's engagement with southern Sudan; the care for the southern Sudanese prompted a concerted probing of the human geographical terrain of Sudan for an answer to the suffering being witnessed. As opposed to simply projecting a monolithic demonic force that needs to be confronted, this probing of the regional geography led to the recognition of specific issues and problems that could be negotiated.

It is not my intention to claim, however, that an ethics of care therefore leads to an entirely unproblematic engagement with geography. In fact, we are presented with other challenges. One challenge that I want to consider more closely, particularly through the example of the Naivasha Accords, concerns the inherent partiality in care ethics. As promising as the Naivasha Accords appeared to be at the time of their signing there has emerged an increasing sense among specialists of the region that this agreement was fundamentally flawed, primarily because it left out numerous parties with a legitimate stake in what was being agreed to. Most critically, Sudan's substantial oil reserves were completely portioned out between the leadership of the SPLA and the Sudanese government in Khartoum, thereby shutting out numerous tribes and regions from this vital source of income (Cook, 2005; De Waal, 2007; Flint & De Waal, 2005; Middleton & O'Keefe, 2006).

Thus, even as the ink on the Naivasha Accords was drying, a rebellion in the western Darfur region of Sudan was already underway, largely attributed to a resentment on the part of the Darfurian rebels for having been sidestepped in Naivasha. The Sudanese regime quickly responded by unleashing a vicious counter insurgency, once again resorting to violence against civilians that recalled the war that had just come to an end in the south. In the next two years Darfur would become recognized as one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world, with numerous reports of government sponsored ethnic cleansing campaigns and even genocide.

In retrospect, it can be argued that the map used to negotiate the Naivasha peace agreement, although geographically nuanced in terms of the demands made by the two warring parties, was nevertheless not detailed and all encompassing enough. It has

consequently also been suggested that the external ethical and political impetus that lay behind the Naivasha deal, of which the GCR was a significant part, was too delimited in scope and thus exclusionary by nature, especially with regard to the populations in the west and the east of the country. I want to propose that this scenario points to a fundamental peril within care ethics itself.

Biased Geographical Engagements

In his probing article on the spatial scope of beneficence, David Smith (1998) discerns two critical factors entailed in caring: proximity and similarity. Smith then goes on to point out the inherently local nature of these qualities and thus questions the ability of caring to be projected over distance. This has been a recurring critique of the ethics of care approach, namely that a care ethics is inherently communitarian due to its inability to transgress the geographical boundaries that make people "near and dear". I have challenged this critique here by showing that the GCR has indeed managed to overcome great distance in its solidarity with the southern Sudanese people. Yet with the apparent favoritism entailed within the Naivasha agreement we are nevertheless left with a sense that the eagerness to care for the southern Sudanese came at the cost, even if not intended, of those that did not have the privilege of being cared for.

I contend that this predicament reveals a possible shortcoming in an ethics of care beyond the critique of its communitarian tendencies. In other words, it is not just a question of breaking the local bounds that demarcate difference, it is also a question of ensuring that one's care does not come at the expense of others. In the end, however, the issue is still rooted in the geographical limitations of an ethics based on an interpersonal

caring – in this case, however, it is not a question of whether caring can be expanded past the local community (I argue that it can), rather it is the problem that caring cannot be expanded to include everyone and the consequences that this entails.

In the case of the GCR the geographical limitations of a care ethics became painfully evident with regard to Darfur. Throughout the Naivasha negotiations the GCR was well aware of the events beginning to unfold in Darfur. Reference to Darfur was made in several GCR publications and websites prior to the signing of the Naivasha deal.[9] Yet this awareness and even concern proved to be insufficient to make a true mark on how the Naivasha Accords were handled. The intimacy that had been established with the southern Sudanese was simply lacking with regard to Darfur. As an important consequence there was no real understanding of the geographically inscribed concerns and needs of the Darfurians; they remained abstract victims, viewed as mostly unconnected to the space and place making deals being worked out between the North and the South.

When the situation in Darfur then progressively and alarmingly deteriorated in 2005 the GCR began to address the situation more directly. The National Association of Evangelicals and the Southern Baptist Convention became loud and influential voices publicizing the Darfur conflict and pressuring the U.S. government to become more involved in ending it. However, this activism was of a different nature to the solidarity that was shown for the southern Sudanese. Instead, I contend that the concern for a still distant Darfur ultimately gave way to the reassertion of the 10/40 Window imaginary,

[9] There were also isolated cases where a concern for the Christians in the south of Sudan was excessively partial, with arguments being made, for example, that Darfur should not be allowed to ruin the chance for peace in the South.

accompanied by a simplified moral geography that posited black Africans as the innocent victims of a vehement stronghold of Satan.

In this sense, a simple good vs. evil dichotomy was reestablished on the basis of unquestioned cultural lines. Catholic Relief Services President, Ken Hackett, warned of precisely this way of thinking about Darfur:

> "What is critical right now for Sudan and for the region at large is that no more time be lost and that the conflicts be kept from turning into a general antagonism between people of different religious or ethnic backgrounds. If the struggles in Sudan are perceived as a clash between cultures—Arabs against Africans, Sudan versus the West, Islam versus everyone else—they will become unmanageable. And the crisis will not contain itself within Sudan's borders" (Hacket, 2004).

Yet it is such a clash between cultures that was (and still is) being promoted by the GCR in Darfur. References were thus made to the "Arab Islamist Sudanese government" and of "Arab Janjaweed militias" which are said to be engaged in a "genocidal jihad" against black Africans. There is no mention of the significant Arab groups in Darfur that have not taken up arms against African tribes and that remain wary of the centralized government and its treatment of Darfur (De Waal, 2005; Morton, 2004; Prunier, 2005). The Darfurian rebel groups, in turn, and the humanitarian crimes they have committed, are never mentioned. Furthermore, and not least, the geographically sedimented economic, political, and environmental grounds for the conflict are completely washed over (see for

example Flint and De Waal, 2005; Prunier, 2005; Middleton & O'Keefe, 2006; Verney, 2004).

What is ultimately being neglected in Darfur, in other words, is once again the specific map of this conflict, which needs to be employed to address the grievances of the numerous parties involved. Such a map exists; what is needed, however, is the diligence and investment to bring the key parties to the table to discuss it. The pressure to do this, however, is not forthcoming. I suggest that the reason for this lack of pressure to engage the specifics of this crisis lies in the fact that the GCR - as well as many other advocacy groups - have failed to establish a proximity to the people of western Sudan. In this way, the Darfurians have remained faceless, the geography of their conflict, in turn, abstract and hard to decipher.

In the absence of a proximate care, and the geographical sensitivities that come with it, recourse has been made instead to the tactical suppositions ingrained in the 10/40 Window imaginary, resulting in a return to a hardline approach to Sudan and calls for military intervention. As Richard Land of the Southern Baptist Convention forcefully put it with regard to such an intervention:

> "We must call on the United Nations to act; if the United Nations doesn't act, then we must call on the African Union; if the African Union doesn't act, then we must call on NATO; if NATO doesn't act, then we must act. The United States must act, alone if necessary . . ." (Land, 2006).

It should be noted, however, that although pressure for more peacekeepers is undoubtedly legitimate, the extensive military intervention suggested here again runs the serious risk of precipitating numerous unintended and grievous consequences, not least because the basis for the calls for intervention are grounded on a geographical imaginary that is largely out of synch with the actual, complex human geographical realities in place. In this sense, the reasserted 10/40 Window is working not only to divert attention from a workable solution in Darfur, it is promoting a confrontational approach that, if it were ever heeded, could very well worsen the predicament of the Darfurians on the ground.

Universalizing Care

The key question that ultimately arises from this case regards how broader ethical norms and more particular emotive care ethics can be brought together to avoid the pitfalls here identified, that is, of either a poor, overly macro-oriented geographical representation, leading to misconstrued global practices, or a biased, overly micro-oriented engagement with place, leading to the neglect of actors that are nonetheless impacted by ones "caring". In order to consider this question, however, it is important, I contend, to recognize the fundamentally different types of work that broadly applied norms and specific emotive care do within our ethical outlooks and practices.

In this sense, I side with Marilyn Friedman who makes a clear distinction between moral arguments and the moral motivations that emerge from an emotive and proximate connection to a particular other. As Friedman puts it, "moral thinking", which is used to make universalist ethical arguments, "has no necessary motivational source in the self, so not everyone will find it convincing . . ." (1993: 88). On the contrary, a proximate

emotive care, or as Cloke describes it, “a sense for the other which is emotional, connected and committed” (2002: 594), must be accepted as more than a rational ethical vision, it is, instead, immediate, passionate, and grounded on a personal dedication that is felt, not thought. For precisely this reason, however, such a care is also, according to Friedman, delimited in its scope. In other words, we will inevitably be confronted with the suffering of others to whom we have not established any form of interpersonal and heartfelt connectivity. There simply are too many people in the world to allow for a personal intimate care for all.

In the end, the shortcoming of both rational norms and emotive care calls for a successful calibration between the two. However, opposed to David Smith (1998) who ultimately seeks a calibration that privileges rational, universal norms, I suggest we start with the primacy of care ethics. The reason for this switch is not only due to the motivational potency and thus potential that I believe is entailed in an expanded ethics of care, but because, as I have demonstrated in this article, care ethics are necessarily more geographically nuanced, focusing on context, particularity, and thus locality. It is this receptivity to geography, I suggest, that places care ethics in an ideal position to develop viable solutions to specific ethical challenges while at the same time countering dangerous misconceptions of place that may emerge from particular universal norms. For these reasons I suggest that normative regimes should be judged primarily for how they may successfully complement an ethics of care, rather than arguing for which normative rationalizations are most convincing, more ethically sound, or logically most coherent.

I believe that the case I presented in this article provides an informative basis for sketching a basic outline of what such a compatibility between norms and care should

look like. In other words, by demonstrating a largely incompatible relation between the universalized norms of the GCR, expressed in the 10/40 window imaginary, and the emotive care ethics that developed for the southern Sudanese, I have been able to identify the critical points of overlap and potential friction between these two divergent forms of ethical motivation. Based on these findings I identify three key points as being decisive for establishing a normative system that is not only attuned to but also fosters a positive care ethics.

The first point is that a rationalized normative regime should encourage reaching out to distant others, preferably through direct and interpersonal contact. Such a call for actual interaction with people far away is, in fact, entailed, in the normative regime of the Great Commission and can ultimately be seen as the cause for the ethics of care that developed for the southern Sudanese. Whereas there are numerous ethical norms that may foster interactions with distant, particularly suffering strangers, within academia it is worth highlighting the calls that have been made for a greater interpersonal collaboration with such strangers in the work that academics do (hooks, 1991; Katz, 1994; Routledge, 1996; 2001; 2003). As Routledge puts it, "it is important for academics to be *with* resisting others as well as *for* them". It should be noted, however, that the intimate contact that ensues from the interactive research that is thus promoted, as any other contact between different cultures, is also fraught with ethical challenges, demanding a careful interaction with difference while also fairly addressing the power dynamics involved in such interactions (England, 1994; Katz, 1992; 1994).

The second point, which follows directly from the first, has to do with embracing rather than resisting alterity. In this article I presented a universalist normative outlook

ingrained in the GCR that is generally absolutist in nature, and thus one that clashes with alterity. Yet the acceptance of alterity is often demanded by an ethics of care, either for such a care to develop in the first place or as part of a solution to the suffering of a cared for other. Not all normative regimes, however, have to be absolutist in the way that a divine command ethics is; alternative normative rationales should thus be fostered that are more open to alterity, and which, therefore, are less driven to homogenize space and, therefore, also more likely to appreciate differences across space.

Particularly enlightening in this regard has been the development of feminist ontologies based on a relational subjectivity in which humans are not seen as atomistic, rational creatures - the ultimate basis for a rights based approach to ethics - but rather as integrally linked to and dependent on other human beings (cf. Clement, 1996; Fisher and Tronto, 1990; Friedman, 1991; Tronto, 1993; 1999). Geographers, such as Massey (2004; 2005) and Whatmore (1997) have followed this trend by emphasizing the material interconnectivity of humans to other humans (and non-human life) over great distance, making this connectivity the basis of their calls for ethical concern and responsibility. Popke, on the other hand, building on the work of Levinas, goes a step further by placing our commitment to the unknown other at the center of our ontological being in the world, thus pressing upon us an inherent need to seek out, recognize, and appreciate the alterity of unknown others in need.

Finally, the third point concerns the fact that care ethics, precisely because of its potency, needs to be moderated by an effective normative framework to counter its partiality. The care fostered by the GCR, for example, was unable to fully recognize or act on the fact that the achieved peace deal they had been supporting excluded the

legitimate concerns of numerous actors who could not claim the privilege of having a U.S. benefactor. What is called for is thus a normative rationalization that is based on an attempt to intellectually apply our emotive care beyond the local. Clement, a feminist ethics of care theorist, addresses such a universalization of care through the perspective of proximate care itself. She states: "we learn to care for distant others by first developing close relationships to nearby others, and then recognizing similarities between close and distant others" (in Smith, 1998: 24). Although I see this recognition of similarity between close and distant others as a "rational achievement" in Friedman's sense, its realization through rational thinking would nonetheless offer a "careful care", in which the proximate care that one feels is supplemented by a sensitivity to the legitimate needs and desires of every person involved within a particular moral decision. In this sense, a commitment to justice could be established that is grounded on the impetus of care itself (cf. Lawson, 2007 for a rendition of the geographical dimensions of such a care-based justice).

To sum up, I want to suggest that the care-centered ethical framework that I have presented here ultimately amounts to a concerted attempt to be true to the geography that saturates all ethical challenges, particularly those involving distant strangers. The first two points mentioned above, of establishing an interpersonal connectivity with others and opening ourselves to their (and their neighbors') alterity, are based on a commitment to place, to foster a care that is local and contextual, in which the detailed geography in place can be probed for practical initiatives to redress the injustices and suffering that have become sedimented there. The third point emphasizes the need for a care-based justice, which takes a step back from the immediate emotional impetus of proximate care

to take into account how ones engagement with one particular place is normatively connected to other places, both near and far, where an ethics of care may not yet have reached.

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APPENDIX C

CARING FOR DISTANT VICTIMS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: AGAMBEN AND THE FAITH-BASED MOVEMENT TO SAVE DARFUR

To be submitted to Environment and Planning D: Society and Space

By Hannes Gerhardt

Abstract

In this paper I take up the issue of caring for foreign, far away others who have become the victim of extreme forms of state based violence such as ethnic cleansing or genocide. I approach this issue from the perspective of the recent work of Giorgio Agamben, who posits the inherent need to circumvent sovereign power within any form of normative activism. The case I consider to enlighten this issue is that of the faith-based movement to "Save Darfur". To begin, I show how this movement promotes an ideal in which the United States is seen to take the global responsibility to protect innocent, persecuted life beyond national boundaries. I argue, however, that this vision also leads to the acceptance of a sovereign framework for the valuation of life, thus failing to confront the inherent power of the sovereign to condemn life in the first place. Building on Agamben, I posit the possibility of establishing alternative communities of solidarity that challenge the sovereign's self-ascribed role as the absolute valuator of life. I argue that the basis for such alternative communities is best understood via a transnational ethics of care, which ultimately seeks a solidarity not only based on a sense of our common identity but on our common predicament in the face of a universally prevalent sovereign power. I ultimately show how such an ethics of care is also discernable in the "Save Darfur" movement, in which a more interconnected and personal relation to the Darfurians is fostered and maintained.

Introduction

In May 2004, as the United States was celebrating its role in finally negotiating an end to the Sudanese civil war between the North and the South, an emerging rebellion in the Western part of Sudan was already being met by a vicious counter insurgency. This counter insurgency has primarily targeted the civilian populations of particular black-African tribes in Darfur. Over the past three years there have been numerous reports of extensive humanitarian crimes sponsored by the government of Sudan, which is accused of having the intention to ethnically cleanse Darfur of particular populations. To date up to 400,000 people have lost their lives in this violence, thousands of women have been raped, while over 2.5 million people remain displaced in camps rife with hunger and disease. In September, 2004 the United States characterized the events in Darfur as genocide

Despite the horror that the events in Darfur may instill in us, however, it is a situation that appears to have become a regular aspect of contemporary human history. Numerous and repeated calls for a political commitment to a post-Auschwitzian ethics have not materialized. One such call was that of Theodor Adorno in 1966, who wrote, “A new categorical imperative has been imposed by Hitler upon unfree mankind: to arrange their thoughts and actions so that Auschwitz will not repeat itself, so that nothing similar will happen” (quoted in Bernstein, 2006, page 31). In responding to Adorno, J. M. Bernstein wrote, “What the new imperative calls for is a new conception of culture that would entail a singular and massive transformation in the structures of authority governing everyday life, and therefore a new self-understanding of how culture can be formative for us” (2006, page 32). To date, however, this massive transformation has remained elusive

as genocide and ethnic cleansing have been allowed to unfold in different forms and degrees throughout the world, including Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda and now in Darfur.

The ultimate question then is, what kind of culture must we call forth in order to alter the "structures of authority" in such a way as to make genocide practically unthinkable? In this article I will posit one suggestion that evolves out of a critical reading of Giorgio Agamben's work and an engagement with the ethical framework of how to care for "distant others". In other words, I address myself to the questions of how we can most effectively care for those far away who are the victims of sovereign power's transgressions and how such a care can ultimately be part of a grander aim to prevent, or at least minimize, such transgressions?

Within geography the interest in caring for "distant others" or "distant strangers" has been around for some time. Geographers have approached this issue in a variety of ways, some limiting themselves to the purely theoretical realm of moral theory (Barnett, 2005; Bridge, 1999; Cloke, 2002, Popke, 2003; Sack, 1997; Smith, 1998; 2000) while others have attempted to apply aspects of this theory to particular cases such as development aid (Corbridge, 1993; 1994, Korf, 2007; Silk, 2004) and issues of ethical consumption (Barnett et al., 2005a; 2005b; Castree, 2004; Friedberg, 2004; Goodman, 2004; Hudson and Hudson, 2003; Miller, 2001). There has, however, been only scant attention paid by geographers to the problems involved in caring for foreign strangers who are being persecuted by their own state, for example through genocide or ethnic cleansing (see O'Tuathail, 1999 for a partial exception).

I want to suggest that one reason for this disregard is that, in opposition to an ethical concern linked to the global economic system, which is inherently transnational, events

of foreign political violence are mostly viewed through the framework of a geographical bounding of ethical responsibility based on the Westphalian conceptualization of distinct and independent sovereign states (Billig, 1995; Campbell, 1998a; Campbell and Shapiro, 1999; Hindess, 1998; 2000a; 2000b; Popke, 2003; Shapiro, 1998). Thus, the thorny question of our responsibility for intervening in a predatory state is immediately confronted with the issue of the sanctity of a state's sovereignty. Directly related to this are incessant concerns that the humanitarian interventions needed to protect endangered lives are simply a front for a post-colonial usurpation of weaker states (for example Hardt and Negri, 2000).

In this article, however, I do not intend to discuss the pros and cons of humanitarian intervention. Instead, I want to address the issue of caring for victims of distant political violence by addressing what I see to be the very core of the issue, namely the inherent nature of sovereign power itself. Such a focus is inspired and informed by the work of Giorgio Agamben whose conceptualization of sovereign power centers on its final command over life, that is, the power to expel life from a protective community.[1] According to Agamben (1998), this power, furthermore, is grounded on a sovereignly maintained radical separation of life itself: the human as bare biological life, captured in the Greek term *zoe*, and the human as a dignified, political actor, captured in the Greek term *bios*.

Taking such a depiction of sovereign power seriously, we can then ponder what the implications are with regard to a caring over distance, which, in turn, reveals some critical limitations in Agamben's work. Thus, whereas I accept Agamben's contention

[1] Agamben never adequately defines "sovereign power" but I understand it as any relative monopoly on violence within a particular space.

that the core mechanism that enables political violence resides in the sovereign's monopoly on the valuation of life, I also want to challenge Agamben on two particular fronts. First, I critique Agamben's rigid ontology of power, which makes it impossible to engage sovereign power in any constructive way. Second, I argue against Agamben's conception of a liberation from sovereign power as occurring primarily within the atomistic individual.

I argue instead that the key to countering the sovereign's oppressive power lies precisely in the creation of a globally expansive network of communities that are able to offer a valuation of life that directly challenges the sovereign's monopoly of the *zoe-bios* distinction. By establishing such an alternative it becomes possible to check the transgressive powers of the sovereign and, eventually, to vigilantly engage the sovereign to help ensure human security and well-being. Instead of presenting this constructive critique of Agamben on its own, however, I attempt to do so along side an illuminating case of a nascent, faith-based mobilization focused on the Darfur crisis in Sudan, which I refer to as the Save Darfur Movement (SDM). My intention is thus to engage in a back and forth dialogue between Agamben's theorizations on sovereign power and the discourse and practices of the SDM to ultimately better understand, and to some extent also qualify, both.

The empirical part of this research consisted of fieldwork conducted in Washington D.C. in the fall of 2005. This work was primarily aimed at collecting information on the Save Dave Darfur Movement (SDM), which I delimited to those religious denominations and faith-based organizations that were members of, or associated with, the "Save Darfur" coalition. This coalition, which was founded by the American Jewish World

Service in 2004, constitutes a well organized non-governmental umbrella organization centered in Washington D.C. The self-proclaimed mission of the Save Darfur coalition is "to raise public awareness about the ongoing genocide in Darfur and to mobilize a unified response to the atrocities that threaten the lives of two million people in the Darfur region" (Save Darfur, 2007). The key SDM actors within this coalition include the National Council of Churches, The Union for Reform Judaism, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, and the National Association of Evangelicals.

The fieldwork consisted of numerous interviews with key informants from SDM organizations. I also collected an extensive amount of advocacy literature on the issue of Darfur from these organizations. In addition to these, I took part in Darfur related meetings and gatherings organized by the SDM. Finally, I served as a part-time intern in the government affairs office of the Episcopal Church, which was particularly active on the issue of Darfur and the Sudan in general.

Through this fieldwork and later with the help of N-Vivo textual processing software I was able to map out the discourses being employed by the SDM. The analysis of this discourse ultimately focused on the language employed to express ethical concern and responsibility for the life of Darfurians. I was also interested in how the United State was represented in relation to the Darfur crisis by the SDM, and in what way the United States was incorporated into conceptions of responsibility and care for Darfur. This focus was also pursued in the participant observation. Being a participant observer allowed me to query the intimate contact I established through my work within the SDM to discern the ways in which the relation between discourse and identity actively produced and reproduced a particular commitment to the distant life in Darfur and, related to this, the

general perception of the state's responsibility for this life. The benefit to such intimate contact over simple interviews was that, with time, I was able to establish a trust with my co-workers and fellow activists that allowed me to truly get a sense of their emotions and sentiments regarding their advocacy work (Jorgensen, 1993).

Caring Through Sovereign Power

Due to its clearly expressed transnational ethical focus the SDM can be regarded as an ideal example of a movement that seeks to fundamentally transcend humanly constructed political boundaries as the basis for ethical inclusion and care (for other examples see Cravey, 2004; Desai, 2002; Goodman, 2004; Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Nepstad, 2001; Tarrow, 2005). This rejection of ethical boundaries is something that was repeatedly stressed in the written and verbal discourse of the SDM. Bill, a member of a small mainline denomination and an activist in the Save Darfur campaign summed this sentiment up quite well in an interview I conducted:

> "It doesn't make any sense for our care to only go so far, to the borders of the United States, for example. We are all equal under God and so every human deserves the same amount of care as any other."

In this sense, the discourse of the SDM presents a consistent and deeply held conviction in the need for caring transnationally.

Accompanying this transnational ethical focus, however, was the articulation of a demand on meta-sovereign power to take responsibility for transnational life. By meta-

sovereign power I mean an intervening force that is seen to supersede the sovereign prerogative of any individual state. Thus, more particularly, since the government of Sudan was deemed to be unable or unwilling to offer protection to its population a call was made for a meta-sovereign intervention. As one main advocacy paper within the SDM states:

> "To be clear, the preferred solution is for the international community to flex its diplomatic muscles . . . What is also clear, however, is that the international community must not take no for an answer when it comes to protecting civilians in Darfur" (Save Darfur, 2006a).

It should be noted that most of the advocacy work of the SDM has focused on establishing a viable protective force, or "boots on the ground", to protect "innocent civilians". Originally, demands were made for an African Union force, then for its expansion and a "toughening" of its mandate, and later, as conditions on the ground continued to deteriorate, the emphasis shifted to a large U.N. force with NATO support. In this way, sovereign power is directly pulled into the care for distant strangers. As one advocacy postcard intended for the Whitehouse bluntly states: "Mr. President. Beyond politics, beyond borders, beyond religion, there is the moral imperative to save lives" (Save Darfur, 2006b).

Ontological Differences

For Agamben, the incorporation of sovereign power in any project of liberation is, in the end, counter productive and dangerous. The underlying reasoning for this assessment is that Agamben embraces a Schmittian understanding of sovereignty as grounded in a force, or a decision, that exceeds the law that it enforces. According to Agamben (2005) this raw power, or *auctoritas* as he calls it, is characterized by the state of exception, a space where pure *anomie* reigns, that is, the pure dis-order that results from the arbitrary will of the sovereign becoming law.

However, as Agamben makes clear, the force of the law in the space of the ordered and norm-driven *nomos* can only be grounded by this *auctoritas*, and thus depends on the *anomic* space of the exception. Applied to the biopolitical realm, this logic shows that the sovereign's capture of life depends in some way on the banning of life, of excepting life from *bios*. Agamben writes: "If the exception is the structure of sovereignty, then sovereignty is not an exclusively political concept, an exclusively juridical concept . . . it is the originary structure in which law refers to life and includes it in itself by suspending it" (1998, page 28). When life is in fact suspended by the sovereign in this way it becomes what Agamben calls *homo sacer*, that is, the life that is outside of protection and which can be killed and tortured with impunity.

From an Agambian perspective then, the call on sovereign power to engage in humanitarian interventions not only empowers the sovereign's ability to call a state of exception but also serves to expand the sovereign's spatial reach, leading to an eventual globalized state of exception. Clearly, this is not a view that is shared by the SDM or the

human rights movement in general. The crux of the difference concerns how sovereign power is conceptualized. Does sovereign power inevitably create spaces of exception, as Agamben would have it, or is sovereign power bound to more extensive practices and discourse that, with the help of a vigilant civil society, could eventually bring about a space virtually free of exceptions? Unfortunately, I do not think that this question can be answered in an empirical way. What can be done, however, is to consider the opposing ontological orientations on which these approaches depend and contemplate the consequences that these have for ones political and ethical perception of space.

Agamben's ontology is ultimately grounded in a problem that has continued to bedevil philosophy - and mathematics for that matter - regarding the inability to find a permanent ground for truth statements, and thus reality.[2] In other words, Agamben follows a Derridian understanding of language in which our utterances, or *parole*, are continuously deferred to a larger language structure, or *langue*, "whose actual denotation is maintained in infinite suspension" (Agamben 1998, page 20). In this sense, *parole* is given its foundation by the ungrounded ground of *langue*. For Agamben *langue*, then, takes on the role of the sovereign and *parole* adopts the role of the particular expressions of the *nomos*. Agamben thus suggest that in a similar way to how *langue* serves to ground *parole*, the sovereign serves as the vanishing ground for law, and just as language is internally unstable and can be deconstructed to reveal its empty denotation, the sovereign too reveals that it is nothing more than itself. The sovereign must therefore again and again become the ground to itself, at which point sovereign power becomes *auctoritas*;

[2] With regard to mathematics I am referring here to Gödel's theory which ultimately states that every mathematical system that can be expressed in first-order logic is, as far as that logic is concerned, incomplete and not provably consistent within that system.

the *nomos* thus vanishes to give way to spaces of *anomie*, where the arbitrary will of the sovereign becomes law.

But Agamben's ontological positioning can be opposed by refusing to recognize the undergirding need or drive for a self referential foundation. In other words, the fact that *parole* is deferred to a *langue* "whose actual denotation is maintained in infinite suspension" must not be considered problematic in of itself. This is generally the position taken within ordinary language philosophy and pragmatism more generally, where the emphasis is on functionality rather than with the grounding of truth statements (the work of John Dewey, the later Wittgenstein and Richard Rorty are particularly relevant here). The emphasis in pragmatism is on the fact that language still functions to create meaning even if it fails to provide a direct reference to the world, just as mathematical systems still manage to calculate and predict even though they cannot be proved from within these same systems. In this way the *langue* of language or the logic of mathematics are not separated out as grounding forces but rather are seen as part of a larger indeterminate, although still meaningful system.

It is my contention that the ontological rejection of a necessary grounding foundation to establish truth, meaning, or sense can be transposed to a consideration of sovereignty and law. Sovereignty, for example, need not be completely isolated and presented as gripped by an obsession to become self-referential. Law and the sovereign, in other words, can be seen as haphazard formations within complicated systems of emergence that ultimately have no ground, yet that nevertheless create order. This, of course, resembles a much more Foucauldian understanding of power, particularly his conceptualization of governmentality, which consists of a broad spectrum of discourses

and practices that shape the execution of governance at both a micro and macro level (Foucault, 1991). By *not* isolating the sovereign as a necessary grounding force for law, it is thus possible to envision the governmentalization of the sovereign[3]. I believe that it is such an ontology that is ultimately internalized by the SDM. What we can see in this movement is the conceptualization of a sovereign power that is independent yet still intricately connected to a larger indeterminate governmentality.

Thus, when asked who they felt had the power to stop the political violence in Darfur, my informants frequently presented relatively complex understandings of power, often emphasizing the particularly critical role played by civil society. As Betty, a full time activist for a small Catholic NGO told me after an event co-sponsored by her organization:

> "Well, of course, the Sudanese government could put an end to the killing, but they won't. This means that someone else has to do it. The United States called this genocide, and so they should take the lead . . . But our government isn't doing what needs to be done, that is why we need to get involved. We have the power to get the world involved . . . If the people make enough noise, governments will listen. We, together, can stop the killing."

The understanding of power is here clearly one of an interaction between the sovereign and the constituent power of society.

[3] This is just a different way of rephrasing Foucault's (1991) original comment concerning the governmentalization of the state.

Following from this, I want to suggest that the ontology of power that we ultimately accept has a fundamental influence on our political and ethical conceptualization of space, particularly our view of the spatial articulation of *nomos* and *anomie.* With an Agambian ontology all space must be seen as being at the mercy of sovereign power. In such a case anomic spaces, associated with exclusion and extermination (see for example, Gregory, 2004a; 2004b; 2004c; Long, 2004; Minca, 2005; Pratt, 2006; Secor, 2007) must be seen as the "normal" space, for it is the natural space of the sovereign, who trumps all other forms of power. It is precisely because *anomie* is the more natural space that Agamben ultimately posits a global permanent exception in which all space will eventually be stripped of its *nomos*. The sovereign, then, will no longer engage in organizing spaces that order "forms of life and juridical norms" and instead will contain "within itself a dislocating localization that exceeds it and in which virtually every form of life and every norm is captured" (1998, page 175). In this way, *nomos* and *anomie*, inside and outside become blurred; governmentality disintegrates leaving only internment and torture camps as the expression of raw sovereign power.

Within an Agambian perception of space there is, therefore, no point in making a distinction between forms of sovereign power. Every spatially delimited *nomos* can become an exception at any time. In this regard, the call on the sovereign to establish a *nomos*, for example in Sudan, will be achieved, if at all, only at the cost of expanding sovereign power more generally. Thus, according to Agamben, any such efforts to universalize the *nomos* will only contribute to the inevitable extension of anomic spaces, culminating finally in the all pervasive permanent exception.

In a Foucauldian ontology, however, the *nomos*, with its regulation of and investment in life, becomes the "normal" space. This dominant space can consist of both spaces of control associated with Foucault's (1979) *Discipline and Punish* (see for example, Driver, 1985; 1993; Hannah, 1997; Pallot, 2005; Soja, 1989) as well as the more haphazard and emergent spaces of governance associated with Foucault's (1978) *History of Sexuality* (see, for example, Agnew and Coleman, 2007; Hannah, 2000; O'Tuathail, 1996; Philo, 1992; Sharp et al., 2000). Either way, however, in a Foucauldian emphasis on the *nomos* the sovereign is seen to retreat, becoming diffused in more specific and spatially delimited forms of power. This is not to say, however, that sovereign power must be dismissed altogether. As Foucault states,

> "I wouldn't say exactly that sovereignty's old right – to take life or let live – was replaced, but it came to be complemented by a new right which does not erase the old right but which does penetrate it, permeate it. This is the right, or rather precisely the opposite right. It is the power to 'make' live and 'let' die" (2003, page 241).

Thus, in a Foucauldian conception of contemporary power the sovereign is still present, yet the sovereign decision can never be completely isolated from the established governmentality that is in effect. If this governmentality nonetheless does collapse within an exceptional anomic space, however, the sovereign power that was linked to it is ultimately also placed in a precarious situation. What remains is the power of the sword,

the power to kill, which, according to Foucault, is ultimately less stable than the more diffuse sovereign power that can make live or let die.

Empire Lite

It is the vision of a subsumption of the sovereign to a global, humane governmentality, which itself is seen to come about through an emergent, bottom-up process that gives rise within the SDM to a utopic geography to come. In this utopia, which is in complete contradiction to Agamben's vision of the future, *anomic* space is seen as completely overcome; it is fundamentally disallowed from ever forming. For example, Jonathan, a full-time activist for a mainline protestant NGO told me in an interview: "We still have a long way to go, but my hope is that through movements like this we will be able to establish the structures, both internationally and domestically, both within governments and society, to make genocide impossible".

As I have pointed out, in order to achieve this aim, the SDM has placed a heavy emphasis on directing sovereign power to enforce a governmental obligation "to make live" against the old power "to take life". In other words, the fundamental aim of the SDM is to tame "regressive" sovereign power with "progressive" sovereign power using a number of interventions, including military ones. The SDM, therefore, can here be seen to make a clear distinction between two types of sovereign power, which in turn pose two types of challenges with regard to establishing a utopic geography free of anomic spaces. On the one hand there is the problem of the sovereign's power over life, which can be used to condemn populations to genocide and ethnic cleansing. This problem is associated with "rogue" sovereigns, such as the government of Sudan, which are

understood in similar ways to Agamben's conception of *auctoritas*: the sovereign whose life becomes law, that is, a pure and arbitrary power over life.

On the other hand, there are "moderate" sovereigns, associated with the United States and the "international community", who are seen as more intimately entwined within regimes of humane governmentality, both domestically and globally. The key problem associated with this moderate sovereign power is its *realpolitik*, that is, its focus on narrow "national" interests. Peter, working for the government affairs office of a large mainline protestant denomination, spoke of these "western" states to me as follows: "I mean, these guys aren't your typically good Samaritans. They have all kinds of interests. All we can do is to try to keep them focused on doing the right thing." Yet despite the skepticism towards sovereign power that is evident in this quote, there remains a real belief in a possible "right thing" that the sovereign could be brought to do, which ultimately is to enforce a global, life protecting *nomos*.

If I were to leave the depiction of the SDM at this, however, I would basically be engaging in a rather typical global civil society story; that is, the account of a global struggle to replace the narrow, national interests that determine statecraft with ethical imperatives dictated by the increasingly large and organized global network of ethics-based NGOs (see for example Falk, 2000; Kaldor, 1999; 2003; Linklater, 1998). In this approach, liberal-democratic states are seen as potential benign pawns in a game determined primarily from within global civil society itself (Chandler, 2002). It is precisely such a view that then smoothly segues into the positive conception of what Ignatieff casually has referred to as "Empire Lite", that is, an American-led world order that seeks to establish "free markets, human rights and democracy, enforced by the most

awesome military power the world has ever known" (2003, page 23). It is, essentially a vision of a "humanitarian empire" established through vigorous nation-building and occasional military interventions when states fail.

The Empire Lite vision is ultimately a complete rejection of Agamben's warning of the nature of sovereign power, which is that no matter what its expression the sovereign, by acting as the gatekeeper between spaces of *zoe* and *bios*, always commands the power to ban life. Taking Agamben seriously would thus mean recognizing that the double action of enabling and restraining sovereign power is deeply paradoxical, for, as Agamben shows, the power that controls the inscription of value onto life is also the power that can recall this value and ban it to the status of *homo sacer* (also see Caldwell, 2004). I believe that it is in fact possible, and helpful, to accept this understanding of sovereign power without, however, having to accept Agamben's ontology in its entirety. In short, sovereign power can be recognized to be essentially the same everywhere, as Agamben suggests, yet the ultimate execution of sovereign power over life, by banning it, is not inevitable or necessary, rather it is a constant potential that may be realized in the sovereign's pursuit of, in the words of Peter above, "all kinds of interests." The key switch that happens if we incorporate Agamben's thought here is that we can no longer clearly separate benign and rogue sovereigns. We cannot map out spaces where humans are fundamentally safe from sovereign power and where they are not.

Despite aspects within the SDM that clearly expound an Empire Lite imaginary, some members of the movement did, in fact, recognize the inherent challenge posed by sovereign power. Tom, who worked as a volunteer for the Save Darfur cause, for example, stated:

> "I'm aware of the paradox, to call in the U.S. to save lives here while at the same time they are committing torture in Iraq and Guantanamo. This too must be challenged. The sanctity of life must be defended, that is our obligation as Christians. It is a calling that I believe will never end."

In such a sentiment we can see an open acknowledgement of the inherent power of the sovereign, regardless of its form, to persecute life.

Such a realization deeply problematizes the issue of how best to care at a distance for victims of genocide and ethnic cleansing. In other words, we are forced to ask whether our energies should focus on the sovereign's potential to protect or rather whether we should emphasize its power to condemn. This is not necessarily an either/or question, although the two approaches must be seen as being at odds with each other. To reiterate, sovereign power in all of its forms is based first and foremost on its position as the absolute valuator and guardian of life. It should therefore be in the interest of any movement seeking to challenge the very root of the sovereign's power to condemn life to develop a valuation of life that circumvents this power. By calling on a meta-sovereign to intervene to save lives, however, the very opposite is done.

This is a conundrum that probably has no completely satisfying answer. For its part, the SDM has chosen to embrace the need for a sovereign power to intervene in Sudan in order to save lives. It is not my intention here to argue against this approach - in the short term the call for a physical intervention to prevent massive humanitarian crimes is certainly understandable. What I want to do instead is point out that whereas this

approach may indeed lead to the saving of lives it does not, on its own, create the cultural transformation that would make genocide unthinkable. The question that I want to pursue therefore is, given the call on the sovereign to protect life, which was here deemed necessary, what efforts have been made, or could be made, to nevertheless reclaim the capture of life from sovereign power more generally, to keep this power in check and thus to seek a protection and wellbeing for humans across the globe that is less fragile?

Giving in to Bare Life

The rest of this article will be dedicated to answering the above question by considering how the SDM positions itself with regard to sovereign power's self-proclaimed role as the undisputed gatekeeper between spaces of *zoe* and *bios*. I will argue that there are two trends to discern: one which ultimately reinforces the sovereign command over the *zoe-bios* distinction and one which challenges it.

The sovereign's command over life is produced and reproduced by society whenever life is conceptualized in terms of sovereign power. I will refer to this as a sovereign framework for the valuation of life, which basically views life as either being incorporated by a sovereign, making it the good life of political inclusion, or being banned by the sovereign, making it *zoe*, the abject naked life. Within the SDM the sovereign framework for the valuation of life was most evident in the discourse surrounding what can be called "survival camps", that is, the refugee camps and "feeding centers" established by the international community to "care" for those that have been forced to flee their homes due to the ongoing political violence in Darfur.

From an Agambian perspective such survival camps reflect the crux of contemporary biopower. Agamben states: “The decisive activity of biopower in our time consists in the production not of life or death, but rather of a mutable and virtually infinite survival (1999, page 155)”. The point of this is the construction of a bare life that enables the sovereign’s capture of life as such. As Katia Genel states, “The camp entails a direct relation between power and life. It is a new and stable spatial order inhabited by a bare life which, increasingly, fails to appear within the system: in this way life is made the object of a radical capture by the sovereign” (2006, page 56). It is important to note, however, that this radical capture strengthens sovereign power in general – not only the sovereign that has initially banned these persons (the Sudanese state), but also the sovereign that manages to keep them alive within the status of bare life (the “international” community). In this sense, the space of the survival camp is the ultimate battleground for the command over the valuation of life.

Within the SDM, however, there has been little resistance to the sovereign’s framework for the valuation life with regard to the critical space of the camp. Instead, the SDM discourse often presents the camp dwellers in Darfur as bare, naked life. In other words, the “sanctity of life” that often animates the moral concern within the discourse quickly succumbs to a focus on life’s mere survival. Consider this statement from the leading background paper distributed by the Save Darfur Coalition: “These innocent victims are essentially on life support, their continued existence dependent on U.S. and international humanitarian aid and the presence of African Union peacekeepers” (Save Darfur, 2006a). Agamben’s (1999) focus on the “neomort”, the body on life support, as the essence of abstracted bare life on which sovereign power feeds is here strikingly

reflected. The humanity of those in the camps, presented as basically no longer sentient, is essentially taken from them. In this way the separation of a sovereignly determined *zoe* and *bios* is recreated.

Equally enlightening is the following statement by the U.S. Senior Vice President of World Vision, an evangelical humanitarian relief agency linked to the Save Darfur Coalition via the National Association of Evangelicals:

> "My first view of the camp was heart-breaking. How can a human being live like this? You cannot call this living. They have lost all their dignity. Everything human has been taken away from them. What have they done to deserve this? (World Vision, 2004)"

What we are confronted with here is the ultimate point of the camp from the perspective of Agamben (1999): The creation of the *Muselmann*, the pure bare life, which is human but beyond humanity. The *Muselmann*, which originally refers to the Nazi concentration camp inmates who had given up on "dignified" life and thus had become "living dead", aims to demonstrate life's utter abandonment – the ultimate completion of *zoe*. Thus, the sight of the *Muselmann* is intended to instill in us a sense of the pitiable and inhuman creatures we become when abandoned by the sovereign. In this sense, the quote by the World Vision executive above is just what the sovereign would ask of us – dismay, almost a sense of repulsion, and a fixation on the absolute power of the sovereign over life. In other words, it doesn't really matter what "they" did to deserve this fate, what matters is their final subjection to sovereign power.

According to Agamben the fact of the *Muselmann* demands of us a new ethics, one that is beyond dignity, an ethics that manages to value the innate humanness of our inhumanity. As shown above, the SDM does not always manage to achieve this. As with most human rights movements it is still in many ways caught up in the demand for dignity, the demand for a sovereignly ordained *bios*. From a standpoint concerned with the execution of a care over distance this approach ultimately fails to achieve a true solidarity because the sovereign's command of the *zoe-bios* distinction, at its apex in the critical space of the camp, is not adequately challenged. In other words, the lives of the Darfurian are allowed to be interpolated primarily by sovereign power, which, in the end, has no actual interest in particular lives but rather only in the dominion over life in general. The sovereign has nothing to gain, and perhaps even something to lose, by making such camps unthinkable and thus cannot be a true partner in one's care for the camp inhabitants. A true care, instead, must seek to transgress sovereign power in order to allow life to be interpolated from within communities that are truly committed and connected to each and every life.

Responding to the *Muselmann*

Agamben, however, although helpful in elucidating the challenge of what care for distant others entails, is ultimately unable and unwilling to spell out how such care could actually be executed. This is due to the ontology of power that Agamben embraces and the consequent need to overcome sovereign power in its entirety. For Agamben this task can only be achieved by making *bios* subservient to a *zoe* that is conceived as being innately within us. Agamben thus speaks of a form of life, which he defines as, "this

being that is only its own bare existence" and a life that, "being its own form, remains inseparable from it" (1998, page 188). Such a form of life designates what Agamben (1993) calls a "whatever singularity", that is, a life that is pure potentiality in that it remains completely un-inscribed from any external forces.

Agamben sees the dawn of such forms of life as made possible through a Benjaminian messianic trajectory, which, curiously, develops and culminates via sovereign power itself. Agamben asserts, "In the state of exception become the rule, the life of *homo sacer*, which was the correlate of sovereign power, turns into an existence over which power no longer seems to have any hold" (1998, page 153). What such a position finally means with regard to caring over distance is fully revealed in Agamben's work *Remnants of Auschwitz*, where, in reference to the concentration camp survivors of WWII, he states, "The bare life to which human beings were reduced neither demands nor conforms to anything. It itself is the only norm; it is absolutely immanent (1999, page 69)". Thus, for Agamben, the *Muselmann*, the abject bare life of the camp, does not, in fact, demand a response.

Instead, Agamben suggests that the *Muselmann* calls for an insight; the *Muselmann* shows us the way to the inhumaness, or complete lack of subjectivity, that is at the core of all humanity. Bernstein thus argues that,

> "The figure of the *Muselmann* becomes the desubjectified subject, where desubjectification is the chaos of language before language, what is left of the speaking being after all form is torn away from it. But if the *Muselmann* figures the

other side of language, then he is a metaphysical trope, the perfectly inhuman that is the possibility of the human" (2006, page 45).

What Agamben thus achieves is the human as a ground to him/herself, thus overcoming the link to sovereign power. The lesson of Auschwitz, then, represents a metaphysical revelation, enabled by the *Muselmann*; this has nothing to do with actually standing by the *Muselmann* or caring for the life in the camp. For Agamben the task at hand is metaphysical and those that suffer are nothing more than a token of our true metaphysical condition – namely that *zoe* is innately within us and that *bios*, which is subservient to *zoe*, is irreconcilable with it.

In the end, Agamben's solution maintains a typical poststructuralist focus on subjectivity and the need to free this subjectivity from any imposing external political determinations. We are thus presented with a utopian geography in which there are only sovereign-less anomic spaces, where every life becomes its own law. Yet such a non-relational ethics, grounded in atomistic entities, or the utopic whatever singularities that we are all to become, leaves no room for a caring over distance. Such an impasse, if we consider the failure to recognize the potential positive power of human solidarity an impasse, can be avoided, however, if we do not start with the assumption that sovereign power must be overcome absolutely. For example, as I argued earlier, within a more Foucauldian ontology there is never truly an escape from power and, consequently, there will never come a time in which humans become pure potentialities in a universally anomic space devoid of power. Yet, what nevertheless enables the possibility of resistance and liberation, even if this liberation is always temporary, is that the

sovereign's capture of life is not regarded as necessarily absolute. Life, in other words, is seen to be interpolated from many sources, of which sovereign power is but one, albeit a lethal one. The acknowledgement that sovereign power will always endure, but that it need not endure in its monopoly on the valuation of life, leads directly to the possibility and need for establishing a solidarity in resistance to those interpolating forces that are most oppressive.

What is called for, then, is not a messianic blast in which the sovereign's nakedness is revealed once and for all but rather a continuous struggle to again and again strip the sovereign's absolute claim on life by establishing an alternative valuation to life that the sovereign cannot easily transgress. Agamben would, of course, not concede to this approach since any valuation of life that exceeds the individual would entail new power constructions that interfere with the utopia he strives for. Yet it is precisely the lack of a utopia, namely the conviction that a liberation from oppressive power will be a continuous struggle, that animates the alternative that I want to present.

Resisting Sovereign Power as Such

In what follows I will consider the ways in which the SDM has engaged in alternative valuations of life that serve as a solidarity over distance against the sovereign monopoly on the value over life. This aspect of the SDM is in clear distinction to the ways in which the SDM managed to affirm the sovereign's capture of life, particularly with regard to the humanitarian aid and relief discourses associated with the refugee camps.

To begin with, I want to comment on the focus on the sacredness of life that saturates the SDM discourse. Although the way that life was spoken about varied from group to

group, the focus on the innate value of life resonated across all groups. Both Christian and Jewish groups frequently made calls to recognize the image of the Divine in every human life. Reference was regularly made to the "Gospel's call to protect human life and dignity" (U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops, 2006). The words "sacred" and "sanctity" were particularly common. The Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism (2006), for example, states: "The Torah makes clear that we have an obligation to preserve the sanctity of life by speaking out in response to oppression and brutality in our world."

Jewish respondents also frequently mentioned a faith that equates a single life to the entire cosmos. Discourse emanating from Jewish sources, and echoed in my interviews with Jewish informants, made frequent references to the preciousness of each individual. Thus the struggle for Darfur was frequently framed as a struggle for each and every endangered individual, and that every life saved was equal to saving the world. It should be noted that this care for the individual life clearly resonates with the Hebraically rooted pastoral power commented on by Foucault, which envisions a rationale for organizing human societies based on the shepherd and the flock, that is, a power "whose role is constantly to ensure, sustain, and improve the lives of each and every one" (Foucault 1999, page 141). In this way, pastoral power focuses on subjects as "living individuals" who are to be cared for rather than on governed populations, or citizens, with rights and obligations.

Following Agamben, however, the "sanctity" of life that is here referred to is actually grounded on the sovereign's final dominance over life. In other words, despite the pronouncement of the divinely proffered sanctity of life there is an ingrained acknowledgement of the sovereign's command over life. Agamben writes, "The

sacredness of life, which is invoked today as an absolutely fundamental right in opposition to sovereign power, in fact originally expresses precisely both life's subjection to a power over death and life's irreparable exposure in the relation of abandonment" (1998, page 83).[4] Yet Agamben's point would not necessarily be disputed by most members of the SDM. The connection between sacredness and sovereign power is clear in the discourse of the SDM where the sanctity of life is almost always made within the context of the sovereign's act of banning or taking this life. In other words, it is precisely life's "subjection to a power over death" that has motivated the SDM to seek sovereign guarantees for life's protection.

It is my contention, however, that recognizing life's vulnerability in the face of sovereign power does not necessarily render moot the claims to life's sanctity. It is helpful here to point to the pastoral power that initially emerged within Christian thinking during the Roman Empire. The aim of Christians at that time, who openly proclaimed that nothing was more alien to them than "public matters of the empire" (Hamacher, 2004), was ultimately to interpolate the lives of subjectivities not in terms of their status as political beings but rather in terms of their social-spiritual identity. It is this effort to claim a value on life that was independent of the sovereign political realm that arguably led to the fundamental fracturing between the political and social community, thus providing the groundwork for the emergence of "civil society".[5] The politicization of this

[4] In this sense Agamben speaks of sacred life rather in terms of *homo sacer*, drawing on the Latin term of sacer as the "vile" or "ignominious" one who violates the law (1998:105). *Homo sacer* then actually refers to a life caught within a double exception – the life that is banned from both the political and the religious realms of signification. Thus *homo sacer*, the sacred human, is the life that can be "killed but not sacrificed."

[5] In "The Jewish Question" Marx recognized the Judeo-Christian tendency of attempting to form an alternative community to the political community associated with the sovereign. For Marx this ultimately solidified the gap between political emancipation and social emancipation.

gap between the political and social worlds then eventually gave rise to the rights regimes intended to protect the social subject from sovereign power. However, if, as Agamben, we only focus on these rights, which are in the domain of the political, we lose sight of the capacity of the social community, in divorcing itself from the concerns of the empire, to establish an alternative valuation of life. Yet, I want to suggest, that it is precisely in such an alternative valuation of life that the sovereign's monopoly on the *zoe-bios* distinction is challenged and where the internalized sacredness of life is maintained.

Ethics of Care

It is at this point that I finally want to turn to what is referred to as an ethics of care, which I see as intimately linked to the establishment and maintenance of life's sanctity beyond the value attributed to it by the sovereign. Within an ethics of care life's value is ultimately seen to be grounded in intersubjectivity, as opposed to any "rights" to be guaranteed by sovereign power (Clement, 1996; Fisher and Tronto, 1990; Friedman, 1991; Sevenhuijsen, 1998; Tronto, 1993; 1999). The vital contribution that a feminist ethics of care makes, therefore, is that it emphasizes the actual connections and relations between people rather than stipulating their fundamental separation as atomistic, generic entities. The focus here, however, on interpersonal relations has led some to question whether a care ethics can be applied over distance. I contend that some components of the SDM have indeed demonstrated an internalized ethics of care with regard to those suffering in the far away location of Darfur. Furthermore, I suggest that such a care has often managed to circumvent and even challenge the sovereign's monopoly on the valuation of life.

In his critical book on humanitarian aid, David Rieff demands that we move beyond treating "human beings in the generic sense . . . devoid of historical context, geographical specificity . . . and any real personalization" (Rieff , 2002, page 35). In support of this sentiment, it is my position that it is precisely this abstraction of the human that also leads to an understanding of life as bare, abandoned, and completely at the mercy of sovereign power. I content that we could oppose such a view of life by establishing a sense of solidarity that transcends reference to a vague human essence to be protected by the sovereign in favor of a sense of care that is grounded in an emotional interpersonal connection to the "other".

Jenny Edkins offers a similar ethical vision in which we "look at subjects as produced always already in and through relations with other subjects" (2003, page 256). This also recalls Popke's challenge "to open ourselves to the fold of community constituted by our being-in-common-in-the-world" (2003, page 312). Yet I want to argue that this interconnectivity between oneself and distant others needs also to move beyond what Marilyn Freidman would call a "rational achievement" (1993, page 88). In addition, we need to develop, as Cloke puts it, "a sense for the other which is emotional, connected and committed" (2002, page 594). Put another way, Derek McCormack writes, 'the question is not only "how far can we care" but also becomes one of cultivating commitments that may increase the intensity of attachment and connectivity' (2003, page 503).

Within the SDM I discerned two significant and mutually reinforcing elements in achieving such an "intensity" of care: first, establishing a personal link to those lives being cared for, and second, making these lives an integral part of one's routinized

existence. Establishing a personal link to the distant sufferer first of all means not abstracting these identities in the discourse by referring to them as mere bare life. Within the SDM, for example, there are many examples within the discourse where the Darfurians are consciously tied into the caring community of the SDM. Thus, for example, when addressing the Washington Save Darfur rally in 2006, Rev. John McCullough was able to declare, "When Darfur is at risk, we are at risk . . . [we endanger] our collective sense of humanity" (quoted in Church World Service, 2006). In other words, the Darfur crisis and the pain of those victimized are not just viewed as a problem over there, it is a problem that is presented as affecting us personally, impacting our very identity.

Such a sentiment of interconnectivity and relation was prevalent within the SDM discourse. In my interaction with co-activists, for example, frequent calls were made to assist our "neighbors" or our "brothers and sisters in Darfur." In one campaign associated with the SDM the call to care was turned into a letter addressing those to be cared for: "even though you are far away, you are like us, mothers and fathers, children and grandparents, friends and community" (Dear Sudan, 2006). It is within such efforts not to abstract the humans being cared for that we can also discern a fundamental challenge to the terminology of "distant others". In other words, those to be cared for over there are presented as emotionally close and as sharing an equally innate value to us over here.

Yet truly maintaining an emotional proximity to far away strangers also requires more than a refusal to succumb to the dehumanizing impetus of the sovereign's creation of the *Muselmann*. An intersubjective care ultimately requires fostering a personalized relation to the far away suffering stranger, creating an emotionally internalized value for that life.

Most of the SDM members I interviewed and worked with, for example, clearly saw themselves as somehow connected to the Darfurians they aimed to help. When I asked them about this connection many spoke of a form of epiphany, a sudden moment in which the suffering and the horror being experienced in Darfur suddenly became real to them, often through a film or a talk, at which point they were overcome by an emotive sense of empathy and responsibility.

The importance of being exposed to the suffering of distant strangers, particularly when it presents the humanity of these victims, cannot be overemphasized in its role in arousing emotional commitment. As a participant observer in the SDM I attended a number of gatherings aimed at raising awareness about Darfur. These were generally quite emotional events in which images and reports of the violence in Darfur were presented, often in graphic detail. By far the most moving moments, however, were those where the victims of the violence in Darfur were humanized and taken out of the context of the *Muselmann* role. I recall one event where a Darfurian woman was able to speak of her own experiences as a victim of the violence in Darfur. The simple presence of this woman, the fact that you could see her face and gestures immediately humanized the suffering that she came to speak about. Interestingly, this woman spent much time talking, via an interpreter, of her past life before the conflict started, what her everyday life looked like, what dreams and aspirations she had, only then to begin to describe the unfathomable violence by which she was victimized. By this time, the audience was riveted, connected to her pain. Muted and suppressed sobs were uttered throughout the auditorium.

This process of humanizing the victim, of tying them into our "collective sense of humanity" must be seen as an integral aspect of the "epiphany" moments that many activists referred to in explaining their sense of urgency to get involved in the issue of Darfur. In addition to this, however, it is interesting to note that several activists also referred to particular aspects of their identity, whether it was as a Jew, an African American, or a Woman, as a particular quality that connected them to the victims in Darfur. Jews thus often mentioned their particular history with genocide, African Americans emphasized the racial connotations of the Darfur conflict, whereas women often stressed the high number of rapes associated with the crisis. In other words, reference was made to a commonality, grounded in an experience of sovereign persecution, that linked these otherwise very different people in a mutual political struggle against sovereign oppression.

This leads me to a critical point I want to make: regardless of whether one's impulse to care is limited to a sense of a collective humanity or whether it is enhanced by a particular identity, I want to suggest that the collective effort discernable in this case to maintain the sanctity of far away others must be seen, in the end, as a resistance to the sovereign's self ascribed role as the absolute valuator of life. In other words, a solidarity is established that is not only based on a sense of our common identity but on our common predicament in the face of a universally prevalent sovereign power. As Foucault once put it while addressing a press conference in 1981 as an advocate for the assistance of "boat people" fleeing Vietnam, "we are all governed and, to that extent, in solidarity" (quoted in Campbell 1998b, page 516).

Yet I also want to emphasize here that whereas the various forms of establishing a personal link to those lives being cared for outlined above are all critical to establishing a solidarity over distance, to sustain such a solidarity it is necessary to integrate this personal link into one's routinized life. In other words, it does not suffice to be moved by one film or talk and then never hear of the issue again. Within the SDM I discerned immensely robust forms of integrating the care for distant others into the everyday lives not only of activists but also of SDM supporters. I contend that a critical factor in this accomplishment was the SDM's faith-based roots, particularly its ability to make Darfur an issue in local churches.

According to my churchgoing informants, in some congregations the issue of Darfur was often raised in church services and other church gatherings, information was regularly distributed and displayed in church spaces, and church rooms were used for organizing campaigns and demonstrations. In other words, in the Washington D.C. area, the social and physical infrastructure of particular churches and church networks were routinely accessed by the SDM. Beyond providing critical resources for the movement, however, I contend that the incorporation of churches into the SDM enabled the possibility of constantly reminding churchgoers of events unfolding in Darfur and providing information with regard to what could be done about the suffering there.

Finally, and also related to the SDM's faith-based character, was the widespread practice of prayer within the movement. Within SDM discourse repeated references to prayer are made across all faith groups as a way to care for those suffering in Darfur. As a participant observer, I witnessed and took part in numerous events in which prayer was incorporated. When I asked one young co-activist, Gary, about the meaning of prayer for

him, he responded "By praying for Darfurians everyday I ensure myself that I don't forget, and I remind myself to stay active." Such a sentiment was echoed by several of my informants. Regardless here of one's belief in the causal efficacy of prayer, I contend that the practice of prayer in many ways offers a unique ritual of care in which, as Gary explains, one is forced to remember and stay committed to the suffering of the distant other.[6] In this sense, it must be recognized that the faith-based character of the SDM offers a very different form of engagement to that offered by, for example, large secular human rights organizations, where members are often only asked to send money, upon which the distant stranger quickly disappears from memory. (see for example, Desforges, 2004).[7]

Conclusion

The fundamental conclusion of this article is that any movement that cares over distance for life persecuted by sovereign power must attempt not only to address the challenge of "guiding" sovereign power to protect but also to constantly bear in mind the need to keep this power in check in order to hinder its capacity to condemn. I have suggested that this is best achieved through an ethics of care that personalizes the humanity of those being persecuted and establishes a solidarity grounded in a common struggle against the inherent power over life that sovereign power in general maintains. Such a solidarity is essentially grounded on an alternative valuation of life to that

[6] An argument can even be made that the act of prayer itself is, in a way, engaging in a valuation of life that fundamentally circumvents and ultimately defies the earthly sovereign's power over life, which, in the end, can never grasp the victims in Darfur as anything other than merely abandoned, bare life.

[7] In this sense, the Save Darfur Movement has been compared to the Anti-Apartheid movement, which was also largely driven by church groups.

provided by the sovereign. It is a valuation that recognizes every human being as a "form of life", a self-grounded potentiality, yet one that is secured through an intersubjective solidarity against any power seeking to violate this valuation.

In this way, the *Muselmann*, the human who is presented as devoid of dignity, must therefore be embraced as fully and actually essentially human. Our reaction to the sovereign's persecution of life, its attempt to juxtapose *zoe* and *bios* in the creation or maintenance of the abject camp dweller, must be met with an appropriate response. Such a response must avoid the tendency to cry out, "oh, the danger and abjection of sovereign abandonment" and rather must declare, in unison, "how dare the sovereign treat *us* this way". In this manner we can attempt to actively circumvent the sovereign by, using the words of a flyer from the SDM, creating a "network of communities of compassion" driven by the conviction in the "power of communities to transform tragedy into hope" (Dear Sudan, 2006). This is ultimately a call to a continuous pastoral care where we are all shepherds for each other. In this way the creation of communities of solidarity, which manage to establish a real alternative to the sovereign's framework for the ascription of value onto life, is not just a means to bring about caring for distant others, it is the ultimate goal of ethics itself. It is in truly being with others, even, and perhaps especially, over distance, that sovereign transgressions become, in a sense, unthinkable, not necessarily in a literal way but in a way that the sovereign is constantly denied its capacity to ban life – regardless of whose life it is or where it resides.

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APPENDIX D

Questions to guide the discourse analysis (based on Fairclough 2003)

Representation of place

1) How abstractly or concretely are specific places depicted?

2) What is emphasized and what is excluded?

3) What are the existential and propositional assumptions that underlie these depictions?

4) What attributes are assigned in characterizing these places

5) What is the nature of agency within the processes taking place in these places (active vs. passive)?

6) What kind of statements are used – facts, predictions, hypotheticals?

7) What are the basic semantic relations between sentences and clauses – for example, is the causality employed that of giving a reason, a consequence, or a purpose?

8) Is there a higher level semantic relation at work throughout the text, for example a problem-solution framework?

9) To what extent is there a truly explanatory logic at work as opposed to a simple logic of appearance?

10) In what way are actors grammatically positioned as active or passive?

11) How are actors positioned in terms of their relations to other actors (pronominal determinations) and groups – particularly in-groups and out-groups.

12) What qualities are attributed to the actors and how is this done?

13) How is time and space expressed in the text, either directly or through grammatical constructions, and what does this tell us about the perceived relation between past, present and future; the interaction of spaces and scales; and the relation between the temporal and spatial?

14) What is the intertextuality of the text? In other words, to what extent are the statements and views of non-authorial "voices" brought into the text?

15) How are these voices used and related to the authorial voice?

16) Which voices are significantly excluded?

Representation of ethical commitment

1) What is the general modality of the text, or in other words, what does the text commit itself to? More particularly, to what obligations and necessities (deontic modalities) is the text committed?

2) To what extent are these commitments categorical, such as through assertions or denials, and to what extent are they modalized.

3) What values are perpetrated in terms of desirability and undesirability?
What language is used to present these values and what assumptions underlie these positions?

4) What is the general orientation to difference in the text? In other words, how are voices that represent different meaning systems and norms dealt with?

5) By looking at the grammar, semantic structure, and vocabulary of the text, is there an acceptance of difference, a suppression of difference, a dialogue with difference, an accentuation and battle with difference, or a focus on commonality (equivalence)?

6) How does the text function as a form of legitimating and what is being legitimated?

7) How is legitimating achieved – through reliance on authority and law (authorization), a given knowledge system (rationalization), narratives (mythopoesis)?

8) What are the predominant values that are inherent in the chosen form of legitimizing?